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I. INTRODUCTION
In late 1994 and early 1995, the "Republican [R]evolution" 2 swept
through Washington, D.C. and Capitol Hill following the historic 1994
2. See Michael Weisskopf & David Maraniss, Forging an Alliance for Deregulation:
Rep. DeLay Makes Companies Full Partners in the Movement, WASH. POST, Mar.
12, 1995, at Al, A8 ("During [DeLay's] rise to power in Congress, he had be-
friended many industry lobbyists who shared his fervor. Some of them were
gathered in his office that January [1995] morning at the dawn of the Republican
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mid-term election. 3 This election sweep shifted control of the Con-
gress from the Democrats to the Republicans for the first time in forty
years. 4 The still-faintly-echoing mantra that reverberated in the halls
of the Capitol as those newly elected congresspersons took their revo-
lutionary seats was that of "deregulation."5 As a cornerstone of its
1995 agenda for change, the "Revolution Congress"6 made deregula-
tion, particularly deregulation of corporate America, one of its primary
objectives. 7 Indeed the Revolution Congress's leadership felt that the
nearly sixty years of "big government" reign, namely federal regula-
revolution, energized by a sense that their time was finally at hand." (emphasis
added)).
3. See Richard Whitt, Conservative Agenda Will Help America Succeed .... AT-
LANTA J. CONST., Nov. 18, 1994, at A6 ("Riding the crest of a political tidal wave
that carried Republicans to a sweep of Congress last week, U.S. Rep. Newt Ging-
rich returned home today seeking support from students and business leaders for
his conservative agenda. Calling the Republican landslide potentially the most
decisive election since the 1932 victory of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Gingrich said
the nation must move in a new, conservative direction if it is to survive.").
4. See Rhodes Cook, Do the Math, and the Result Is: Not Much of a Contest, WASH.
POST, Oct. 6, 2002, at B3 ("The 1994 election continued this trend, producing the
Republican Revolution that ended 40 years of Democratic control of the House
and the Senate."); see also infra note 12.
5. See Richard A. Gephardt, Drive to Deregulate: GOP Congress Paved the Way for
Enron and Other Corporate Misdeeds, SPECIAL REPORT (Democratic Policy
Comm.), July 11, 2002, at 1 ("The GOP 'Contract' contained a lot of language
about accountability and responsibility, when it came to government and welfare
mothers. However, it created a double standard coddling corporations.... At the
time [of the Republican election rout of 1994], the press reported widely on the
coming wave of massive deregulation led by House Republicans . . . ."). The
Washington Post reported that following the "Revolution" victory by Republicans,
the GOP was planning a "systematic assault on regulation." Opinion Editorial,
Regulating Regulation, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 1995, at A18 ("House Republicans
want to impose a six-month freeze or moratorium on federal regulatory activity.
The administration is right to call the proposal a clumsy device that would itself
create precisely the kind of 'administrative nightmare' that its authors claim to
deplore.").
6. The term "Revolution Congress" will refer to the 1995 and 1996 sessions of Con-
gress (104th Congress), commonly referred to as the Republican Revolution of
1994. See supra note 2. "Revolution Congress" and "104th Congress" will be used
interchangeably throughout this Article.
7. See David Warner, Putting the Brakes on Federal Rules, NATION'S Bus., Mar.
1995, at 42 ("Rolling back regulations and heading off potential over-regulation
are top priorities in both houses of the 104th Congress."); see also Gephardt,
supra note 5, at 1 ("Gingrich called 'regulation ... one of the five great enemies
that killed the entrepreneurial spirit.'") (quoting Newt Gingrich). Aiding
Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich in the Revolution Congress's drive to der-
egulate, Congressman Tom DeLay was equally enthusiastic as the majority whip.
DeLay led the stampede to free corporations from virtually all regulations. See
Weisskopf & Maraniss, supra note 2, at Al. Representative DeLay was so anx-
ious that "[hie could not wait to start on what he considered the central mission of
his political career: the demise of the modern era of government regulation." Id.
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tion, as initiated by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt,8 and but-
tressed by the United States Supreme Court since 1937,9 had finally
8. See andrd douglas pond cummings, The Integration Conundrum: Debilitating
Failures of the Securities and Exchange Commission Must Be Addressed as U.S.
Corporate Malfeasance Is "Getting Serious, So Serious," 48 WAYNE L. REV. 1305,
1337-39 (2003) (describing the initiation of the Securities Act of 1933 by Presi-
dent Roosevelt and the Congress as a means to federally regulate the U.S. capital
markets following the market collapse of 1929 that led to the Great Depression);
see also infra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
In 1933, when Franklin Delano Roosevelt was sworn in as President of the
United States, he proposed and Congress enacted into law a series of statutes
designed to cure the ongoing economic crisis that had plagued the country since
the stock market crash in 1929. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw 166-67 (2001). The goal was to stabilize the economy and ensure that a
severe crisis never again would occur. See id. at 166. This legislation was known
as the New Deal and was unprecedented due both to its size and the swiftness
with which it was passed. Id. A great portion of the New Deal legislation regu-
lated what citizens, and the federal courts, had previously regarded as private
property rights and rights comfortably within the domain of the states. See id. at
167.
9. See STONE ET AL., supra note 8, at 167. The first federal court challenges to the
constitutionality of the New Deal started in 1934. See id. The U.S. Supreme
Court's initial signals were unclear and mixed. However, in Railroad Retirement
Board v. Alton Railroad Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935), the Supreme Court struck
down the constitutionality of the Railroad Retirement Act of 1934. See STONE ET
AL., supra note 8, at 167. Justice Owen Roberts wrote the 5-4 majority opinion
and held that, although Congress had the power to regulate the safety of the
railroads, it did not have the power to establish an obligatory retirement and
pension plan. Id. Only three weeks later in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), the Supreme Court struck down the constitu-
tionality of the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, which was arguably the
cornerstone of the New Deal. STONE ET AL., supra note 8, at 167-69. In the after-
math of Schechter, Congress passed the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of
1935. However, this statute was struck down by the Supreme Court in Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). STONE ET AL., supra note 8, at 169-73.
In response to these Supreme Court decisions countering his New Deal legis-
lation and his attempt to institute sweeping federal regulation, President
Roosevelt proposed changes to the structure of the Supreme Court. See id. at
174-75. In 1936, aware of the fact that six Supreme Court justices were over
seventy years old, President Roosevelt proposed that for each justice over the age
of seventy who did not resign or retire, an additional justice would be added to
the Court, totaling fifteen justices if no one left the bench. Id. at 175. President
Roosevelt wanted to increase the number ofjustices who would find his New Deal
legislation constitutional. The proposal encountered much opposition and was
attacked as contrary to the U.S. Constitution, even though the Constitution does
not mandate the number ofjustices that must sit on the high Court. During this
debate over President Roosevelt's "court packing" proposal, Justice Willis Van
Devanter retired. Id. In addition, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a
state minimum wage statute in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937). See STONE ET AL., supra note 8, at 175. Most notably, Justice Owen J.
Roberts, who had voted with the five-person majority block on the previous issues
blocking federal regulatory plans, changed his position and voted to uphold the
federal regulation. Id. Justice Roberts' change in position has henceforth been
known as "the switch in time that saved Nine," because his new position saved
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run its course and the time for complete regulatory rollback and rever-
sal had arrived.' 0 Many of the Revolution Congress's leaders believed
that extensive federal regulation-of all industries-was an evil that
necessarily had to be eradicated."
the Court's nine-member composition. Id. Following the Court's rulings in West
Coast Hotel and NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), the
Senate Judiciary Committee rejected President Roosevelt's "court packing" pro-
posal, because the Supreme Court had signaled approval of the federal regula-
tions that the New Deal offered and would continue to do so, broadening the
scope of Congressional Commerce Clause power. Not until 1995, in the Supreme
Court decision of United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), did the now-more-
conservative Supreme Court begin decreasing the scope of the federal govern-
ment's Commerce Clause power and limiting broad federal regulatory powers.
See STONE ET AL., supra note 8, 175, 186-97, 199-203.
10. See David M. Shribman, After Half a Century, the Roosevelt Era Falls to the Re-
publican Revolution, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 1, 1995, at A33. In late 1995 Shribman
reported that:
Next week some of the grandees of the capital will gather under the
glittering lights of the Sheraton Carlton ballroom. The occasion is a din-
ner celebrating the "Life, Times and Memorial of President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt." The guest of honor is House Speaker Newt Gingrich.
Politics has its own special dialects, and one of them is irony. And in
the last few weeks it has become evident that Speaker Gingrich and the
foot soldiers in his Republican Revolution have come to Washington not
to praise Franklin Roosevelt but to bury him.
Id. Representative DeLay was so eager to begin his deregulatory crusade that
"[e]ven before the new Congress convened ... [he] assembl[ed] a coalition called
'Project Relief.' The Project brought together more than 100 groups (and their
lobbyists) behind a very narrow cause: stopping federal regulations of business."
Gareth Cook, Laws for Sale: Republicans in Congress Let Lobbyists Write Laws,
WASH. MONTHLY, July 1995, at 44. "The honor of serving on Project Relief-and
helping to draft the legislation-did not come cheaply, according to a painstaking
study of Federal Election Commission (FEC) records by the Washington, D.C.-
based Environmental Working Group." Id.
DeLay's "eagerness" has resurfaced in recent months as the House of Repre-
sentatives Ethics Committee formally rebuked the Texas Congressperson three
times "for conduct that suggested political donations might influence legislative
action." Charles Babington, DeLay Draws Third Rebuke: Ethics Panel Cites Two
Situations, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 2004, at Al. "The... rebuke marked the second
time in six days-and the third time overall-that the ethics panel has admon-
ished [DeLay] .... The back-to-back chastisements are highly unusual for any
lawmaker, let alone one who aspires to be speaker .... " Id. One of the admon-
ishments handed down by the House Ethics Committee "stemmed from a fund-
raiser DeLay hosted for energy company officials while Congress was considering
major energy legislation." Ted Barrett, House Ethics Committee Admonishes De-
Lay Again, CNN.coM, Oct. 7, 2004, at http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/
10/07/delay.ethics/index.html.
11. See Timothy Noah, GOP's Rep. DeLay Is Working in Every Corner To Exterminate
Regulations that Bug Business, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 1995, at A16 ("Rep. Tom
DeLay once made his living killing roaches. Now he kills regulations."). Noah
stated that when Representative DeLay, the outspoken leader of the Revolution
Congress's effort to effectively rid Washington, D.C. of federal regulation, was
asked if there was any existing regulation that DeLay would allow to remain in
2005]
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A. Deregulation and Reform Hysteria
Congress began its 104th session with an extremely aggressive
agenda of "reform," and deregulation styled the "Contract with
America." 12 The Revolution Congress first set its deregulatory sights
on the securities markets;13 second, on the telecommunications indus-
place, "he becomes uncharacteristically hesitant. 'Not that I can think of,' he fi-
nally says." Id. In August 1995, Business Week reported:
The GOP rout of Congress opened hunting season on regulators ...
Representative Tom DeLay (R-Tex.) compared the EPA to the Gestapo.
Days later, Representative David M.. McIntosh (R-Ind.) suggested that
FDA Commissioner David A. Kessler was killing women. How? McIn-
tosh claimed FDA's ban on some breast implants may be scaring women
away from having mammograms.
Harsh words-backed by harsh deeds.
John Carey et al., The Regulators Rein Themselves In, Bus. WK., Aug. 21, 1995,
at 61.
12. ED GILLESPIE & BOB SCHELLHAS, CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE BOLD PLAN BY
REP. NEWT GINGRICH, REP. DICK ARMEY AND THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS To CHANGE
THE NATION 3-4 (1994). As described in Contract with America:
Election Day, November 8, 1994, was a turning point. America's vot-
ers dismantled the forty-year lock the Democrats had on Congress, giv-
ing Republicans control of the U.S. Senate and the House of
Representatives. For the first time in more than 130 years, a sitting
Speaker of the House was defeated for reelection. And despite their abil-
ity to wield influence inside the Washington Beltway, two of the most
powerful committee chairmen in the House were dethroned by the voters
back home.
Nothing written before or after the election better defines the differ-
ence between the two parties than the document you now hold in your
hands-the Contract with America. Rarely has such a meaningful man-
date for change been delivered by voters. That mandate is articulated in
the common-sense agenda of the Contract, the essence of which was
presented by Republican candidates six weeks before voters went to the
polls and has been much discussed ever since. For the first time in mem-
ory, American citizens have a document they can refer to as a means of
holding Congress accountable. Returning accountability, and the faith
and trust that come with it, was the very reason for creating this
Contract.
Id. at 3-4; see also Katharine Q. Seelye, Republicans Plan Ambitious Agenda in
Next Congress, N.Y. TimEs, Nov. 15, 1994, at Al ("As it rolled out its 'new order'
for Congress and the nation, the incoming House Republican leadership an-
nounced today that it would force Congress to work 20 hours a day, seven days a
week.., to push through Newt Gingrich's 'Contract With America' in 100 days.").
13. See infra sections II.A-E; see also William S. Lerach, Plundering America: How
American Investors Got Taken for Trillions by Corporate Insiders: The Rise of the
New Corporate Kleptocracy, 8 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 69, 76-77 (2002). Lerach, a
preeminent plaintiffs' securities fraud class-action attorney, has written passion-
ately about the frontal assault the Revolution Congress initiated against federal
regulation of the U.S. securities markets:
The Republican sweep in 1994 produced the first Republican majorities
in both houses of Congress in decades. Republicans-who had years ear-
lier vigorously resisted Roosevelt's efforts to regulate the securities mar-
kets, public companies, and the accounting industry-now moved
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try; 14 third, on hard-won environmental protections; and fourth, on
the energy industry,15 establishing each as a primary target at which
it would aim its early deregulatory firepower.16 The 104th Congress
was gaveled into session with delight17 by Speaker Gingrich, as the
Revolution Congress was certain it had received a mid-term election
mandate to end Washington's "business as usual"-and then set about
to "transform" and deregulate the federal government.'
8
quickly to cut back the protections provided to investors by the federal
securities laws. Specifically, they sought to curtail securities class action
suits by investors that had proved so effective at exposing corporate
fraud and holding perpetrators accountable. Sensing their first opportu-
nity in decades to roll back the federal securities laws, the corporate in-
terests, accounting oligopoly, Wall Street bankers and their big law
firms descended on Congress with a massive lobbying and public-rela-
tions campaign seeking enactment of what came to be known as the Pri-
vate Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ....
Id. at 76; see also Face Value: In Praise of Trial Lawyers, ECONOMIST, July 12,
2003, at 60 (noting that supporters of William Lerach "champion him as
America's best hope for corporate reform"). In describing Lerach as the preemi-
nent shareholder lawsuit attorney, The Economist reports:
At first, the institutions ignored him. But once the stockmarket bub-
ble had burst, they found Mr. Lerach's theories of fraud-meticulously
detailed schemes of personal enrichment that had the boss talking up
the share price, cashing in his stock options, then letting the whole arti-
fice collapse with a profit warning or a big write-off-suddenly, and
shockingly, credible.
Id.
14. See infra section III.A.
15. See infra section III.B.
16. See Gephardt, supra note 5, at 2-4.
17. See Richard S. Dunham & Mary Beth Regan, Let the Wild Rumpus Start!, Bus.
WK., Jan. 16, 1995, at 28 ("On Jan. 4, when Speaker Newt Gingrich gaveled the
first Republican-controlled House of Representatives in 40 years to order, he
ushered in a new era for American business.... Executives of companies big and
small are chanting the same mantra: Slash spending, cut taxes, eviscerate gov-
ernment regulation."); see also Cook, supra note 10, at 44 ("Washington state's
Republican Senator Slade Gorton was as eager as a six-year-old with a brand-
new toy."); Kenneth Cooper & Helen Dewar, For Most Republicans on Hill, Last
Week Was Like No Other, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 1994, at A8 ("Something that
hasn't happened in about 40 years happened last week on Capitol Hill: House
Republicans talked and everyone listened."); Richard Dunham, The House En-
forcer Isn't Blinking, Bus. WK., Oct. 2, 1995, at 73 ("House Majority Whip Tom
DeLay is a happy warrior. As chief vote-counter and head-knocker for the GOP
revolution, the Texas Republican spends each day leading his troops into battle to
claim what he calls 'the fruits of our victory.'"); supra note 10.
18. See Seelye, supra note 12, at Al ("Flush with their new-found gains, which give
them control of the House for the first time in four decades, the Republicans re-
jected the word 'transition' as too narrow for the scope of their endeavor ... call-
ing it instead a 'transformation.' Transition would be when you trade keys-you
give me your keys, I'll give you my keys,' said Representative Jim Nussle, Repub-
lican of Iowa, who was named chairman of the changeover. 'Transformation is
really a redesign and renewal of the administrative and legislative processes.'");
see also Stan Crock & John Carey, A GOP Jihad Against Red Tape, Bus. WK.,
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Early Revolution Congress's deregulatory and reform efforts laser-
focused on the federal securities laws that, after intense lobbying, in-
fighting, hand wringing, and doom-saying,' 9 led to the passage of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA").20 In an
effort to relieve the securities markets of burdensome federal govern-
ment oversight, a bipartisan Congress easily passed the PSLRA and
handily overrode a President Bill Clinton veto.2 1 The PSLRA dramat-
ically changed the landscape of federal securities law regulation by
amending the Securities Act of 1933 ("1933 Securities Act")22 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("1934 Securities Exchange Act")2 3 to
essentially, as many argue, "shield corporations and accountants from
shareholder lawsuits."24 But the PSLRA did far more (or worse) than
shield corporations and corporate insiders from shareholder lawsuits,
as detailed infra.25
Following the immense reform "victory" of the PSLRA, the Revolu-
tion Congress immediately turned its attention to the telecommunica-
tions industry as its next deregulation target. 2 6 This deregulatory
Nov. 28, 1994, at 48 ("In early November [1994] the Clinton Administration's reg-
ulatory juggernaut-from trustbusters to drinking-water overseers-was run-
ning full tilt. But the Republicans' stunning election victory may soon produce
something far different: a GOP jihad against federal red tape."); supra note 17.
19. See infra notes 115-24 and accompanying text.
20. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat.
737.
21. See 141 CONG. REC. 38,354 (1995); see also infra notes 119-20 and 123-24.
22. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbb (2000).
23. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78l11 (2000).
24. See Gephardt, supra note 5, at 5.
25. See infra section II.D.
26. See Jeanne Cummings et al., Securities Threat: Bush Crackdown on Business
Fraud Signals New Era, WALL ST. J., July 10, 2002, at Al ("[Tihe most notorious
[fraud-plagued corporations] have exploded in sectors deregulated in the 1990s:
Enron Corp. and its competitors in electricity and energy trading and WorldCom
Inc., Global Crossing Ltd., and Qwest Communications International Inc. in tele-
communications."). In truth, "commentators are pointing out that the major cor-
porate scandals being played out currently are in industries that were
deregulated by Congress in recent years, such as telecommunications
(WorldCom) and energy (Enron)." cummings, supra note 8, at 1372 n.324. "The
depth of the scandals in companies whose industries were deregulated in the
1990s continues to amaze." Id. The Wall Street Journal further reports that
when President George W. Bush gave a "tongue-lashing" to malfeasant big busi-
ness executives as he prepared to sign the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, these executives
were in fact the same big business executives that he had wooed prior to his 2000
election with promises of an administration that would scale back federal inter-
ference in their affairs. See Cummings et al., supra, at Al.
Perhaps President Bush should direct the "tongue-lashing" to those in his own
Administration as well. In a bewildering revelation, Republican-appointed Pen-
tagon officials recently began developing and implementing a futures market
scheme involving the investment of money in "terrorism and assassination" con-
tingencies. See Paul Courson & Steve Turnham, Amid Furor, Pentagon Kills Ter-
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attention evolved into the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("Telecom-
munications Act").27 Passed with wide support and signed into law by
a clearly supportive President Clinton, the Telecommunications Act
dramatically altered the landscape of federal telecom regulation by
overhauling the Telecommunications Act of 1934,28 amending federal
law essentially to rewrite longstanding federal laws affecting cable tel-
evision, telecommunications, and the Internet. "The Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996 is the first major overhaul of telecommunications law
in almost 62 years. The goal of this new law is to let anyone enter any
communications business-to let any communications business com-
pete in any market against any other."29 The Telecommunications
Act deregulated five major industry categories: radio and television
broadcasting, cable television, telephone services, internet and on-line
computer service, and telecom equipment manufacturing. 30 But, the
rorism Futures Market, CNN.coM, July 30, 2003 ("Facing an outcry on Capitol
Hill, the Pentagon on Tuesday [July 29, 20031 killed a program that would have
had investors betting on the likelihood of terrorist attacks and assassinations."),
at http'/www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/07/29/terror.market/index.html. The
AP reported that:
[t]he little-publicized Pentagon plan envisioned a potential futures trad-
ing market in which speculators would wager on the Internet on the like-
lihood of a future terrorist attack or assassination attempt on a
particular leader. A Web site promoting the plan already is available.
When the plan was disclosed by two Democratic senators Monday, the
Pentagon defended it as a way to gain intelligence about potential ter-
rorists' plans. Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton said she was appalled to
hear of plans to set up "a futures market in death." Other Democrats
expressed similar alarm. "The idea of a federal betting parlor on atroci-
ties and terrorism is ridiculous and it's grotesque," said Sen. Ron Wyden
one of two lawmakers who disclosed the plan Monday.
Plan for Terror Market Canceled, CNN.coM, July 29, 2003, at http://www.cnn.
com/2003/US/07/29/terrorist.market.ap/index.html.
The Pentagon will abandon a plan to establish a futures market to help
predict terrorist strikes, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services
Committee said Tuesday [July 29, 2003]. Sen. John Warner said he
spoke by phone with the program's director, "and we mutually agreed
that this thing should be stopped."
Id.
27. See 47 U.S.C. § 153 (2000).
28. Telecommunications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064.
29. See FED. COMMUNICATIONS COMM'N, TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996, at http:l
www.fcc.gov/telecom.html (last modified Mar. 29, 2004). "The Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996 has the potential to change the way we work, live and learn. It
will affect telephone service-local and long distance, cable programming and
other video services, broadcast services and services provided to schools." Id.
30. Fritz J. Messere, U.S. Policy: Telecommunications Act of 1996, at http://www.mu-
seum.tv/archives/etvU/htmlU/uspolicyt/uspolicyt.htm (last visited Aug. 29,
2003).
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Telecommunications Act did far more (or worse) than attempt to stim-
ulate competition in the telecommunications market.31
After the massive deregulatory and reform "victories" of the
PSLRA and the Telecommunications Act, the Revolution Congress
took aim at the electricity, energy, and derivatives trading industries
in its effort to continue to roll back federal regulation.32 Motivated by
recent successes in the securities and telecom industries, Congress
continued its aggressive efforts to privatize and remove federal over-
sight from other highly regulated fields.33 Such aggressive efforts
eventually led to the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000
("CFMA").34 The CFMA dramatically distorted the energy derivatives
trading landscape by refusing the opportunity to regulate energy de-
rivatives trading leading to unregulated energy derivatives trading in
wildly fraudulent and dishonest ways. 35 The CFMA did far more (or
worse) than fail to regulate the energy derivatives trading market,
bowing to intense lobbying from the likes of Enron and El Paso.
36
The success of the Revolution Congress in discarding or eliminat-
ing significant segments of federal regulation from crucial industries
was accompanied simultaneously by a wild bull market that saw the
U.S. market indicators soar to record heights never before attained.
3 7
31. See andr6 douglas pond cummings, How the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and
Other 1990's Deregulation Facilitated the Market Crash of 2002: Still "Ain't No
Glory in Pain" (May 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author and
available in the Schmid Law Library at the University of Nebraska College of
Law). Careful analysis of the Telecommunications Act is beyond the scope of this
Article.
32. See Cummings et al., supra note 26.
33. See Crock & Carey, supra note 18 (detailing the agencies that faced immense
regulatory rollbacks at the hands of the Revolution Congress including the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA"), the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"), the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC") and the Occupational Safety & Health Administration
("OSHA"), amongst dozens of other agencies and industries).
34. See Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 1(a)(5), 114 Stat 2763, 2763 (2000).
35. See id.
36. See cummings, supra note 31. Careful examination of the CFMA is beyond the
scope of this Article.
37. See Peter Grant & Esther Gross, Dow Shoots to a Record High, DAILY NEWS, Nov.
24, 1998, at 3 ("The stock market soared into record territory yesterday in a bull
stampede that trampled fears the U.S. economy may be heading for a slow-
down."); see also Investor Optimism Has Stocks Soaring, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 24,
1998, at B1 ("Holiday cheer swept over Wall Street on Wednesday.... Looking
forward, solid investor optimism and an absence of negative news promised to
ring out the old year on a high note."); Swing Low, Swing High: Dow, Nasdaq
Have Record Days, After a Troubled Week, ABCNEws.coM, Jan. 7, 2000 (available
in the Schmid Law Library at the University of Nebraska College of Law) ("The
Dow Jones Industrials soared into record territory today after investors brushed
off signs of inflationary pressure and a profit warning from Lucent and sent stock
sharply higher. The Nasdaq composite, which tumbled earlier this week, re-
corded its best day in history. According to preliminary calculations, the Dow
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The late 1990s and early part of 2000 saw unabashed speculation that
the U.S. capital markets could potentially continue the meteoric climb
that had become almost expected by U.S. investors.38 Notwithstand-
ing such exuberance, the U.S. capital markets collapsed in 2002.39
Not since Black Tuesday and the stock market crash of 1929 had the
U.S. capital markets faltered so astonishingly.40
B. Market Collapse
The Great Depression, one of the bleakest economic periods in U.S.
history, was precipitated by Black Tuesday4 ' and the U.S. stock mar-
Jones industrial average rose 269.30 to close at 11,522.56 topping its Dec. 31
closing record of 11,497.12."); Wall St. Romps in Record Day, NEWSDAY, Dec. 24,
1998, at A56 ("The Standard & Poor's 500 ... clos[ed] at a record high for the
third day in a row, while the technology-rich NASDAQ composite index soared
... to a record.., easily passing Monday's high.").
38. See Tom Walker, Market's Two-Year Washout Teaches Myriad Lessons, ATLANTA
J. CONST., Mar. 17, 2002, at 1G ("Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan's
1996 observation that stock market 'exuberance' might be 'irrational' was a warn-
ing. Two years ago this month Wall Street learned how right he was. March
2000 marked the end of the strongest, longest bull market in U.S. history. Just
how far the market would fall came as a surprise."); see also Sandra Guy, Analy-
sis Finds Flaws in Retail Industry, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Jan. 10, 2003, at 46 ("The
slowdown cannot be blamed solely on the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks ....
The irrational exuberance of stock market investors during the late 1990s drove
exaggerated retail growth . . ").
39. See infra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
41. See T.H. WATKINS, THE HUNGRY YEARS: A NARRATIVE HISTORY OF THE GREAT
DEPRESSION IN AMERICA 32 (1999). Describing "Black Tuesday," October 29,
1929, Watkins writes:
Selling began in earnest at 10:00 A.M. on Monday and continued on into
the next day-"Black Tuesday," October 29. No one had ever witnessed
anything like this day of trading. People began to collect under the big
brooding statue of Alexander Hamilton in front of the Exchange building
as word of what was happening on the Exchange floor drifted like rancid
wood smoke through downtown New York. Soon there were ten thou-
sand people in the narrow street. Some took to religion, wandering to sit
numbly in the pews of nearby Trinity Church. There was reason enough
for prayer. Inside the Exchange, brokers stood on the floor gape-
mouthed and weeping while the losses mounted in a frenzy of sales that
by closing had surpassed 16.4 million shares. The Times industrials had
sunk 43 points, obliterating every gain made since the Bull Market of
1929 had begun. Most of the 751 fabulous trusts that had been created
since 1927 were ruined, and with them hundreds of thousands of
investors.
More than $10 billion in market value-about $95 billion in today's
[1999] money-had vanished in a mere five hours of trading. The full
scope of the catastrophe would not be known until the following morn-
ing, when all the tallies were done, but only fools pretended the wounds
were not mortal.
Id. at 32-33.
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ket crash of 1929.42 During that stock market collapse, the Dow Jones
Industrial Average dropped 340 points and lost eighty-nine percent of
its value. 43 Thousands of U.S. investors lost millions of dollars4 4 as
subsequent congressional panels uncovered the fraudulent activity of
corporations, underwriters, and executives as the primary cause of the
false valuation of collapsing companies, into which investors had
poured (and lost) their life savings. 45
The stock market collapse of 2001-02 has become, some argue, an
equally spectacular failure as Black Tuesday and the market crash of
1929.46 One commentator urged the adoption of the moniker "Crash
of 2002."47 "Ten trading days, 1,360 points off the Dow. Let's start
calling the 'sell off what it is. Let's call it a panic. Let's call it a crash.
Indeed, after rallying following Sept. 11, the markets topped out in
March [2002], and have been careening downward... ."48 During the
stock market crash of 2001 and 2002, the Dow Jones Industrial Aver-
age dropped approximately 4,550 points from a January 2000 all time
42. See KENNETH S. DAviS, FDR: THE NEW DEAL YEARS 1933-1937: A HISTORY 12
(1986) ("For it was in America, after all, that the worldwide Great Depression
had been signaled and triggered by the stock market crash of '29, itself a mani-
festation of breakdown in the American mind and character. Everywhere one
looked, here in America, was apparent confirmation of the view that capitalism
had so totally failed it could never be revived and that the American democracy
was going down with it."); see also cummings, supra note 8, at 1332-33 ("[P]rior
to the market collapse preceding the Depression, few federal safeguards were in
place and available to investors when they were approached with an opportunity
to invest in the stock of emerging companies in the early twentieth century. This
lack of regulatory safeguards proved to be disastrous as scores of the U.S. invest-
ing public lost fortunes during the Great Depression.").
43. See Lerach, supra note 13, at 71 ("But the 1920s bubble burst in late October,
1929. By mid-November, 1929, the Dow plunged to 198 from its September, 1929
high of 381. By July, 1932, the Dow hit forty-one, down 89%. It would not sur-
pass its 1929 high for twenty-five years."). In fact, "[b]etween September 1, 1929
and July 1, 1932, the aggregate market value of all stocks listed on the New York
Stock Exchange ... had declined from an all-time high of close to $90 billion to
less than $16 billion . . . ." CHARLES J. JOHNSON, JR., & JOSEPH MCLAUGHLIN,
CORPORATE FINANCE AND SECURITIES LAw 1 (1997).
44. See cummings, supra note 8, at 1332 nn.72-74.
45. See id. at 1332 n.72 ("The floatation of such a mass of essentially fraudulent se-
curities was made possible because of the complete abandonment by many under-
writers and dealers in securities of those standards of fair, honest, and prudent
dealing that should be basic to the encouragement of investment in any enter-
prise."); see also Lerach, supra note 13, at 75 ("In the wake of the 1929 Crash,
Congress's Pecorra hearings exposed the rawest kind of self-dealing, abuse and
fraud by corporate insiders, Wall Street bankers (coining the term 'banksters'),
and the accounting firms during the 1920s.").
46. See Justin Lahart, The Crash of 2002, CNNMONEY.COM, July 22, 2002, at httpJ/
money.cnn.com/2002/07/19/news/crash2002. See also cummings, supra note 8, at
1306-12.
47. See Lahart, supra note 46.
48. Id.
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high of 11,750 to an October 2002 low of 7,197,49 and the U.S. capital
markets lost $7.7 trillion in U.S. market capitalization value.
50 Mil-
lions of U.S. investors lost billions of dollars5 ' as, once again, subse-
quent congressional panels, governmental agencies, and state
attorneys general determined that malfeasant activity of corporations
and executives was the primary cause of the collapsing companies,
52
into which investors had poured (and lost) their life savings.
53
49. Telephone Interview with Brent Highberger, Vice President, Senior Financial
Advisor, Merrill Lynch (Oct. 8, 2003).
50. Lahart, supra note 46 ("The Dow is down 25 percent since then; the S&P 500 is
down 27 percent, and the Nasdaq is down 32 percent. And the continuation of
selling on Monday, following the seventh worst point-loss in Dow history, is doing
little to reassure investors that the worst is over. People worry that, with $7.7
trillion knocked off U.S. market capitalization since March 2000 ($750 billion in
the past week alone!), the selling will bleed into the economy, not just snuffing
the recovery but sending the country into a deflationary episode like the one Ja-
pan labors under. Or like the United States strained under in the 1930s.").
51. See id.
52. See cummings, supra note 8, at 1368 n.314, 1371 n.320, 1372 n.323 (detailing the
various charges being levied against criminal corporate executives by the SEC
and various state attorneys general). Unquestionably, the tragic events of Sep-
tember 11, 2001 ("9/11") had a crippling, albeit temporary, impact on the U.S.
capital markets. See E.S. Browning, Stock Prices Gain, Reaching Levels Unseen
Since 9111, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2004, at Al ("Stocks soared to levels that ha-
ven't been seen since before the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks."). The markets
had recovered significantly by early 2002, when news of corporate scandals began
to hit investors at a dizzying pace, leading to one of the largest selloffs in modern
history. See id. ("'After that whole process with 9/11 and then the corporate scan-
dals that followed, companies tightened their belts,' said Todd Leone, head of
listed stock trading at brokerage firm SG Cowen in New York. 'Today, they are a
lot leaner, productivity is a lot better. Companies are doing better with fewer
people.'").
53. See Kirstin Downey, Restitution Sought from Enron Officials, WASH. POST, June
27, 2003, at El ("Former Enron Corp. executives, including chairman Kenneth L.
Lay, chief executive Jeffrey K. Skilling and the company's directors, failed to pro-
tect 20,000 workers' and retirees' savings and should pay restitution, the Labor
Department contended yesterday in a lawsuit... . 'Lay went so far as to tout
company stock as a good investment to employees even after he had been warned
that a wave of accounting scandals was expected to engulf the corporation....
They said nothing, they did nothing to protect' workers, even as they were selling
Enron stock themselves .... 'Vorkers at many other companies were hurt as
badly or almost as badly as at Enron,' including those at WorldCom Inc., Global
Crossing Ltd., Williams Cos. and Dynegy Inc."); see also Kate Berry, Global
Crossing Top Brass May Get Off Hook in Civil Suits: Will Justice Be Served?, L.A.
Bus. J., Aug. 25, 2003, at 1 ("Former employees, shareholders and bondholders of
Global Crossing, Ltd. are nearing a broad settlement of all civil litigation filed
against the bankrupt telecommunications firm, its co-founder, Gary Winnick,
and 32 former officers and directors .... The amount of the potential settlement
represents a fraction of the money lost by investors and employees when Global
Crossing filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in January 2002."). Berry
further reports:
Many former Global Crossing employees found their 401(k) retirement
plans, loaded with Global Crossing shares, had become worthless.
2005]
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When the U.S. capital markets collapsed in the late 1920s and
early 1930s, various estimates concluded that fully half (50%) of the
stock issued in the decade previous to the Great Depression had no
value and was proven worthless.54 Prior to the 1929 market crash,
very few federal safeguards were in place and available to investors
when they were approached with an opportunity to invest in the stock
of emerging companies. 55 This lack of regulatory safeguards proved to
be disastrous, as thousands upon thousands of U.S. investors lost for-
tunes during the Great Depression.56 As the nation staggered from
the effects of the market collapse and Depression, President Roosevelt
and the U.S. Congress decided that the U.S. capital markets had to be
safeguarded through congressional federal regulatory enactment.57
Others were promised severance packages that were terminated when
the company filed for bankruptcy protection in 2002, even though lump-
sum payouts were given to top executives.
"We literally have thousands of people who lost their savings, their
jobs and their severance and health coverage."
Id.
54. "[S]ome $50 billion of new securities had been floated in the United States during
the decade following World War I, of which fully half had proved to be worthless."
JOHNSON & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 43, at 2 (citing H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 2
(1933)). The House of Representatives committee placed much of the blame of
the market crash, "unique in financial history," squarely on the securities indus-
try. See id. (citation omitted). The House committee reported:
[tihe floatation of such a mass of essentially fraudulent securities was
made possible because of the complete abandonment by many under-
writers and dealers in securities of those standards of fair, honest, and
prudent dealing that should be basic to the encouragement of invest-
ment in any enterprise. Alluring promises of easy wealth were.., made
with little or no attempt to bring to the investor's attention those facts
essential to estimating the worth of any security.
Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 2).
55. See id. at 2 ("Securities regulation had been the exclusive province of the states.
This had been the case since 1911 when the first blue sky law was enacted in
Kansas. In the aftermath of the crash, however, state securities laws were per-
ceived to be inadequate, resulting in growing pressure for regulation on the Fed-
eral level.").
56. See id. at 1. Referring to the enormous loss suffered by investors due to the mar-
ket crash of 1929, Johnson & McLaughlin report:
Between September 1, 1929 and July 1, 1932, the aggregate market
value of all stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange .. .had de-
clined from an all-time high of close to $90 billion to less than $16 billion,
a loss to which, in the words of the Senate Banking and Currency Com-
mittee, "the annals of finance present no counterpart."
Id.
57. Id. at 3. One of the first things President Roosevelt did upon being inaugurated
in 1932 was call upon Congress to create remedial legislation that would protect
U.S. investors:
I recommend to the Congress legislation for Federal supervision of
traffic in investment securities in interstate commerce.
In spite of many State statutes the public in the past has sustained
severe losses through practices neither ethical nor honest on the part of
many persons and corporations selling securities.
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"The U.S. investing public needed to be protected from unscrupulous
sellers and fraudulent issuers of securities whose duplicity had precip-
itated the Depression."5 8 To protect U.S. investors, the Executive
drafted, and Congress debated and eventually passed the 1933 Securi-
ties Act, which evolved ultimately into an act of disclosure,
59 and the
1934 Securities Exchange Act, which extended federal regulation to
trading in securities that are already issued and outstanding and also
created the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC").60 Presi-
dent Roosevelt, the New Deal Congress, and the drafters of the 1933
Of course, the Federal Government cannot and should not take any
action which might be construed as approving or guaranteeing that
newly issued securities are sound in the sense that their value will be
maintained or that the properties which they represent will earn profit.
There is, however, an obligation upon us to insist that every issue of
new securities to be sold in interstate commerce shall be accompanied by
full publicity and information, and that no essentially important element
attending the issue shall be concealed from the buying public.
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 1-2). The drafting of legislation eventually
fell primarily on the shoulders of then-professor Felix Frankfurter, and after a
number of revisions and consultations with Wall Street lawyers, the draft legisla-
tion became the Securities Act of 1933, officially enacted May 27, 1933. See id. at
4.
58. See cummings, supra note 8, at 1333-34.
59. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2000). Prominent scholars describe the essential ele-
ments of the 1933 Securities Act as consisting of:
(a) mandatory full disclosure in a registration statement filed with the
Federal Trade Commission (later the SEC), (b) SEC review during a
"waiting period," at the end of which sales could commence, (c)
mandatory delivery of a prospectus at or before the delivery of the secur-
ity, and (d) civil liabilities for untrue statements and for certain
omissions.
JOHNSON & McLAUGHLIN, supra note 43, at 4. Ultimately, the 1933 Securities
Act can best be categorized as a disclosure statute. The principal purpose of the
statute, as set forth in its preamble, is to provide "full and fair disclosure of the
character of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and through the
mails...." See id. at 6.
60. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2000). Prominent scholars describe the 1934 Secur-
ities Exchange Act as having
established the Securities and Exchange Commission and transferred to
it the responsibility for administration of the 1933 Act (which had origi-
nally been assigned to the Federal Trade Commission). Other provisions
of the Act [a] impose disclosure and other requirements on publicly-held
corporations; [b] prohibit various "manipulative or deceptive devices or
contrivances" in connection with the purchase or sale of securities; [c]
restrict the amount of credit that may be extended for the purchase of
securities; [d] require brokers and dealers to register with the SEC and
regulate their activities; and [e] provide for SEC registration and super-
vision of national securities exchanges and associations, clearing agen-
cies, transfer agents, and securities information processors.
DAVID L. RATNER & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, SECURITIES REGULATION: IN A NUTSHELL
10-11 (7th ed. 2002); see also DAVIS, supra note 42, at 362-69 (describing the
fascinating process the 1934 Securities Exchange Act endured from conception to
enactment).
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Securities Act believed that required disclosure of pertinent and cru-
cial business information, including profits, debts, earnings, and po-
tential profitability, would give the investing public protection and-
perhaps most importantly-knowledge.61
Despite overwhelming public support for the passage of federal
protective regulation of the securities markets,6 2 the 1933 Securities
Act and 1934 Securities Exchange Act were bitterly opposed by many
in the securities "industry."6 3 Wall Street argued vehemently against
passage of federal oversight, claiming that regulation of the free mar-
ket would retard the ability of the capital markets, and capitalism in
general, to properly expand, grow, and develop.64 Ignoring, to a de-
61. See JOHNSON & McLAUGHLIN, supra note 43, at 3-6. Professor Frankfurter ex-
plained the disclosure of information afforded through the 1933 Securities Act as
follows: "'Unlike the theory on which state blue-sky laws are based, the Federal
Securities Act does not place the government's imprimatur upon securities. It is
designed merely to secure essential facts for the investor, not to substitute the gov-
ernment's judgment for his own.'" Id. at 6 (quoting Felix Frankfurter, The Fed-
eral Securities Act: II, FORTUNE, Aug. 1933, at 108 (emphasis added)).
62. See DAvis, supra note 42, at 367 ("Yet the 'people of this country .. .in over-
whelming majority' [are] fully aware that unregulated speculation in securities
and commodities had contributed greatly to the 'terrible conditions of the years
following 1929,' and they would 'not be satisfied with legislation' on this matter
which did not have 'teeth in it.'") (quoting a March 26, 1934 letter from President
Roosevelt to Senators Fletcher and Rayburn, who were shepherding the 1934 Se-
curities Exchange Act through the U.S. Senate).
63. See id. at 362-68. Perhaps the most hostile opposition to the new federal securi-
ties laws were led "by Richard Whitney, the arrogantly aristocratic president of
the New York Stock Exchange." Id. at 362. Whitney, and a host of corporate,
institutional oppositionists, descended upon Washington, D.C. in 1934 to lobby in
strident resistance to the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. See id. at 366. Professor
Davis highlights the intensity of the "establishment's" opposition to the imposi-
tion of federal regulation upon the securities markets as follows:
Richard Whitney organized and led opposition to the bill.
Within days after Roosevelt's recommendation of the legislation, the
New York Stock Exchange president had formed an ad hoc national or-
ganization, with committees in key industrial cities, to wage war on
Fletcher-Rayburn [precursor bill to the Securities Exchange Act of
1934]. He moved down to Washington for the duration of this war, rent-
ing a house from which to direct the struggle, and he was the first of a
parade of witnesses who marched against the bill in mental uniform and
in perfect emotional step with one another through several weeks of
House and Senate committee hearings. Far from being an evil thing,
speculation was the very essence of the American Way, the very founda-
tion of the American system, and could not be prevented by statute in
any case, since it was "human nature." Such was the conviction of Rich-
ard Whitney; such was the conviction of those who followed him to the
witness table.
Id. at 365-66 (citation omitted).
64. See id. at 366-68. One opponent charged that the regulatory provisions of the
1934 Securities Exchange Act were "the product of a deep, dark plot to point the
nation 'down the road from Democracy to Communism.'" Id. at 368.
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gree,6 5 the strident protests from industry insiders, President
Roosevelt and the New Deal Congress easily passed sweeping federal
regulation of the U.S. capital markets.
6 6
The 1933 Securities Act, 1934 Securities Exchange Act, and the
battery of federal regulations that were put into place by President
Roosevelt and the New Deal Congress 6 7 for the express purpose of pro-
tecting U.S. investors68 sought to strike a delicate balance between
investor protection and enhancement of capital formation by U.S. cor-
porations. 6 9 The Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC") has strug-
gled for seventy years, since its lofty origin, to appropriately balance
its stated goal of protecting U.S. investors and safeguarding the integ-
rity of the U.S. capital markets 70 against the constant press of U.S.
65. See id. at 366 ("Under intense hostile pressures, and in the knowledge that the
White House had not endorsed the stringent requirements of the original bill but
had instead evinced a willingness to compromise, Cohen, Landis, and Corcoran
[drafters of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act], the last of whom proved to be a
remarkably able defender of the bill in Senate and House hearings, again rewrote
the measure completely.").
66. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text; see also DAVIs, supra note 42, at
369 ("Of this final bill there was no floor debate; it was passed through both
houses by a large majority. Roosevelt signed it into law on June 6[, 19341.").
67. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN & DAVID L. RATNER, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 5-6 (6th ed. 2003) ("Federal securities law basically consists of six
statutes, enacted between 1933 and 1940, and periodically amended in the inter-
vening years, and one enacted in 1970. They are: Securities Act of 1933; Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934; Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935; Trust
Indenture Act of 1939; Investment Company Act of 1940; Investment Advisers
Act of 1940; [and] Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970.").
68. See infra note 70. One of the many ways the Federal securities laws sought to
protect investors was through the creation of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission: "'[T]he mission of this agency, the obsession, is investor protection. It
comes above every other consideration.'" David Vise, Guardian of the Investor,
WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 1995, at A12 (quoting then SEC Chairperson Arthur Lev-
itt, Jr.) (emphasis added).
69. See cummings, supra note 8, at 1322 ("The historical battle that is at the heart of
[all securities] problem [s] concerns investor protection (through registration) ver-
sus capital formation (and the obstacles that restrict such formation.)"). Profes-
sor Cheryl Wade notes that
[t]o prevent the hampering of commerce that results from unnecessary
registration, the 1933 [Securities] Act provides a variety of exemptions
from registration that relieve issuers of the cost and delay of registra-
tion. These exemptions generally reflect a balancing of the 1933 Act's
goal of protecting investors through mandatory registration with its goal
of facilitating capital formation, particularly for small issuers.
Cheryl L. Wade, The Integration of Securities Offerings: A Proposed Formula
That Fosters the Policies of Securities Regulation, 25 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 199, 200
(1994). Wade concludes that "[i]n pursuing the goal of facilitating commerce, the
SEC has not ... abandoned its goal of investor protection." Id. at 207.
70. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, THE INVESTOR'S ADVOCATE: How THE SEC PRO-
TECTS INVESTORS AND MAINTAINS MARKET INTEGRITY ("The primary mission of the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is to protect investors and
maintain the integrity of the securities markets. As more and more first-time
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corporations and companies to raise capital, often times quickly, to
successfully conduct their business. 7 1 To this day, the SEC continues
to struggle with striking this delicate investor-protection-versus-capi-
tal-formation balance.72
Despite this relentless tussle, for the last seventy years the SEC
has mostly succeeded in protecting U.S. investors and guarding the
integrity of the U.S. capital markets. 7 3 Because of a broad congres-
sional grant of rulemaking authority, the SEC has constantly altered,
investors turn to the markets to help secure their futures... these goals are more
compelling than ever."), at http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last modi-
fied Jan. 12, 2005). The SEC states prominently that its primary responsibility is
to protect those that invest in the U.S. capital markets. Id. The SEC describes
its congressional mandate as follows:
The laws and rules that govern the securities industry in the United
States derive from a simple and straightforward concept: all investors,
whether large institutions or private individuals, should have access to
certain basic facts about an investment prior to buying it. To achieve
this, the SEC requires public companies to disclose meaningful financial
and other. information to the public, which provides a common pool of
knowledge for all investors to use to judge for themselves if a company's
securities are a good investment. Only through the steady flow of
timely, comprehensive and accurate information can people make sound
investment decisions.
Id.; see also cummings, supra note 8, at 1313 n.12.
71. See generally Carl W. Schneider et al., Going Public: Practice, Procedure, and
Consequences, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1981).(describing the process of raising new
capital for emerging businesses through initiating an initial public offering and
detailing the attendant timetable and required expenses).
72. See Tamar Frankel, Regulation and Investors' Trust in the Securities Markets, 68
BROOK. L. REV. 439, 439-40 (2002). In connection with the constant struggle be-
tween appropriate regulation and unfettered capital formation, Professor Fran-
kel observes:
Many an economist and academic have argued that regulation is costly
for issuers and financial intermediaries. Regulation, they say, is a bar-
rier to capital formation, that is, to inducing savers to part with their
money and invest in securities. I assume that they are correct. Regula-
tion does impose these costs, and the costs can be a barrier to raising
capital for issuers.
Today, some commentators bemoan what they consider to be exces-
sive congressional regulation, especially from the 1930s. These commen-
tators try to show that this body of regulation was wrong and costly.
Yet, in the 1930s or any other period of regulatory activism, few argued
against regulation. In fact, issuers and intermediaries sought govern-
ment regulation. What is interesting is how they sought regulation. On
the one hand they clamored for it, and on the other they argued for wa-
tering down and restricting the impact of every regulatory provision,
fighting all the way to congressional approval.
Id. at 440-41.
73. See Stephen Labaton, In Stormy Time, S.E.C. Facing Deeper Trouble, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 1, 2002, at 1. Prior to the stock market crash of 2002, the SEC was widely
considered "one of the brightest stars in the constellation of federal regulatory
agencies." Id.
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adjusted, and tinkered with federal securities regulations in an effort
to meet the ever-changing and fast-paced worldwide economies and
dazzling technological advances.7 4 For the most part, since its incep-
tion, the SEC has been lauded for its ability to carefully regulate the
U.S. capital markets, U.S. corporations, and issuances of corporate se-
curities, while simultaneously permitting U.S. companies to function
seamlessly, albeit with some difficulty. 75 However, the "shining star"
of the U.S. federal regulatory constellation has fallen in recent
years.76 Due to the market crash of 2002, much of the praise and ac-
claim that had been heaped upon the SEC over the years has dissi-
pated and been replaced with harsh criticism.
77
74. See HAZEN & RATNER, supra note 67, at 9-10. Hazen and Ratner describe the
flexibility and success of the SEC as follows:
Among lawyers, and among students of governmental process, the
SEC generally enjoys a high reputation. It has been noteworthy for the
level of intelligence and integrity of its staff, the flexibility and informal-
ity of many of its procedures, and its avoidance of the political and eco-
nomic pitfalls in which many other regulatory agencies have found
themselves trapped. Its disclosure and enforcement policies have also
been credited with making an important contribution to the generally
favorable reputation which American corporate securities and American
securities markets enjoy, not only among American investors, but also in
foreign countries.
Id. But see infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
75. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text. Most U.S. publicly traded compa-
nies likely would argue that complying with the securities laws disclosure re-
quirements is a most difficult undertaking. See JAMEs D. Cox ET AL., SECURITIES
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 153-54 (4th ed. 2004).
76. See Labaton, supra note 73 ("The Securities and Exchange Commission, still reel-
ing from the recent resignation of its chairman Harvey L. Pitt and other top offi-
cials, is plagued by problems that go deeper than its leadership difficulties and
have undermined its ability to police companies and markets . . . ."). Labaton
acknowledges that despite its status as "one of the brightest stars" in the federal
regulatory constellation, the SEC has been harshly criticized for its breakdowns
in the wake of "stunning corporate failures that exposed the severe regulatory
shortcomings . . . ." Id.; see also cummings, supra note 8, at 1306 n.3, 1311 n.9
(recounting the hailstorm of criticism levied against the SEC in the aftermath of
the market collapse of 2002).
77. See Stephen Labaton, Government Report Details a Chaotic S.E.C. Under Pitt,
N.Y. TiMEs, Dec. 20, 2002, at 1 ("The Securities and Exchange Commission under
Harvey L. Pitt was described today as dysfunctional by a government report ex-
amining the agency's selection of a new accounting oversight board."); see also
Thor Valdmanis, Senate Report Blasts SEC's Enron Oversight, USA TODAY, Oct.
7, 2002, at 2B. USA Today reports:
The Securities and Exchange Commission is expected to come under re-
newed criticism with the release today of a congressional report on the
SEC's failure to prevent Enron's Collapse.
In a letter attached to the 130-page Senate Governmental Affairs
Committee staff report, ranking Sens. Joseph Lieberman, D-Conn., and
Fred Thompson, R-Tenn., accuse the SEC and Wall Street research ana-
lysts of allowing "the greed of a few" at Enron to go "unchecked and
unchallenged."
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With an admittedly overworked and underfunded SEC on watch,7 8
chaired by Harvey L. Pitt, a man appointed by the Bush administra-
tion and "cozy" with the corporate executives he was to be policing,
7 9
the Enron Corporation ("Enron") perpetrated one of the most daring
frauds that has ever been perpetrated on the U.S. investing public.
8 0
The collapse of Enron was preceded by a shocking array of deception,
malfeasance, avarice, greed, and smoke and mirrors.8 1 At the time of
Enron's bankruptcy filing, it was the largest corporate disintegration
ever in the history of the United States.8 2 Unfortunately, the scale of
"The investigation revealed a story of systemic and catastrophic fail-
ure-a failure of all the watchdogs to properly discharge their appointed
responsibilities," the senators write.
Id.; see also Jeffrey Birnbaum, It's Time for Him To Go: The Securities and Ex-
change Commission Is Desperate for Strong Leadership-And Harvey Pitt Isn't
Providing It, FORTUNE, Oct. 28, 2002, at 99. While deregulation in the 1990s ena-
bled an environment that lead to the massive corporate corruption exposed in
2001 and 2002, the SEC took a simultaneous laissez faire approach to federal
oversight in the 1990s and under the leadership of Pitt. See id. This approach,
when exposed, caused many to harshly criticize Pitt and the SEC. See id; see also
Mark Maremont & Deborah Solomon, Behind SEC's Failings: Caution, Tight
Budget, '90s Exuberance, WALL ST. J., Dec. 24, 2003, at Al ("Testifying last
month before a Senate committee examining the mutual-fund scandal, current
SEC Chairman William Donaldson admitted his agency hadn't even been looking
for the kinds of abuses that were uncovered by today's crusading Wall Street cop,
New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer. 'For too long,' Mr. Donaldson said, 'the
commission has found itself in a position of reacting to market problems rather
than anticipating them.'"). Badly underfunded, the SEC "proved a timid, poorly
managed bureaucracy at a time when the markets it polices and frauds it seeks
to prevent were increasingly complex." Id.
78. See Gephardt, supra note 5, at 7-8 (showing how the Revolution Congress contin-
ually refused throughout the 1990s to appropriately fund the SEC in such a way
as to allow it to engage in proper federal oversight).
79. See Valdmanis, supra note 77, at 2B ("The [Senate Governmental Affairs Com-
mittee] report, stemming from one of several congressional probes into Enron,
comes at a difficult time for SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt, whose perceived cozy
ties to business have again emerged as an issue."); see also Birnbaum, supra note
77, at 100 ("Pitt came into office in 2001 .... A lawyer who had represented
accounting firms, among other companies, Pitt opposed the heavy-handed gov-
ernment intervention and promised a 'kinder and gentler' SEC. But fate con-
spired to give him a mandate for market regulation that [former Chairperson]
Arthur Levitt could only dream of. The corporate malfeasance over the past year
has put Pitt in an uncomfortable position: He is a diehard deregulator at a time
when more regulation is widely viewed as necessary to prevent future scandals.").
80. See infra section IV.A.
81. See infra notes 306-21 and accompanying text.
82. See Marianne M. Jennings, A Primer on Enron: Lessons From a Perfect Storm of
Financial Reporting, Corporate Governance and Ethical Culture Failures, 39 CAL.
W. L. REV. 163, 194-96 (2003) (detailing the causes and effects of the Enron im-
plosion); see also ROBERT BRYCE, PIPE DREAMS: GREED, EGo, AND THE DEATH OF
ENRON (2002); BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST Guys IN THE
ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON (2003); REBECCA
SMITH & JOHN R. EMSHWILLER, 24 DAYS (2003); MIMI SWARTZ & SHERRON WAT-
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Enron's implosion was to be exceeded by others who, together with
Enron, were responsible in part for ushering in the stock market crash
of 2002.83
With a labored and economically strained SEC as sentinel,84
WorldCom Inc. ("WorldCom") committed a scandalous deception
against the U.S. investing public.8 5 WorldCom executives hid, di-
verted, and secreted billions of dollars of financial loss in an effort to
maintain its value, while misrepresenting the health and vitality of
the company to U.S. investors.8 6 Sadly, the WorldCom travesty con-
tinues as revelations of fraud and deceit continue to be exposed as the
corporation seeks to successfully emerge from bankruptcy as MCI.87
WorldCom, together with Enron, must shoulder some responsibility
for ushering in the stock market crash of 2002.88
With the guardian of investors8 9 on duty, Adelphia Communica-
tions Corp. ("Adelphia") executed an impudent fraud against the U.S.
investing public. 90 Adelphia's primary executives looted, plundered,
and embezzled hundreds of millions of dollars of shareholder value, by
using the company as a personal piggy bank and faking the fitness
KINS, POWER FAILURE: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE COLLAPSE OF ENRON (2004);
Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Enronitis: Why Good Corporations Go Bad, 2004 COLUM.
Bus. L. REV. (2004); Faith Stevelman Kahn, Bombing Markets, Subverting the
Rule of Law: Enron, Financial Fraud, and September 11, 2001, 76 TuL. L. REV.
1579 (2002); John R. Kroger, Enron, Fraud, and Securities Reform: An Enron
Prosecutor's Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 57 (2005); Steven Schwarcz, Enron
and the Use and Abuse of Special Purpose Entities in Corporate Structures, 70 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1309 (2002).
83. See infra sections IV.A-F.
84. See supra note 78.
85. See infra section IV.C.
86. See infra notes 332-46 and accompanying text.
87. See Allan Chernoff, MCI Hit With Criminal Charges, CNNMONEY.COM, Aug. 27,
2003 ("WorldCom, now doing business as MCI, currently is in Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy protection, after an $11 billion accounting scandal."), at http://money.cnn.
com/2003/08/27/technology/mci charges/index.htm; WorldCom Accusations Ex-
pand, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2003, at C3; see also Andrew Backover, Judge OKs
MCI's $750M Settlement of Fraud Charges, USA TODAY, Aug. 7, 2003, at B1 ("A
bankruptcy judge Wednesday approved a record $750 million settlement of fraud
charges against MCI by regulators. But allegations of wrongdoing continue to
engulf MCI."). USA Today reports that:
The flurry of allegations and counterclaims is increasing before a Sept. 8
hearing to decide whether MCI, formerly WorldCom, can emerge from
the biggest bankruptcy case ever. After the SEC settlement, that's one
of its biggest hurdles to recovering from its $11 billion accounting fraud.
The rivals say MCI improperly avoided millions of dollars in fees to
connect calls by laundering phone traffic or disguising its origin.
Id.
88. See infra sections IV.A, C.
89. See Vise, supra note 68.
90. See infra section IV.D.
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and veracity of the company to U.S. investors. 9 1 Thus, Adelphia also
should be held partially responsible for ushering in the stock market
crash of 2002.92
Global Crossing, Ltd. ("Global Crossing") and Qwest Communica-
tions International Inc. ("Qwest") also effectuated shocking facades
against the U.S. investing public.93 Global Crossing and Qwest sepa-
rately buried, screened, and obscured hundreds of millions of dollars
of financial loss in an effort to maintain stock price, while feigning a
fit and vigorous image to U.S. investors. 9 4 Global Crossing and
Qwest, together with Enron, WorldCom and Adelphia, should be held
responsible, in part, for ushering in the stock market crash of 2002.95
In a still unfolding alleged scam, the El Paso Corp. ("El Paso")
seemingly foisted a brazen money grab on the U.S. investing public.96
In an effort to drive up its stock price and while pretending an honest
and sincere concern for its energy clients and its U.S. investors, El
Paso likely withheld, inhibited, and fraudulently repressed energy
supplies, thereby costing energy-starved states hundreds of millions of
dollars. 9 7 El Paso, like the others discussed above, can and should be
held partially responsible for escorting in the stock market crash of
2002.98
The aforementioned corporations have been singled out based on
the willingness of each company to engage in astonishing duplicity,
particularly in industries that Congress has deregulated since 1995.99
However, Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, Global Crossing, Qwest, and
El Paso have ample companionship when identifying corporate
malfeasors whose actions triggered the crash of 2002: Tyco Interna-
tional Ltd., Xerox Corp., Rite Aid Corporation, Nicor Inc., Merck &
Co., Johnson & Johnson Inc., Sunbeam Corporation, Kmart, Abbot
Laboratories, Cendant Corp., General Electric Co., and ImClone Sys-
tems, Inc., amongst others, cannot escape blame. 0 0
91. See infra notes 349-52 and accompanying text.
92. See infra sections IVA, C-D.
93. See infra sections V.E-F.
94. See infra notes 354-73 and accompanying text.
95. See infra sections IV.A, C-F.
96. See infra section IV.B.
97. See infra notes 322-31 and accompanying text.
98. See infra sections IV.A-F.
99. See Cummings et al., supra note 26 and accompanying text; see also cummings,
supra note 8, at 1372 n.324.
100. See infra Part IV; see also cummings, supra note 8, at 1319 ("Nor is the SEC
protecting investors from unscrupulous corporate pirates, a list that now includes
Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, Xerox, Rite Aid, Tyco International, Global Cross-
ing, Nicor, Merck, Johnson & Johnson, Sunbeam, ImClone and Qwest Communi-
cations, amongst many others.").
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The "independent" auditors that each played a primary role in ena-
bling such acts of corporate treachery' 0 ' cannot be forgotten when
describing corporate malfeasance: Arthur Andersen, Price-
waterhouseCoopers, Ernst & Young, KPMG, and DeLoitte &
Touche.10 2 Neither can the investment banks,l03 nor the lawyers
101. See cummings, supra note 8, at 1309-10 & n.7.
102. See id. at 1310 n.7 ("However, Arthur Andersen will likely not be alone now in
shouldering accounting firm blame for the astonishing corporate failures of the
past two years. Other 'big-five' firms-K.P.M.G., Deloitte & Touche and Ernst &
Young-now face serious allegations of misconduct and . . . civil action filed
against them by state regulators and the SEC."). KPMG LLP has been harshly
criticized for its role in the WorldCom disaster, specifically, "[tihe examiner in
MCI's Chapter 11 bankruptcy case issued a report critical of a 'highly aggressive'
tax strategy . . . recommended to MCI to avoid paying hundreds of millions of
dollars in state income taxes, concluding that MCI has grounds to sue KPMG-
its current auditor." Dennis Berman et al., MCI Examiner Criticizes KPMG on
Tax Strategy, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2004, at A3. KPMG responded that the "tax
strategy used by MCI is commonly used by other companies and called the exam-
iner's conclusions 'simply wrong.'" Id. "MCI, the former WorldCom, still uses the
tax strategy." Id.
103. See Morgan, Citi to Pay $305 Million: Wall Street Banks Agree to Settlement To
End an Investigation into Their Dealings with Enron, CNNMONEY.COM, July 28,
2003 (available in the Schmid Law Library at the University of Nebraska College
of Law). CNN Money reports:
J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. and Citigroup Inc. agreed Monday to pay more
than $300 million to resolve an investigation into charges that the banks
helped bankrupt Enron Corp. and another energy trading firm mislead
investors. Under the settlement with the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, J.P. Morgan, the nation's No. 2 bank, will pay $135 million and
Citigroup, the largest bank ranked by assets, will pay $120 million. It
will allow the banks to avoid prosecution but force them to alter some
business practices.
Id.; see Lerach, supra note 13, at 114-17 ("But more than anybody else, it was the
banks (banksters?) that were behind the colossal frauds at Enron and WorldCom.
This still is the largely untold story of these two frauds .... So, with the help of
their Wall Street banks, Enron and WorldCom raised thirty-three billion dollars
in fresh capital from investors in the four years before they both went bankrupt-
selling what were 'investment grade' rated bonds when issued-but which in
short order were worthless! This is probably the greatest bond rip-off in his-
tory."); SEC Subpoenas Citigroup: Regulators Want to Question Financial Firm
on Its Role in Dynegy's Project Alpha Transaction, CNNMONEY.COM, May 31,
2002 ("The Securities and Exchange Commission has subpoenaed Citigroup Inc.
over its role in a controversial natural-gas transaction that made energy trader
Dynegy Inc.'s finances look better than they actually were .... ."), at http://money.
cnn.com/2002/05/31/news/companies/citigroup-dynegy; see also Berman et al.,
supra note 102 ("[The MCI bankruptcy examiner] reserve[d] special ire for securi-
ties firm Salomon Smith Barney, which the report says doled out more than
950,000 shares from 22 initial and secondary public offerings to ex-Chief Execu-
tive Bernard Ebbers for a profit of $12.8 million."). Richard Thornburgh, the
WorldCom bankruptcy examiner, concluded with respect to investment bank Sal-
omon Smith Barney that the more than 950,000 shares "'were intended to and
did influence Mr. Ebbers to award' more than $100 million in investment-bank-
ing fees to Salomon, a unit of Citigroup Inc ..... " Id. "Mr. Thornburgh said MCI
has grounds to sue both Citigroup and Mr. Ebbers for damages for breach of fidu-
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(and their firms) that represented each scandalous corporation,10 4 es-
cape blame for facilitating, arguably, the greatest corporate betrayal
of U.S. investors in United States history.1o5 In a surprisingly under-
reported study, Professor Ho Young Lee conducted a systematic analy-
sis of Big Six accounting firms10 6 following adoption of the PSLRA
examining whether accounting irregularities increased after pas-
sage.1o 7 In a critically important conclusion, Professor Lee found that
accruals108 and auditing irregularities ballooned for the Big Six ac-
counting firms in the years directly following passage of the
PSLRA.109 Accounting irregularities and accruals did not increase,
however, for accounting firms not characterized as one of the Big
Six.110 This study is crucial for two reasons: First, those that claim
that no connection exists between 1990s deregulation, specifically the
PSLRA, and the subsequent market collapse of 2002, can hardly pro-
claim that no connecting evidence exists. Big Six auditor instances of
fraud and duplicity skyrocketed following the adoption of the PSLRA.
Second, a binding connection between the PSLRA and the market
crash of 2002 clearly is formed wherein the role of auditors and ac-
countants cannot be understated. While corrupt corporate executives
ciary duty and good faith." Id.; see also Jonathan Weil & Robin Sidel, J.P. Mor-
gan's WorldCom Risk: Former Underwriter in Scandal May Face High Settlement
Costs as Class-Action Suit Draws Near, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 2005, at C1 ("Inves-
tors allege that the former bond underwriters, including J.P. Morgan, failed to
adequately investigate the company's financial health when they sold $17 billion
of WorldCom bonds in 2000 and 2001-shortly before the telecom company...
slid into bankruptcy amid a massive accounting-fraud scandal.").
104. See Lerach, supra note 13, at 113 ("Enron's lawyers also failed miserably ....
These were sophisticated firms, like investment bankers, who held themselves
out as having special expertise to help put together the kinds of complex struc-
tured financial transactions that created million [sic] and millions of dollars of
false profits for Enron.").
105. See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
106. In 1995, the Big Six accounting firms referred to Pricewaterhouse, Arthur Ander-
sen, KPMG, Deloitte & Touche, Coopers Lybrand, and Ernst & Young. Since
1995, Pricewaterhouse merged with Coopers Lybrand forming Price-
waterhouseCoopers, and Arthur Andersen ceased to exist following the corporate
scandals of 2002.
107. See Ho Young Lee & Vivek Mande, The Effect of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 on Accounting Discretion of Client Managers of Big 6 and
Non-Big 6 Auditors, 22 AuDrrrNG: J. PRAc. & THEORY, Mar. 2003, at 93, 93-105.
108. An accrual is defined as "the recognition of revenue when earned or expenses
when incurred regardless of when cash is received or disbursed." VENTURELINE,
ACCOUNTING DICTIONARY, at http://www.ventureline.com/glossaryA.asp (last vis-
ited Mar. 21, 2005). The accrual basis of accounting is "whereD revenue and ex-
penses are recorded in the period in which they are earned or incurred regardless
of whether cash is received or disbursed in that period. This is the accounting
basis that generally is required to be used in order to conform to generally ac-
cepted accounting principles (GAAP) . . . ." Id.
109. See Lee & Mande, supra note 107, at 99-105.
110. See id.
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receive their fair share of blame and ire, the accountants that enabled
the duplicity must now share that limelight. Third, when regulation
and federal oversight is removed, many corporate executives and pro-
fessional auditors cannot be counted on to act nobly.
Simply stated, because of U.S. corporate management's dishonesty
and willingness to engage in fraud and deception, trillions of dollars
were lost by U.S. investors"' and thousands of employees' lives were
ruined due to the loss of employment 1 2 and the decimation of retire-
ment accounts.1 3 In light of the preceding introduction to the deregu-
lation and reform hysteria that gripped the Revolution Congress and
111. See David Greising, Enough Already: Reform Now, from the Top, CHI. TRIB., June
9, 2002, at C1 (detailing the surge in corporate scandals resulting in related stock
plummet). While reporting on the recent accounting failures and falsifications of
such companies as Kmart, Abbot Laboratories, Cendant Corp., and General Elec-
tric, Greising notes "[tihere was a time when all it took to follow business was a
good eye for strategy and a good head for numbers. Now we need a good nose for
a scandal and a strong stomach for indigestion.... By some estimates, investors
have lost $4 trillion in market value in scandal-related stock drops." Id.
112. See Diane E. Lewis, More Layoffs Likely for Firms Under Fire, BOSTON GLOBE,
July 7, 2002, at G2 ("Enron reduced its staff by 4,000 after it was forced to restate
its earnings, reports Challenger, Gray & Christmas, an outplacement firm that
tracks layoffs. Thus far, 8,000 Andersen workers have been impacted, and
WorldCom is expected to cut 17,000. Meanwhile, workers at Tyco lost 15,000 jobs
in February."). The Boston Globe further reports:
"We will likely continue to see more jobless fallout from these firms as
well as other companies under fire," said John Challenger, chief execu-
tive of the Chicago-based firm. "The lapses in corporate ethics not only
affect employees, but entire communities end up suffering as unemploy-
ment rises and consumer spending falls."
... "Already, there have been about 1,000 companies that have re-
vised their profit numbers .... The Bush administration is trying to
limit the damage (from the accounting scandals here) to a few bad ap-
ples, but it is much more widespread than that. Not all the companies
will go under, but this whole thing, from the viewpoint of people over-
seas, looks like a nightmare."
Id.
113. See supra note 53; see also Enron Workers Went Down with Ship, CBSNEws.cOM,
Jan. 14, 2002 ("Thousands of Enron employees lost their investments, savings
and retirement portfolios in the collapse of the energy trading giant. Congres-
sional committees as well as the Justice and Labor departments want to know
why many senior Enron executives and board members sold their stock when it
was still valuable, while workers were barred from selling stock in their 401(k)
funds"), at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/01/14/national/printable324196.
shtml. CBS News.com continued:
Enron employees whose 401(k) accounts were filled with company
stock watched helplessly as ceaseless bad news obliterated their value
last fall, while a bookkeeping mechanism barred them from cashing out.
"I'll never trust my employer quite the same again," said Tim Dalton,
a corporate security specialist who was among the 4,500 Houston work-
ers laid off in December [2001].
Id. See generally Marianne Lavelle & Matthew Benjamin, The Biggest Bust:
Workers and Stockholders Are Enron's Worst Casualties, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Dec. 10, 2001, at 34 (discussing the consequences of Enron's collapse).
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the subsequent description of the market crash of 2002, the following
question is irrefutably apparent: Did the deregulation and reform ef-
forts of the Revolution Congress directly cause or lead to the U.S. capi-
tal market crash of 2002?114 This Article will look surgically at that
question.
First, this Article will carefully examine the PSLRA, noting the in-
vestor protections that were stripped from the federal securities laws,
and will seek to determine the effect that such stripping had on the
securities industry and the individual investor. An examination of the
legislative history of the PSLRA will follow, which should reveal
whether the dire circumstances actuated by the market collapse of
2002 were in fact forecasted by opponents of the PSLRA.
Second, this Article will examine the market collapse of 2002. Spe-
cifically, it will inspect and detail the sources of the enormous failure
of each of the primary corporations in each industry outlined above.
Determining the source of the corporate fiascos will reveal whether
the atmosphere of deregulation initiated by the Revolution Congress
ultimately led, in part, to the collapse of the U.S. capital markets in
late 2001 and 2002. In particular, the Article will examine the colos-
sal collapses of Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, Global Crossing, and
Qwest, amongst others.
Third, after analyzing whether 1990s deregulation is partially to
blame for the stock market collapse of 2002, the Article will examine
whether recent congressional proposals, including the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, will in fact fix the problem that deregulation ap-
pears to have so quietly introduced. Finally, this Article will conclude
by positing that re-regulation of the securities industry must occur to
protect against future market destruction by corporate malfeasors.
The Article will also rebut those scholars and authors who have sug-
gested, since the collapse of 2002, that re-imposing regulations on the
securities and other deregulated industries will not ultimately solve
the problems exposed the by the recent capital markets failure. Spe-
cific re-regulations will be suggested and congressional adoption
urged.
II. THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT
As the cornerstone of its deregulation m6l6e,115 the Revolution
Congress passed the PSLRA in 1995 amid much dissension, spectacle,
114. See infra sections IV.A-F.
115. See supra notes 7, 10-13 and accompanying text. While "deregulation" and "free
markets" were mantras for the Republican Revolution,
their talk of freedom was highly misleading. The Gingrich Republicans
were not interested in creating some fanciful, pristine, abstract "free
market." Such a "free market" has never existed and never will. Rather,
through intensive government efforts, they sought to create new market
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explicit warning, and ceremony and over a Presidential Veto.116 The
PSLRA, to be sure, was a controversial measure,1 1 7 one that rolled
back portions of federal regulation of the securities industry that had
been in place since the 1930s.l 8 Despite the controversial nature of
this deregulation, the PSLRA passed comparatively easily, with some
bipartisan support, 119 and the Senate comfortably voted to override
the President Clinton veto.120 The PSLRA, upon passage, was hailed
as legislation that would bring sanity and evenhandedness to the se-
rules that were favorable to Enron and a host of other influential corpo-
rations. The so-called free market that resulted was not state of nature:
It was a highly crafted artifice, coolly manufactured on K Street and on
Capitol Hill by the Republican Congress-and in Enron's case, with the
help of Kenneth Lay's close friend, the new governor of Texas, George W.
Bush.
Only one force stood between the Gingrich Republicans and total suc-
cess: the Clinton White House and the Democrats. Clinton, to be sure,
recognized the need to reform old regulatory rules and other laws in ac-
cordance with changed economic realities. And the Democrats had
plenty of their own connections to K Street. But Clinton and the vast
majority of his party also realized that radical deregulation of the sort
Gingrich advocated could spell disaster. And now, in the Enron crisis,
the disaster has unfolded.
Sean Wilentz, A Scandal for Our Time, AMERICAN PROSPECT, Feb. 25, 2002, avail-
able at http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=viewPrint&
articleld=6141.
116. See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
117. See 141 CONG. REC. 35,260-311 (1995) (recording the volatile debate on the U.S.
Senate floor in opposition to the PSLRA).
118. See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text; see also Abner J. Mikva, Share
and Shares Alike: Now Let's Fix the "Reform" of our Securities Laws, LEGAL
TIMES, Apr. 8, 2002, at 50; Eugene Zelensky, New Bully on the Class Action Block:
Analysis of Restrictions on Securities Class Actions Imposed by the Private Securi-
ties Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1135, 1136 (1998).
119. 141 CONG. REC. 35,571 (1995) (recording the House of Representatives Rollcall
vote No. 839 that approved the conference report of the PSLRA-320 Yeas to 102
Nays); 141 CONG. REC. 35,304 (1995) (recording the U.S. Senate Rollcall vote No.
589 that approved the conference report of the PSLRA-65 Yeas to 30 Nays).
120. 141 CONG. REC. 38,354 (1995) (recording the Rollcall Vote No. 612 Leg. that over-
rode President Clinton's PSLRA veto-68 Yeas to 30 Nays).
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curities class-action schema.121 However, many fiercely disagreed
with such hailing.1
22
President Clinton, in the face of immense political pressure and
against the recommendations of many leading Democratic Sena-
tors, 123 issued his official PSLRA veto statement, returned the legisla-
tion without approval, and forecasted the debilitating impact the
PSLRA would have on average U.S. investors:
I am returning herewith without my approval H.R. 1058, the "Private Securi-
ties Litigation Reform Act of 1995." This legislation is designed to reform por-
tions of the Federal securities laws and to end frivolous lawsuits and to ensure
that investors receive the best possible information by reducing the litigation
risk to companies that make forward looking statements.
I support these goals.... I am not, however, willing to sign legislation that
will have the effect of closing the courthouse door on investors who have legiti-
mate claims. Those are the victims of fraud that should have recourse in our
courts. Unfortunately, changes made in this bill during conference could well
prevent that.
This country is blessed by strong and vibrant markets and I believe that
they function best when corporations can raise capital by providing investors
with their best good-faith assessment of future prospects, without fear of
costly, unwarranted litigation. But I also know that our markets are as strong
and effective as they are because they operate-and are seen to operate-with
integrity. I believe that this bill, as modified in conference could erode this
crucial basis of our markets' strength.
1 2 4
121. See infra notes 127-34. When describing the Congressional environment that
accompanied passage of the PSLRA, one commentator notes:
In 1995 Congress set out to fix securities class action litigation when
it passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act .... The Reform
Act was designed to address a number of perceived abuses in these
cases. In large part, its solution was to create a series of procedural hur-
dles that make it more difficult for plaintiffs' attorneys to bring and
maintain nonmeritorious securities fraud class actions.
Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003
U. ILL. L. REV. 913, 914.
122. See infra sections II.D-E. (describing the strong opposition to passage of the
PSLRA and the forecasts of corporate malfeasance that would ensue upon
passage).
123. See Mikva, supra note 118. Of President Clinton's decision to veto the PSLRA,
Mikva writes:
The PSLRA passed over President Bill Clinton's veto-one of his
most politically charged decisions. Many of his strongest supporters in
the Senate were sponsors of the bill. While the trial lawyers, key politi-
cal allies of the president, were vigorously opposed to the legislation, the
Silicon Valley crowd, who also had supported Clinton enthusiastically in
1992, were some of the bill's prime movers. Many senior advisers in the
White House, who had suffered their own encounters with aggressive
lawyers in the private sector, urged him to sign the bill.
Id.
124. President's Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Ap-
proval the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 31 WEEKLY CoMP. PRES.
Doc. 2191, 2210-11 (Dec. 20, 1995) (emphasis added); see also Mikva, supra note
118. Mikva adds:
"AIN'T NO GLORY IN PAIN"
President Clinton was not alone in his assessment that passage of the
PSLRA would "have the effect of closing the courthouse door on inves-
tors who have legitimate claims" and would, speaking of U.S. market
integrity, "erode this crucial basis of our markets' strength."1
25 In
light of recent events, particularly the crash of 2002, President Clin-
ton and all those in original, strident opposition to the PSLRA, look
positively clairvoyant.
12 6
A. How the PSLRA Amended Securities Fraud Pleading
Requirements
The PSLRA was originally intended to amend the 1933 Securities
Act and the 1934 Securities Exchange Act so as to end frivolous securi-
ties fraud lawsuits by imposing a number of procedural and substan-
tive hurdles upon securities plaintiffs.12
7 Seeking to once and for all
control the problem of "strike suits,"'128 Congress patched together leg-
islation that created a pleading standard never before contemplated
But in the end President Clinton made the right decision and vetoed
the legislation. It was a bold political move to challenge the special in-
terest juggernaut that had captured congressional majorities in both
houses. It was also futile: Congress overrode the veto, making the
PSLRA law.
Simply put, Congress reduced the incentives against committing
fraud.
Id.
125. See id.; see also infra section II.E.
126. See generally infra section II.E (describing the strong opposition to passage of the
PSLRA and the forecasts of corporate malfeasance that would ensue upon
passage).
127. See John W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform: The Long and Winding Road to
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 Bus. LAw 335, 335-37
(1996).
128. See BARaARA ALLEN BABCOCK & TONI M. MASSARO, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND
PROBLEMS 323 (2d ed. 2001) ("One reason the courts (and many defendants) have
been so concerned about pleading burdens in securities fraud cases is the fear of
strike suits-baseless suits or suits plaintiffs otherwise doubt they could win but
nevertheless file in the hope that defendants will settle to avoid litigation costs.
Surviving a motion to dismiss is often the primary-perhaps sole-objective of
plaintiffs counsel, as no further steps often are necessary."). The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit described what was considered an irre-
solvable tension prior to passage of the PSLRA:
On the one hand, there is the interest in deterring fraud in the securities
markets and remedying it when it occurs. That interest is served by rec-
ognizing that the victims of fraud often are unable to detail their allega-
tions until they have had some opportunity to conduct discovery of those
reasonably suspected of having perpetrated a fraud. ...
On the other hand, there is the interest in deterring the use of the
litigation process as a device for extracting undeserved settlements as
the price of avoiding the extensive discovery costs that frequently ensue
once a complaint survives dismissal, even though no recovery would oc-
cur if the suit were litigated to completion. It has never been clear how
these competing interests are to be accommodated ....
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under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, essentially requiring"super heightened"129 pleading for securities fraud cases while simul-
taneously amending numerous provisions of the securities laws to
make it exceedingly more difficult for aggrieved investors to bring
and/or prevail in a securities fraud lawsuit.130 Further, as stated in
its enacting language, the PSLRA was initiated to ensure that inves-
tors would receive honest, straightforward information by reducing
the litigation risk to corporations that made forward-looking state-
ments in their public filings documents.131 These amendments were
thought necessary based on testimony proffered by dozens of U.S. cor-
porate officers decrying the "unbearable" impact that securities fraud
lawsuits were having on the conduct of business in the United
States.132 Corporate officers testified that "frivolous" securities law-
In re Time Warner, Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 263-64 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
511 U.S. 1017 (1994); see also Elliott J. Weiss & Janet E. Moser, Enter Yossarian:
How to Resolve the Procedural Catch-22 that the Private Securities Litigation Re-
form Act Creates, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 457, 457 (1998) ("'Prompted by significant
evidence of abuse in private securities lawsuits,' Congress decided that a new set
of procedural rules should govern such actions."); Tiffany M. Wong, Comment,
Defendants' Standing To Oppose Lead Plaintiff Appointment Under the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 833, 834 ("Con-
gress perceived that abusive practices were undermining the overriding purposes
of the securities laws .... Such abuses included the filing of frivolous class action
lawsuits, initiated by attorneys with the help of 'professional plaintiffs' with no
regard for the culpability of the entity being sued.").
129. Because Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires heightened or
"particulari[zed]" pleading in lawsuits alleging "fraud or mistake" and because
the PSLRA pleading standard adopted by the Revolution Congress goes signifi-
cantly beyond any standard anticipated in the Federal Rules, I have adopted the
moniker "super heightened" pleading standard to accurately describe what is cur-
rently required of securities fraud plaintiffs. "The most striking aspect of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 is its rejection of the system of
notice pleading that has governed all civil actions in federal courts since 1938."
Weiss & Moser, supra note 128, at 457.
130. See BABCOCK & MAssARo, supra note 128, at 316-24.
131. See Avery, supra note 127, at 335-37.
132. See Private Litigation Under the Federal Securities Laws: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 103d Cong. 104-05 (1993) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of John G.
Adler, President, Adaptec, Inc.); see also Wong, supra note 128, at 835. Wong
argues that:
Plaintiffs' lawyers would routinely engage in a "race to the courthouse"
in order to file their complaint first and consequently be named lead
counsel in a securities class action. Despite the fact that most of these
suits were meritless, the defendant corporations usually chose to settle
the cases rather than face the enormous expenses of discovery and trial.
The plaintiffs' lawyers often negotiated such settlements to favor them-
selves rather than the investors they purported to represent.
Id. (citations omitted); see also supra note 128 and accompanying text. But see
Joel Seligman, The Merits Do Matter, 108 HARv. L. REV. 438, 439 (1994). Profes-
sor Seligman, in 1994, took issue with those corporate voices clamoring for relief
from securities fraud lawsuits:
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suits were severely impairing the ability of corporate America to con-
duct its business in an unfettered, capitalistic way. 13 3 Congress,
buying into these corporate management pleas, voted to add the
"super heightened" pleading standard to securities fraud class-action
suits, while removing a variety of investor protections from the 1933
Securities Act and the 1934 Securities Exchange Act.'
3 4
1. The "Super Heightened" Pleading Standard
Perhaps the most onerous PSLRA revision to the federal securities
laws was the amendment that departed from the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and inflated the pleading standard for class-action se-
curities plaintiffs to an often times unattainable level.1
35 The new
The proponents of new restrictions have argued: "Securities litigation
has gotten out of hand and is destroying the very capital formation pol-
icy it seeks to promote." For example, one businessman has argued that
'companies can become more reluctant to take business risks, for each
time a business fails, [it is] subject to a suit for fraud."
For all the emotional appeal of arguments that excessive litigation is
destroying capital formation, existing data illustrate a quite different
picture.
Id. at 439-40; see also Lerach, supra note 13, at 76-77 ("The tsunami of special-
interest money was flavored by anecdotal tales of woe from Big Six accounting-
firm partners and high-tech corporate executives who whined to congress about
how class action suits by avaricious lawyers distracted them from running their
enterprises, resulted in 'blackmail' settlement that injured public companies, di-
minished productive activities, made it difficult to obtain outside corporate direc-
tors, threatened partners in professional firms with ruin and undermined job and
economic growth."); Lynn A. Stout, Type I Error, Type II Error, and the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act, 38 ARiz. L. REV. 711, 713-15 (1996) (countering
the argument that strike suits cripple corporate America and capital formation
by estimating that the value of corporate fraudulent schemes not litigated cost
hundreds of billions of dollars per year in market valuation, while the value of
strike suits involve one-tenth the cost of fraudulent misbehavior).
133. See Hearings, supra note 132, at 76-77.
134. In identifying abuses in class-action litigation against publicly-held corporations,
the House and Senate committees designated the following abuses as
representative:
(1) the routine filing of lawsuits against issuers of securities and others
whenever there is a significant change in an issuer's stock price, without
regard to any underlying culpability of the issuer, and with only faint
hope that the discovery process might lead eventually to some plausible
cause of action; (2) the targeting of deep pocket defendants, including
accountants, underwriters, and individuals who may be covered by in-
surance, without regard to their actual culpability; (3) the abuse of the
discovery process to impose costs so burdensome that it is often economi-
cal for the victimized party to settle; and (4) the manipulation by class
action lawyers of the clients whom they purportedly represent.
RATNER & HAZEN, supra note 60, at 270. "The 1995 [Private Securities Litiga-
tion] Reform Act attempted to deal with these perceived abuses by adopting...
procedural reforms." Id.
135. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2000). The new super heightened pleading standard
provides:
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pleading standard for a plaintiff suing a corporation for fraudulent vi-
olation of the securities laws requires the victim of the alleged fraud,
without any benefit of discovery, to plead particularized facts that will
show a "strong inference" that each named defendant acted with a
specific intent to defraud.136 A plaintiff must "state with particularity
facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with
the required state of mind."137 This pleading standard increases the
particularity that must be pled to the level of a "strong inference" that
each defendant acted with specific intent to defraud, an unusually
high burden-in truth, a higher burden than any other federal plead-
ing standard.138 If this particularized pleading standard is not met,
(b) Requirements for securities fraud actions.
(1) Misleading statements and omission. In any private action aris-
ing under this title [15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78u] in which the plaintiff
alleges that the defendant-
a. Made an untrue statement of a material fact; or
b. Omitted to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances in which
they were made, not misleading;
the complaint shall specify each statement alleged to have been
misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is mislead-
ing, and, if an allegation regarding the statement or omission is
made on information and belief, the complaint shall state with
particularity all facts on which that belief is formed.
(2) Required state of mind. In any private action arising under this
title in which the plaintiff may recover money damages only on
proof that the defendant acted with a particular state of mind,
the complaint shall, with respect to each act or omission alleged
to violate this title, state with particularity facts giving rise to a
strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state
of mind ....
Id.; see also Steven A. Ramirez, Arbitration and Reform in Private Securities Liti-
gation: Dealing with the Meritorious as well as the Frivolous, 40 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1055, 1059-60 (1999). "Perhaps the most critical effect of the PSLRA, how-
ever, is that it leaves private enforcement of the federal securities laws in near
terminal condition." Id.; see also Perino, supra note 121, at 925 (describing what
the PSLRA pleading standard requires of securities plaintiffs). Professor Perino
writes that:
The pleading standard consists of three components. First, the Act
contains a specificity requirement with respect to allegations that a
statement of omission is false or misleading. The complaint is required
to specify which statements are misleading and the reasons why the
statements are misleading. Second, when a complaint is pleaded on in-
formation and belief, the plaintiff must state "with particularity all facts
on which that belief is formed." Third, plaintiffs are required to "state
with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defen-
dant acted with the required state of mind."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
136. See id.
137. BABCOCK & MAssARo, supra note 128, at 321.
138. See id.; see also Lerach, supra note 13, at 77 ("These restrictions on shareholder
suits under federal law were uniquely punitive. No such set of rules disadvantag-
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the class action is not certified and the victims of the alleged fraud are
foreclosed from proceeding in their lawsuit.
139
Further hampering victims of alleged securities fraud is the
PSLRA amendment that mandates, absent certain findings by the
court, an automatic stay of discovery in any securities lawsuit while
the (routine) motion to dismiss is pending before the court.140 Addi-
tionally, the amendment requires plaintiffs both to identify specific
statements made by the accused management that were in fact mis-
leading and to also explain how and in what way the fraudulent state-
ments were misleading.141
Pre-PSLRA, a victim of securities fraud was required to satisfy
Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that mandates a
heightened, particularized pleading standard as to fraud but required
only a reasonable belief in the original pleading that each named de-
fendant acted with a specific intent to defraud.142 Thus, prior to pas-
sage of the PSLRA, fraud had to be pled "with particularity," but
intent could be "averred generally."14 3 Thereafter, a plaintiff class
was able to conduct discovery as the lawsuit proceeded, prior to a mo-
tion to dismiss hearing, in order to uncover further fraud and misrep-
resentation. 14 4 Congress, in adopting the "super heightened" pleading
standard, for all intents and purposes removed any ability to discover
fraud or malfeasance except within the original pleadings. Thus, after
ing plaintiffs exists in any other field of civil litigation under federal law.") (em-
phasis removed).
139. See H.R. 1058, 104th Cong. § 101(a) (1995) (§ 21D(b)(3)(A) of the Securities Ex-
change Act); see also Lerach, supra note 13, at 87. Lerach reports:
[S]ince the 1995 [Public Securities Litigation Reform] Act [the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals] has thrown 18 consecutive securities fraud suits
by investors out of court. Eighteen times in a row, using the 1995 Act,
the Ninth Circuit has sided with corporate interests and closed the
courthouse door to defrauded investors. Not one complaint out of 18 up-
held or permitted to go forward!
Id. (emphasis removed); see also infra section II.D.
140. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3). This provision requires:
(B) Stay of Discovery. In any private action arising under this title, all
discovery and other proceedings shall be stayed during the pendency
of any motion to dismiss, unless the court finds upon the motion of
any party that particularized discovery is necessary to preserve evi-
dence or to prevent undue prejudice to that party.
Id.
141. See supra notes 129-30, 136-37.
142. See In re Glenfed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541 (9th Cir. 1994).
143. See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) ("Fraud, Mistake, Condition of the Mind. In all aver-
ments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall
be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge and other condition of
mind of a person may be averred generally."); see also BABCOCK & MASSARO,
supra note 128, at 317.
144. See Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, A New Standard for Aiders and
Abettors Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 52 Bus. LAw
1, 4 (1996); see also Avery, supra note 127, at 335.
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raising the standard for the original pleading, Congress attempted to
bar many of the available successful avenues of class-action securities
fraud relief.145
Prior to passage of the PSLRA, the debate about the heightened
pleading standard for securities fraud actions intensified through a
split in the U.S. Court of Appeals, where the Second Circuit adopted a
very strict particularized pleading requirement and the Ninth Circuit
adopted a significantly less strenuous pleading standard for securities
fraud class actions.146 Essentially, both Circuits identified the need
for securities fraud pleadings to meet the heightened pleading stan-
dard required by Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules. However, the Second
Circuit directed plaintiffs appearing before the federal courts in that
Circuit to plead intent and knowledge with very specific allegations:
It is reasonable to require that the plaintiffs specifically plead those events
which they assert give rise to a strong inference that the defendants had
knowledge of the facts contained in . . . the complaint or recklessly disre-
garded their existence. And, of course, plaintiffs must fix the time when these
particular events occurred. 147
Thus, pre-PSLRA, the Second Circuit mandated that securities fraud
claimants plead facts giving rise to a strong inference of fraudulent
intent.148
145. See supra notes 135-41 and accompanying text; see also President's Message to
the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act, supra note 124, at 2. President Clinton, in his PSLRA
veto statement, discussing the heightened pleading standard, stated:
The conferees deleted an amendment offered by Senator Specter and
adopted by the Senate that specifically incorporated Second Circuit case
law with respect to pleading a claim of fraud. Then they specifically in-
dicated that they were not adopting the Second Circuit case law but in-
stead intended to "strengthen" the existing pleading requirements of the
Second Circuit. All this shows that the conferees meant to erect a higher
barrier to bringing suit than any now existing-one so high that even the
most aggrieved investors with the most painful losses may get tossed out
of court before they have a chance to prove their case.
Id. at 1-2 (emphasis added).
146. Compare Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 946 (1980), with In re Glenfed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541 (9th Cir. 1994)
(en banc).
147. A-H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d at 558.
148. Of course, requiring parties to plead fraudulent intent with specificity, prior to
discovery, is a daunting, nearly impossible task that is not required by the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure. The Second Circuit wrote this requirement into its
securities fraud jurisprudence and was criticized for its activism in so doing. See
In re Glenfed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d at 1546. The Ninth Circuit criticized the
Second Circuit thusly:
The Second Circuit's test may or may not have the effect of deterring or
weeding out "strike suits," which various courts have seen as imposing
undesirable social and economic costs.... Whether the test has such an
effect is beside the point. We are not permitted to add new requirements
to Rule 9(b) simply because we like the effect of doing so. This is a job for
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In contrast, the Ninth Circuit held firmly that intent (scienter)
could be averred generally in a securities fraud lawsuit, but that
under Rule 9(b), fraud alone must be pled with specificity:
To allege fraud with particularity, a plaintiff must set forth more than the
neutral facts necessary to identify the transaction. The plaintiff must set
forth what is false or misleading about a statement, and why it is false. In
other words, the plaintiff must set forth an explanation as to why the state-
ment or omission complained of was false or misleading. A plaintiff might do
less and still identify the statements complained of .... 149
Motivated by the split in the Court of Appeals, the 104th Congress,
rather than wait for Supreme Court interpretation of what was re-
quired under Rule 9(b), leaped at the opportunity to severely restrict
securities fraud actions by adopting an unprecedented "special plead-
ing" requirement, completely independent of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the requirements of Rule 9(b)-the "super heightened"
pleading standard for securities fraud plaintiffs.15
0
While some argue that the PSLRA adopted, in essence, the Second
Circuit's securities fraud pleading formulation,151 the reality is that
the pleading standard created under the PSLRA is even more strin-
gent than that promulgated by the Second Circuit.15 2 At the brink of
PSLRA adoption in 1995 and adoption of the "super 'heightened"
pleading standard, Senator Paul Sarbanes, (D-Maryland), reminded
the U.S. Senate that the Second Circuit standard, which the Revolu-
tion Congress sought to codify, was the harshest pleading standard
adopted by any U.S. Court of Appeals and was the decidedly minority
view amongst the U.S. circuit courts.' 53 Notwithstanding, the Revolu-
tion Congress adopted the Second Circuit's pleading standard, but re-
Congress, or for the various legislative, judicial, and advisory bodies in-
volved in the process of amending the Federal Rules.
Id. In adopting the Second Circuit's "super" heightened pleading standard, and
arguably even more, Congress for the first time in history adopted special plead-
ings that are independent of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 9(b).
See infra note 152.
149. In re Glenfed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d at 1546.
150. See supra notes 129, 148; see also BABCOCK & MASSARO, supra note 128, at 323
('One thing is clear: Special pleading rules now apply to federal private securities
litigation that are independent of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Will this development lead
to a proliferation of special pleading rules in other areas? If so, is this a potential
revival of the writs?").
151. See BABCOCK & MAssABo, supra note 128, at 321 ("A plaintiff now must 'state
with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted
with the required state of mind,' essentially adopting the Second Circuit
position.").
152. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (regarding President Clinton's veto
statement); see also infra notes 265-68 and accompanying text (Senator
Sarbanes' Senate floor speech in opposition to the PSLRA).
153. See 141 CONG. REC. 35,242 (1995) (statement of Senator Sarbanes) ("This stan-
dard says investors who seek to file securities fraud cases must 'specifically allege
facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with a required
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fused to codify the Second Circuit's later clarifying caselaw that
enunciated clearer standards for applying the super heightened plead-
ing standard.154
As predicted, this PSLRA "super heightened" pleading standard
has led to much confusion. Because the Revolution Congress failed to
adopt Second Circuit clarifying language for securities fraud pleading,
the new standard was promulgated in great ambiguity, which has led
to "a great deal of litigation in the past few years over precisely what
plaintiffs must plead to survive a motion for summary judgment, re-
state of mind.' This standard, it should be noted, is more stringent than the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure and is the minority view among the circuit courts.").
154. This failure to adopt clarifying case law was the basis for arguments that the
PSLRA pleading standard initiated an even stricter standard than that imposed
by the Second Circuit. See 141 CONG. REC. 35,242 (1995) (statement of Senator
Sarbanes). Senator Sarbanes carefully explained how the PSLRA standard
eclipsed the Second Circuit pleading standard in severity:
When the bill came to the Senate floor, the Senate adopted an
amendment to this provision offered by the distinguished Senator from
Pennsylvania, Senator Specter. Senator Specter's amendment codified
into the legislation additional second circuit holdings clarifying the stan-
dard they had earlier enunciated. These additional holdings state that a
plaintiff may meet the pleading standard by alleging facts showing the
defendant had motive and opportunity to commit fraud, or constituting
strong circumstantial evidence of state of mind. In other words, the sec-
ond circuit laid down this standard and then had subsequent opinions
that elaborated upon it and developed it, and Senator Specter said that if
you are going to include the second circuit standard as initially enunci-
ated, you should also include the further holdings by the second circuit
clarifying this standard.
This, I think, was the one pro-investor amendment adopted on the
Senate floor. What happened to this amendment in conference? It disap-
peared. It was dropped from the legislation. This is part of this process
that I have been outlining here of now you see it, now you don't. Of
course, the person who bears the brunt of that is the investor.
The draft conference report deleted the Specter amendment, leaving
investors without the protection of the additional second circuit hold-
ings. Once again, a pro-investor provision that would have provided
some balance to the bill was removed.
Id. (emphasis added); see also President's Message to the House of Representa-
tives Returning Without Approval the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act,
supra note 124. President Clinton stated very specifically in his PSLRA veto
message that:
The conferees deleted an amendment offered by Senator Specter and
adopted by the Senate that specifically incorporated Second Circuit case
law with respect to pleading a claim of fraud. Then they specifically indi-
cated that they were not -adopting Second Circuit case law but instead
intended to "strengthen" the existing pleading requirements of the Second
Circuit. All this shows that the conferees meant to erect a higher barrier
to bringing suit than any now existing-one so high that even the most
aggrieved investors with the most painful losses may get tossed out of
court before they have a chance to prove their case.
Id. (emphasis added).
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sulting in a wide variety of court interpretations."15 5 Once again, the
U.S. Courts of Appeals have adopted various and wide-ranging inter-
pretations of what exactly is required under the "super heightened"
pleading standard.15 6 One commentator claims that an emerging con-
sensus seems to be that allegations of a generalized desire by corpo-
rate executives to raise capital or increase their compensation is not a
specific enough particularized pleading to meet the new standard,
while showing corporate executives' material departures from gener-
ally accepted accounting standards will typically be a specific enough
pleading.15 Notwithstanding, in light of the corporate corruption
that engulfed the U.S. capital markets in 2001 and 2002, the adoption
of the "super heightened" pleading standard now must be critically
examined. To that end, much evidence is available that the adoption
of a "super heightened" pleading standard was wholly unnecessary,'
58
and has led to rarely-before-encountered corporate fraud.159
2. Super Heightened Pleading Standard Unnecessary
Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a height-
ened pleading standard under two specific situations identified by
Congress as necessary: instances of fraud or mistake. 160 Prior to pas-
sage of the PSLRA, Rule 9(b) required all securities fraud allegations
155. BABCOCK & MAssA~o, supra note 128, at 322; see also Elliott J. Weiss, The New
Securities Fraud Pleading Requirement: Speed Bump or Road Block?, 38 ARiz. L.
REV. 675, 677 (1996) ("The problem with which courts have been grappling-and
the problem that [PSLRA] section 21D(b)(2) addresses-is how much more to re-
quire of a plaintiff before allowing her to litigate a claim of open market fraud.");
R. Tyler Hand, Note, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995:
Heightened Pleading Standards in Class Action Litigation, 26 Am. J. TRiAL
ADvoc. 685, 685-86 (2003) ("At the close of 2002, circuits have adopted three
different interpretations of the Reform Act's heightened [pleading] standards.
Until the United States Supreme Court interprets the Reform Act's provisions, it
is likely that a split among the circuits will persist."); Charles F. Hart, Note, In-
terpreting the Heightened Pleading of the Scienter Requirement in Private Securi-
ties Fraud Litigation: The Tenth Circuit Takes the Middle Ground, 80 DENv. U. L.
REV. 577, 604 (2003) (examining the Tenth Circuit's adoption of- the PSLRA
pleading standard "middle ground" highlighting the confused circuit split in in-
terpreting what must be pled to survive a motion to dismiss post-PSLRA).
156. See BABCOCK & MAssARo, supra note 128, at 322.
157. See Steven B. Rosenfeld, Pleading Scienter Under the Private Securities Litiga-
tion Reform Act of 1995, 1085 PLIICoRP. 791 (1998).
158. See Seligman, supra note 132, at 457. Directly prior to PSLRA enactment, Pro-
fessor Seligman argued that "[w]hat has been most lacking in the legislative de-
bate to date has been authentic data that provides empirical or theoretical
support for particularized law revision. If there is a case for significant changes
in the federal securities class action law, it simply has not been presented to
date." Id.
159. See supra subsection II.A.2.
160. See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
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to be pled with particularity.16 1 Already, securities fraud cases re-
quired a heightened pleading. Still, the requirement to plead facts
with particularity as required by Rule 9(b) was not enough to satisfy
the Revolution Congress. 162 As the Republican Revolutionaries took
their seats in the 104th Congress, they immediately invited corporate
executives and corporate lobbyists into their congressional offices to
begin drafting legislation that would deregulate U.S. corporate law
and, in the long run, would end up protecting corporate malfea-
sance. 163 This unprecedented nod to special interests simply was not
necessary to defray securities fraud strike suits.
The pleading requirements and restrictions established by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were appropriately winnowing frivo-
lous lawsuits prior to enactment of the PSLRA. Rule 9(b), Rule
12(b)(6), and Rule 11164 were giving corporate defendants more than
sufficient protection against frivolous claims, as such claims under the
Federal Rules were being dealt with seriously and strenuously.
16 5
Leading academics in the securities regulation field argued persua-
sively in the early 1990s, prior to passage of the PSLRA, that frivolous
strike suits were being dismissed at significant rates, based either on
failures to meet the Rule 9(b) heightened pleading standard or on a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
161. See BABCOCK & MAssARO, supra note 128, at 316-17.
162. See id. at 321-22.
163. See Cook, supra note 10, at 44. Cook describes the environment permeating the
104th Congress as the Contract with America took shape:
Even before the new Congress convened, Representative Tom DeLay,
the Republican majority whip, was assembling a coalition called "Project
Relief." The Project brought together more than 100 groups (and their
lobbyists) behind a very narrow cause: stopping federal regulations of
business.
The honor of serving on Project Relief-and helping to draft the legis-
lation-did not come cheaply, according to a painstaking study of Fed-
eral Election Commission (FEC) records by the Washington, D.C.-based
Environmental Working Group. In just two years (1993-1994), the 115
PACs now associated with Project Relief gave members of the House
$10.3 million. DeLay alone received $38,000. Indiana Republican David
McIntosh, the chairman of the House Regulatory Affairs Subcommittee,
received $37,000 from Project Relief PACs.
Even before DeLay had finished moving into his new office, the collec-
tion of powerful business and industry lobbyists convened, according to a
March article in The Washington Post.
Id.; see also supra note 10 (detailing DeLay's formal admonishment from the
House of Representatives Ethics Committee for unseemly solicitous activity).
164. See FED. R. Cirv. P. 9(b), 11, 12(b)(6).
165. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securi-
ties Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REv. 497, 526 (1991); see also Seligman, supra note
132, at 442 ("In contrast to data supporting the health of capital formation and
testimony on the importance of the private rights of action, there appear to be
only undocumented assertions that litigation in some way has impeded capital
formation.").
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relief might be granted. 16 6 In 1992, the Securities Industry Associa-
tion reported that forty-six motions to dismiss for failure to meet the
pleading standard required by Rule 9(b) were filed, and of those forty-
six motions, twenty-nine were granted-a sixty-three percent dismis-
sal rate.1
6 7
Further, data that was available to the Senate Securities Subcom-
mittee in the early 1990s suggested that the corporate executives
charging that strike suits were crippling corporate America were sig-
nificantly overstating the problem.168 The leading securities plaintiff
litigation law firm reported that in 1990 and 1991, 111 securities
fraud lawsuits were filed, with forty-three being dismissed on mo-
tion-a thirty-eight percent dismissal rate. 16 9 These lawsuits were
being dismissed at the pleading stage, before significant time or ex-
pense had been incurred by the defendant corporation in legal or dis-
covery costs.
Despite the success many corporations were having in knocking
down securities fraud claims at the pleading stage, the Revolution
Congress still felt that corporate interests were not being protected
enough.170 Now, in light of the market collapse of 2002 and the unbe-
lievable trail of corporate fraud, even strong supporters of the Repub-
lican Revolution and the Contract with America are admitting that
the PSLRA simply went too far.171
166. See Alexander, supra note 165, at 526; see also Seligman, supra note 132, at
445-46.
167. See Seligman, supra note 132, at 446 ("One may reasonably infer from such data
that courts have at least some success in winnowing out nonmeritorious
lawsuits.").
168. See id. at 445.
169. See id. at 446; see also Joel Seligman, Rethinking Private Securities Litigation, 73
U. CIN. L. REV. 95, 96 (2004) ("Despite all the emotional appeal of arguments that
excessive litigation was destroying capital formation, the data available at the
time suggested a quite different picture.").
170. See Perino, supra note 121, at 913. Professor Perino carefully examines whether
the PSLRA achieved its primary goals, which were (1) discouraging the filing of
nonmeritorious "strike" suits; (2) reducing litigation risk for high technology issu-
ers; and (3) reducing the "race to the courthouse" wherein class-action securities
lawsuits were "filed soon after significant stock price declines" with little prefil-
ing investigation. Id.; see also Seligman, supra note 169, at 109. Dean Seligman,
reacting to these stated PSLRA goals, observed:
Proponents of a new law are expected to be emphatic in championing
the law's virtues, but [congressional] assertions such as 'the routine fil-
ing of lawsuits against issuers . . . whenever there is a change in an
issuer's stock price, without regard to any underlying culpability of the
issuer" were shocking for their distortion of the available evidence. The
[PSLRA] appeared to be less a response to a litigation crisis than a re-
sponse to a dramatically changed political landscape.
Id. (omission in original); supra note 134.
171. See Profile: Recent Wall Street Scandals Lead to Crackdown on Alleged Corporate
Corruption (NPR radio broadcast, Jan. 19, 2004) (on file with author and availa-
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B. How the PSLRA Amended the Federal Securities Laws
One significant PSLRA revision to the federal securities laws was
the amendment that created a safe-harbor provision for forward-look-
ing statements, which, in effect, served (and still serves) to shield issu-
ers and management from private liability in connection with false or
misleading forward-looking statements.17 2 If an issuer accompanies
its false or misrepresentative information with "meaningful caution-
ary statements," then it will escape private liability under the revised
securities laws.173 Thus, if accompanied by meaningful cautionary
language, intentional misrepresentation and false financial projec-
tions are excused and liability is removed under the PSLRA.174
Under the safe harbor, forward-looking statements, even if false, are not ac-
tionable if they are identified as forward-looking statements and are "accom-
panied by meaningful cautionary statements identifying important factors
that could cause actual results to differ materially from those in the forward-
looking statement." Even if the statement is not properly identified or is not
accompanied by the appropriate cautionary language, it still falls within the
safe harbor if it is immaterial or if the plaintiff fails to prove that the defen-
ble in the Schmid Law Library at the University of Nebraska College of Law)
(detailing recent comments from members of conservative Washington, D.C.
thinktanks admitting that the PSLRA had gone too far).
172. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c) (2000).
173. See id. The new safe harbor provides:
(c) Safe harbor.
(1) In general. Except as provided in subsection (b), in any private
action arising under this title that is based on an untrue state-
ment of a material fact or omission of a material fact necessary to
make the statement not misleading, a person referred to in sub-
section (a) shall not be liable with respect to any forward-looking
statement, whether written or oral, if and to the extent that-
(A) the forward-looking statement is-
(i) identified as a forward-looking statement, and is accom-
panied by meaningful cautionary statements identifying
important factors that could cause actual results to differ
materially from those in the forward-looking statement;
or
(ii) immaterial; or
(B) the plaintiff fails to prove that the forward-looking state-
ment-
(i) if made by a natural person, was made with actual knowl-
edge by that person that the statement was false or mis-
leading; or
(ii) if made by a business entity; was-
(I) made by or with the approval of an executive officer of
that entity; and
(II) made or approved by such officer with actual knowl-
edge by that officer that the statement was false or
misleading ..
Id. (footnote omitted).
174. See id.; see also Perino, supra note 121, at 927.
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dant had "actual knowledge" that the forward-looking statement was false or
misleading.
1 7 5
Certainly, eradicating liability for intentional false projections cannot
square with the intent of the drafters of the federal securities laws in
the 1930s, where the primary objective was to protect investors and
ensure that honest, straightforward information was widely
disseminated. 176
Unquestionably, forward-looking projections are by definition con-
jectural, and safeguards must be in place if corporations are to be in-
duced to make future assessments. 177 Providing a safe harbor from
private liability for all forward-looking statements, even those that
are intentionally misleading, goes too far.1
78
175. Perino, supra note 121, at 927 (quoting language enunciated in various provi-
sions of the PSLRA).
176. See supra notes 57-61, 67-71 and accompanying text.
177. See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIEs REGULATION 1008-09 (9th
ed. 2003). Professors Coffee and Seligman describe the genesis of "forward look-
ing statements" in required disclosure documents as follows:
More than the case decisions, the most significant driving force for
mandatory disclosure of forward looking statements was the SEC. Item
303(a) of Regulation S-K effectively requires management to disclose
certain estimates and projections in its Management's Discussion and
Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations (the "MD &
A"), which is a required item in both the Annual Report on Form 10-K
and the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q. Specifically, the MD & A must
contain a description of "known trends . ..demands, commitments,
events or uncertainties that will result in or that are reasonably likely to
result in the registrant's liquidity increasing or decreasing in any mate-
rial way." Similar disclosure is required of "any known trends or uncer-
tainties that have had or that the registrant reasonably expects will
have a material favorable or unfavorable impact on net sales or income
from continuing operations."
Id. at 1008 (citations omitted). Further, the SEC has drawn a careful distinction
between required prospective information and voluntary forward-looking
disclosure:
"Both required disclosure regarding the future impact of presently
known trends, events or uncertainties and optional forward-looking in-
formation may involve some prediction or projection. The distinction be-
tween the two rests with the nature of the prediction required. Required
disclosure is based on currently known trends, events and uncertainties
that are reasonably expected to have material effects, such as a reduc-
tion in the registrant's product prices; erosion in the registrant's market
share; changes in insurance coverage; or the likely non-renewal of a ma-
terial contract. In contrast, optional forward-looking disclosure involves
anticipating a future trend or event or anticipating a less predictable
impact of a known event, trend or uncertainty."
Id. at 1009 (quoting Exchange Act Release No. 6711, 38 S.E.C. Docket 138,
140-41 (1987)); see generally id. at 1020-21 (discussing generally the "bespeaks
caution" doctrine and the codification of that doctrine in the PSLRA).
178. See HAZEN & RATNER, supra note 67, at 256. In describing the impetus behind
the enactment of the "safe harbor" protecting forward-looking statements, Hazen
and Ratner describe:
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Another PSLRA revision to the federal securities laws was the
amendment that requires courts in a private securities fraud action to
set forth specific findings detailing whether plaintiffs' counsel com-
plied with Rule 11(b)179 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.18 0
This provision places an automatic Rule 11 burden on federal judges
and simultaneously threatens securities fraud class-action plaintiffs'
attorneys with personal liability if the allegations in the complaint
lack adequate factual support.'18 This Rule 11 provision of the
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, enacted for the
purpose of restricting class actions against publicly-held corporations on
the basis of allegedly inaccurate projections . . . codifies the "bespeaks
caution" doctrine by providing that a company cannot be held liable for a
"forward looking statement [that] is accompanied by meaningful cau-
tionary statements identifying important factors that could cause actual
results to differ materially from those in the forward looking statement."
Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)).
179. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b). Regarding the truthfulness-in-pleading requirements
of Rule 11, Dean Mary Kay Kane notes:
The two most common methods used to promote truthfulness in
pleading and discourage the filing of frivolous claims and defenses are
an attorney signature requirement and verification. In many jurisdic-
tions, the attorney is required to sign the pleadings and that signature
stands as a certification that the claim or defense is filed in good faith-
that there are good grounds to support it and that it is not interposed for
purposes of delay....
' * . [T]he federal rules were amended in 1983 to provide that the
attorney signature is to be affixed only after "a reasonable inquiry" as to
whether there are sufficient grounds in law and in fact to support the
pleadings. Fed.Rule 11. Sanctions for noncompliance were made
mandatory. These changes were designed to allow the court to apply
objective criteria as to the attorneys' reasonable inquiry and to enlarge
the use of the sanction power so as to deter marginal conduct. Consider-
able litigation involving Rule 11 occurred after its amendment and ques-
tions were raised concerning very basic features of the revised
requirement, as well as whether the amended rule was achieving its pur-
pose or was breeding a new form of satellite litigation. Thus, there was
substantial pressure to revise the rule and 1993 amendments were made
to try to respond to some of the criticism.
The revised rule continues to utilize an objective, rather than subjec-
tive, bad-faith standard for assessing whether the signer made a reason-
able inquiry and concluded that the pleading was well-grounded in fact
and law .... Sanctions for violations are now discretionary, however,
and a "safe harbor" provision is included by which parties desiring to
request sanctions must wait at least 21 days after the paper has been
filed and, if the alleged violation is cured in that period, no sanction mo-
tion can be filed. Fed.Rule 11(c)(1)(A).
MARY KAY KANE, CrVIL PROCEDURE: IN A NUTSHELL 100-01 (5th ed. 2003).
180. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(c)(1) (2000). This PSLRA provision provides:
(1) Mandatory review by court. In any private action arising under this
title, upon final adjudication of the action, the court shall include in
the record specific findings regarding compliance by each party and
each attorney representing any party with each requirement of Rule
11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as to any complaint,
responsive pleading, or dispositive motion.
181. See id.; see also Lerach, supra note 13, at 77.
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PSLRA was intended to act as a profound disincentive to plaintiffs'
lawyers for bringing securities fraud class-action lawsuits. Requiring
a federal court to always set forth specific findings as to whether an
attorney met his or her Rule 11 burden is an unprecedented require-
ment,'8 2 meant to discourage victims of securities fraud from hiring
attorneys,1 8 3 and to dissuade securities fraud attorneys from monitor-
ing the securities markets for apparent fraudulent behavior on the
part of U.S. businesses and soliciting clients for the purpose of bring-
ing suit against malfeasant corporations.I
8 4
Pre-PSLRA, the Rule 11 criterion for securities fraud lawsuits was
the same as in all other federal actions.1 8 5 Opposing parties ordina-
rily brought a Rule 11 motion for sanctions, and a federal judge, after
waiting twenty-one days to determine whether the alleged violation
was cured, then determined whether sanctions were warranted in his
or her discretion.' 8 6 Now, under the PSLRA, a judge must set forth
Rule 11 findings and is forced to impose sanctions if a single allegation
lacks adequate factual support.187
182. See generally KANE, supra note 179, at 100-02 (describing the policy behind Rule
11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and detailing the normal process of
requesting Rule 11 sanctions).
183. See 141 CONG. REC. 35,242 (1995) (statement of Senator Sarbanes). In referring
to the PSLRA the evening of its enactment, Senator Sarbanes guessed that the
purpose of the Act was not just to end frivolous securities fraud lawsuits, but to
end almost all securities fraud lawsuits:
Disparate treatment. The bill, as sent out of the Senate, had balanced
treatment with respect to plaintiffs and defendants. Now [after the bill
had returned from conference] we have this disparate treatment, and
there is not justification for it. Its true purpose, I think, is to scare inves-
tors from bringing meritorious fraud suits. When the conference re-
moved the balance from this provision, it was not deterring frivolous
lawsuits, it was hurting investors.
Id. (emphasis added).
184. See generally Lerach, supra note 13, at 94 (noting prior to PSLRA enactment that
if these disincentive provisions were enacted, then securities fraud plaintiffs' law-
yers, like himself, would be unable to bring private victim lawsuits). Lerach, tes-
tifying before Congress, prior to passage of the PSLRA, avowed:
If the antifraud provisions of the securities laws are gutted [as proposed
in the PSLRA] ... don't worry about me, I will go make a living some-
where else. Worry about the public and your markets, and in ten or fif-
teen years you will be holding another hearing with the debacle in the
securities markets that will make you remember the S&L mess with fond-
ness. Because the fraudsters and the dishonest [corporate executives]
are there, and if the prohibitions against fraud are removed, they will
come forward and they will become more active ....
Id. (emphasis added).
185. See generally KANE, supra note 179, at 100-02 (describing the policy behind Rule
11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and detailing the normal process of
requesting Rule 11 sanctions).
186. See generally id.
187. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(c)(2) (2000). This section of the PSLRA provides:
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Once again, the 104th Congress enacted a provision changing the
requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in an unprece-
dented way, and again, only in the securities fraud lawsuit arena. The
1993 amendments to Rule 11 and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
were based almost entirely upon the notion that federal district court
judges were to be granted broad discretion in determining whether
and when to impose Rule 11 sanctions.l8 8 Two short years later, the
Revolution Congress removed its grant of broad discretion under Rule
11 and imposed a mandatory, discretionless obligation upon federal
district court judges to sanction pleading-weak parties in securities
fraud cases. 18 9
A further PSLRA amendment to the federal securities laws se-
verely limits damages available to successful securities fraud plain-
tiffs by establishing a damage award arrived at by comparing the
market price of the security to the difference between the purchase or
sale price of the security and the mean trading price of that security
during a ninety-day period beginning on the date on which the fraudu-
lent activity was disclosed.190 This places serious limitations on the
damages a defrauded investor can recover; this only after a plaintiff
successfully navigates the minefield laid down by other PSLRA
provisions.191
In enacting the PSLRA, the Revolution Congress attempted to bolt
the doors to federal relief for class-action securities fraud plaintiffs,19 2
(2) Mandatory sanctions. If the court makes a finding under paragraph
(1) that a party or attorney violated any requirement of Rule 11(b) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as to any complaint, responsive
pleading, or dispositive motion, the court shall impose sanctions on
such party or attorney in accordance with Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Prior to making a finding that any party or
attorney has violated Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
the court shall give such party or attorney notice and an opportunity
to respond.
Id.
188. See BABCOCK & MAssARo, supra note 128, at 384-87.
189. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(c)(2).
190. See id. This provision states:
(1) In general. Except as provided in paragraph (2), in any private ac-
tion arising under this title in which the plaintiff seeks to establish
damages by reference to the market price of a security, the award of
damages to the plaintiff shall not exceed the difference between the
purchase or sale price paid or received, as appropriate, by the plain-
tiff for the subject security and the mean trading price of that secur-
ity during the 90-day period beginning on the date on which the
information correcting the misstatement or omission that is the basis
for the action is disseminated to the market.
Id.
191. See supra note 139 (describing the attempted lock-down of available federal court
relief for victims of securities fraud after the passage of the PSLRA); see also
infra note 233 and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 134; see also infra note 233 and accompanying text.
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to deter lawyers from bringing securities fraud cases,
19 3 and to dis-
pirit victims of securities fraud from finding an attorney and bringing
a fraud lawsuit.19 4 But even after an attorney, a victim, and/or a class
has surpassed each impediment imposed by the PSLRA, and been
deemed a victor in a lawsuit, any recovery is severely constricted for
the victims of corporate fraud. 195 Some argue that the Revolution
Congress attempted to effectively "reform" successful private securi-
ties class actions out of existence.
196
In 1994, the U.S. Supreme Court contributed to the 104th Con-
gress's deregulation and reform fray by boosting the plaintiffs proof
requirement in a claim for aiding and abetting in violation of the fed-
eral securities laws.19 7 Now, in order to prevail in a private right of
action alleging aiding and abetting liability, the plaintiff must prove
that the harm done by the aider and abettor was the "proximate
cause" of a defendant's fraudulent activity.
1 9 8 Further, a court can
reduce or deny recovery if the harm was caused by mere market de-
preciation. 199 Prior to Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate
193. See supra notes 179-84 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
196. See Lerach, supra note 13, at 87; see also supra note 139. But see Wong, supra
note 128, at 833-34 (detailing the increase of securities fraud class actions in
recent years); see also Perino, supra note 121, at 915 (detailing a voluminous case
study indicating that more securities class-action lawsuits have been filed annu-
ally after passage of the PSLRA):
To explore whether the Reform Act achieved [its] goals, this article uses
a database of 1,449 securities fraud class actions filed in federal court
from 1996 to 2001, the first six years after passage of the PSLRA.
The picture that emerges from studying these data is complicated. It
seems clear, however, that the PSLRA did not work as its backers in-
tended. The best available evidence suggests that there are as many, if
not more, class actions filed annually after passage of the PSLRA as
before.
Id. (footnote omitted). While recognizing that the number of lawsuits filed post-
PSLRA has increased, Perino acknowledges that no quantifiable data yet reveals
the reason behind the increase in filings:
To date . . .the evidence suggests that securities class actions are at
least as frequent following passage of the PSLRA as they were before if
not more frequent. Whether this apparent increase is due to an in-
creased level of fraud, an increase in filings in response to the increase in
risk plaintiffs' attorneys face, or both remains unanswered.
Id. at 941-42. A fairly obvious logical conclusion would be that in light of the
corporate malfeasance that plagued the markets in the late 1990s and the disin-
tegration of the "dot-com" boom in Silicon Valley at the same time, an increase in
securities class-action lawsuits filed is simply a byproduct of the astonishing
fraud perpetrated by corporate wrongdoers following PSLRA passage.
197. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S.
164 (1994).
198. See id. at 177-79.
199. See Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 144, at 7.
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Bank of Denver, N.A.,200 to prevail on an aiding and abetting claim, a
plaintiff was not required to show "proximate cause"; instead, a "but
for" showing was enough to prove that an entity aided and abetted a
corporate fraud.201 This new rule makes it exceedingly more difficult
for a victim of securities fraud to hold liable and responsible the other
involved parties, including underwriters, accountants, and law firms
that assist in the perpetuation of the corporate fraud.202
Essentially, Central Bank removed the private cause of action
against secondary actors in securities fraud scenarios. "By the time
the Supreme Court issued the Central Bank opinion, aiding and abet-
ting liability had been a viable cause of action in the federal courts for
twenty-five years."20 3 Thus, secondary liability attaching to lawyers,
underwriters, or accountants is no longer an available tool for securi-
ties class-action plaintiffs. Central Bank did however provide that pri-
vate causes of action could in fact be brought against secondary actors
so long as it can be proven that the secondary actors were primary
violators in the fraud action. 20 4
To further slant the playing field in favor of corporations and cor-
porate interests, the 104th Congress also enacted a number of supple-
mentary roadblocks to class-action securities fraud plaintiffs. The
PSLRA requires plaintiffs who seek to bring a class-action lawsuit to
undergo a certification process, whereby potential plaintiffs certify
that they are not being paid to bring the lawsuit, that they authorize
the filing of the lawsuit, and that they are willing to represent the
class. 20 5 The plaintiff also is required to identify any other class ac-
tions that have been filed in the past three years wherein she has
200. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
201. See id. at 168-70.
202. See generally supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
203. Joseph F. Morrissey, Catching the Culprits: Is Sarbanes-Oxley Enough?, 2003
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 800, 816 (2003). "Nevertheless, in 1994 the Supreme Court
swooped in and eliminated federal private rights of action under section 10(b) and
rule 10b-5 for aiding and abetting securities fraud." Id.
204. Id. at 820 ("The Central Bank Court explained that if all the elements of a pri-
mary [10b-5] violation are present then liability should attach to the secondary
actor whether that actor is an accountant, a lawyer, a banker or anyone else.").
205. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(2)(A) (2000). This "certification" provision provides:
(2) Certification filed with complaint.
(A) In general. Each plaintiff seeking to serve as a representative
party on behalf of a class shall provide a sworn certification,
which shall be personally signed by such plaintiff and filed with
the complaint, that-
(i) states that the plaintiff has reviewed the complaint and au-
thorized its filing;
(ii) states that the plaintiff did not purchase the security that is
the subject of the complaint at the direction of plaintiffs
counsel or in order to participate in any private action aris-
ing under this title;
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served as a representative party.2 0 6 Also, a plaintiff is prohibited
from being a lead plaintiff in more than five securities class actions
brought within a three-year period. 207 The PSLRA further requires
that the federal district court appoint a lead plaintiff in securities
fraud class actions by determining who is the most capable of repre-
senting the class interests. 2 08 The appointment must take place
ninety days after notice is given of the implementation of the ac-
tion. 209 This lead-plaintiff appointment provision of the PSLRA has
led to confusion, ambiguity, and controversy in the federal courts.
2 10
(iii) states that the plaintiff is willing to serve as a representa-
tive party on behalf of a class, including providing testimony
at deposition and trial, if necessary;
(iv) sets forth all of the transactions of the plaintiff in the secur-
ity that is the subject of the complaint during the class pe-
riod specified in the complaint;
(v) identifies any other action under this title, filed during the
3-year period preceding the date on which the certification is
signed by the plaintiff, in which the plaintiff has sought to
serve as a representative party on behalf of a class; and
(vi) states that the plaintiff will not accept any payment for
serving as a representative party on behalf of a class beyond
the plaintiffs pro rata share of any recovery, except as or-
dered or approved by the court in accordance with para-
graph (4).
Id.
206. Id.
207. See id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(vi). This "professional plaintiff" provision requires:
(vi) Restrictions on professional plaintiffs. Except as the court may oth-
erwise permit, consistent with the purposes of this section, a person
may be a lead plaintiff, or an officer, director, or fiduciary of a lead
plaintiff, in no more than 5 securities class actions brought as plain-
tiff class actions pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
during any 3-year period.
Id.
208. See id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i). This provision states in pertinent part:
(i) In general. Not later than 90 days after the date on which a notice is
published under subparagraph (A)(i), the court shall consider any
motion made by a purported class member in response to the notice,
including any motion by a class member who is not individually
named as a plaintiff in the complaint or complaints, and shall appoint
as lead plaintiff the member or members of the purported plaintiff
class that the court determines to be most capable of adequately rep-
resenting the interests of class members (hereafter in this paragraph
referred to as the "most adequate plaintiff") in accordance with this
subparagraph.
Id.
209. See id.
210. See Wong, supra note 128, at 833-34 ("The PSLRA instructs courts to adopt a
presumption that the most adequate party to represent the plaintiff class is the
one with the greatest financial interest who also satisfies the Requirement of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. District courts are currently split as to
whether or not defendants may challenge the adoption of the lead plaintiff pre-
sumption prior to a motion for class certification, and appellate courts seem un-
willing to rule on the issue.") (citations omitted).
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Again, the Revolution Congress assigned a completely different set of
procedures to securities fraud class actions as compared with the
traditional procedural norms for certifying typical class actions.2 11
Additionally, a PSLRA amendment eliminated joint and several li-
ability for corporate defendants, allowing plaintiff recovery only if
fraudulent defendants knowingly committed a violation of the federal
securities laws.212 Defendants that have not knowingly committed a
211. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23; see also KANE, supra note 179, at 255-63 (describing the
typical procedures followed in federal class actions and the certification process
prescribed). Kane explains the general purpose and utility of the class action and
the certification process as follows:
The class action device allows one or more persons to sue or be sued
on behalf of themselves and other individuals who allegedly possess sim-
ilar grievances or have been harmed in a similar way. The action is per-
mitted to be brought in a representative fashion in order to allow the
assertion of legal rights in situations in which the numbers of people
involved and, in some instances, the small individual amounts involved,
otherwise effectively would prevent the vindication of those rights. The
device also is an efficient and economical means for the courts and the
parties to try a case in which there are common interests, rather than
having to resort to multiple, duplicative lawsuits. Thus, class suits serve
several important objectives....
The most widely used class action statute is the 1966 version of Fed-
eral Rule 23, which governs the federal courts, as well as in several
states. The rule sets out requirements in the first two subdivisions, and
then in the remaining three sections provides guidance to the courts on
how to manage class actions. These last sections include: notice provi-
sions, setting forth when notice is required and what should be included
(23(c)(2) and (d)(2)); authority for restructuring the action by subclassing
(23(c)(4)), and for allowing absent members to intervene (23(d)(3)); and
provisions for approving and controlling settlements (23(e)). The focus is
to encourage the development of flexible management devices and to pro-
vide the courts with some guidance in that area.
The class requirements under Federal Rule 23 also are stated
pragmatically. The party seeking class certification must show that the
action meets the requirements set out in 23(a) and falls within one of the
three categories of 23(b). The basic requirements in [231(a) are [imprac-
ticable joinder, common questions, and adequacy of representation are
present].... [Tihe subdivision (b) categories... provide more guidance
and with the intention that all class action judgments will be binding
regardless of which type of suit is presented. Rule 23(b)(1) focuses on the
possible adverse impact of a non-class judgment on the opposing party,
who might be placed in an impossible position if faced with conflicting
individual judgments, or on the absent class members, whose interests
might be practically impaired if class action treatment were denied.
Rule 23(b)(2) authorizes class suits in which injunctive or declaratory
relief is appropriate on a class-wide basis. Rule 23(b)(3) allows class
treatment if common questions predominate and if a class suit is the
superior means of handling the controversy. This last provision is the
catchall and there is considerable discretion given to the court to deter-
mine superiority.
Id. at 255, 260-61 (emphasis added).
212. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(fX2)(A). The joint and several liability provision reads:
(A) Joint and several liability. Any covered person against whom a final
judgment is entered in a private action shall be liable for damages
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federal securities law violation can only be held proportionately liable
under this provision of the PSLRA.213 Ultimately, the practical effect
of this provision is that if one particular corporate malefactor is insol-
vent, the plaintiff in a securities fraud litigation, after somehow navi-
gating the minefield laid down by the PSLRA and being deemed
victorious, may only be able to recover proportionately from other per-
petrating firms and will be unable to recover full damages suffered as
a result of the bankrupt company's fraud.
Finally, the PSLRA reforms the federal securities laws in a num-
ber of additional ways: broker-dealers are prohibited from taking fees
from class-action lawyers for assisting in identifying class plaintiffs;
terms of all proposed settlements must be fully disclosed; and attor-
neys' fees are restricted to "a reasonable percentage of the damages
* . . actually paid to the class."2 14
Once again, in enacting the PSLRA, the 104th Congress sought not
only to fasten the doors tight against many federal class-action securi-
ties fraud plaintiffs, 2 15 but also to deter lawyers from bringing securi-
ties fraud cases, 2 1 6 to dispirit victims of securities fraud from finding
an attorney and bringing a lawsuit, 21 7 to limit the availability of aid-
ing and abetting claims against enabling firms and entities, 2 18 and to
impose a variety of roadblocks against securities fraud class-action
plaintiffs. 2 19 And, once an attorney, a victim, and/or a class had inex-
plicably surpassed each barrier imposed by the 104th Congress and
the PSLRA and been deemed vanquisher in a lawsuit, any prospective
damages claim against a bankrupt corporate bad actor was severely
constricted by the elimination of the potential for joint and several
liability. 220
jointly and severally only if the trier of fact specifically determines
that such covered person knowingly committed a violation of the se-
curities laws.
Id.
213. See id. § 78u-4(f)(2)(B)(i). This section provides:
(i) In general. Except as provided in subparagraph (A), a covered person
against whom a final judgment is entered in a private action shall be
liable solely for the portion of the judgment that corresponds to the
percentage of responsibility of that covered person, as determined
under paragraph (3).
Id.
214. See RATNER & HAZEN, supra note 60, at 271.
215. See supra note 139 (describing the attempted lock-down of available federal court
relief available to victims of securities fraud after passage of the PSLRA); see also
infra note 233 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 180-84 and accompanying text.
217. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 197-204 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 205-11 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 212-13 and accompanying text.
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Amidst the deregulation hysteria that gripped the 1994 Republi-
can Revolution and the Contract with America, the Revolution Con-
gress lowered its deregulatory hammer on the federal securities laws
and rolled back protections that had been in place for dozens of years.
Content to let corporate America and the U.S. capital markets regu-
late themselves in many areas, the 104th Congress removed con-
straints, liabilities, responsibilities, and disincentives from the
securities laws. Chaos ensued.
22 1
The Revolution Congress cannot claim that it was not
forewarned.
2 22
C. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998
In order to avoid the super heightened pleading standard created
by the PSLRA, some securities fraud plaintiffs were opting, after
1995, to bring their claims in state court, preferring instead to meet
the pleading standards imposed by state blue sky laws. 223 Congress,
still infiltrated with Republican Revolutionaries, sought to foreclose
this avenue by passing the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards
Act of 1998 ("SLUSA").224 SLUSA requires that all securities class
actions against nationally traded companies be brought in federal
court, rather than in state court. 22 5 As one commentator notes,
SLUSA has fairly specific requirements: "essentially provid[ing] for
federal preemption of state jurisdiction in class action law suits based
on securities fraud where damages are sought on behalf of more than
fifty persons and the securities involved are . . . listed on a national
exchange or are ... senior as nationally listed securities."2 26
D. The Effect of the PSLRA on the Securities Industry
Despite explicit warnings and detailed projections of the deleteri-
ous impact passage of the PSLRA would have on the U.S. capital mar-
kets,22 7 the Revolution Congress cavalierly passed the legislation
221. See supra notes 78-100; see also infra Part IV.
222. See infra section II.E.
223. See BABCOCK & MAssARo, supra note 128, at 324; see also Morrissey, supra note
203, at 834 ("Following the PSLRA's attempt to 'reform' securities litigation-or
simply to limit it-a perception arose that securities fraud attorneys were avoid-
ing the new limitations by bringing suit in state courts under more permissive
state anti-fraud statutes and common law.").
224. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f) (2000).
225. See BABCOCK & MAssABo, supra note 128, at 324 ("The special federal pleading
rules for securities cases do not apply to state courts. In an effort to prevent
investors from eluding [PSLRAI by filing in state court, Congress passed S. 1260,
the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998.").
226. Morrissey, supra note 203, at 835.
227. See infra section II.E.
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anyway.228 Following an unprecedented five-year increase in the cap-
ital markets from 1995 to 2000, the bubble burst in a spate of malfea-
sance, fraud, and deceit. 2 29 One enduring legacy of the PSLRA and
1990s Revolution Congress deregulation will be the market crash of
2002.230 "Simply put, Congress reduced the incentives against com-
mitting fraud."2 31 Thus, the first effect of PSLRA's impact on the se-
curities industry was the market crash of 2002, which is described in
some detail below.
2 32
Another PSLRA effect is the arguable barricade that has been er-
ected between securities fraud plaintiffs and the U.S. federal
courts.23 3 One commentator plainly stated "You can't get discovery
unless you have a strong evidence of fraud, and you can't get strong
evidence of fraud without discovery."
23 4
[Slince the 1995 [Public Securities Litigation Reform] Act [the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit] has thrown 18 consecutive securities fraud
suits by investors out of court. Eighteen times in a row, using the 1995 Act, the
Ninth Circuit has sided with corporate interests and closed the courthouse door
228. See supra notes 10-12, 115-25.
229. See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
230. See infra Part IV. The effects of the market crash of 2002 continued well into
2003, as the U.S. capital markets lurched around in fits and starts and the U.S.
unemployment numbers continued to climb, despite sometimes-rosy predictions
that the recession had ended. See Mark Gongloff, Job Cut Announcements Up
43%, CNN.coM, Aug. 5, 2003 ("U.S. job-cut announcements jumped in July [2003]
to their highest level in three months .... another sign that the longest job-mar-
ket slump since World War II continues. U.S. employers announced 85,117 job
cuts in July, a 43 percent jump from 59,715 in June, according to Chicago-based
outplacement firm Challenger Gray & Christmas, which publishes monthly tal-
lies of job-cut announcements."), at http:llmoney.cnn.com/2003/08/05/news/econ-
omy/layoffs/indexlhtm.
231. Mikva, supra note 118, at 50. Mikva, in charging the Revolution Congress with
"enabling fraud" writes:
The PSLRA created new, special legal immunities for misleading "for-
ward looking" statements .....
The PSLRA also limited the liability of accountants who blew audits
and of others who were found guilty of fraud. It elevated pleading re-
quirements and made it harder to get normal court discovery, forcing
defrauded shareholders virtually to make their entire case even before
they went to court. Equally significant, lawmakers ignored the SEC's
request and rejected attempts to overturn two 5-4 Supreme Court deci-
sions that had restricted the agency's ability to fight securities fraud.
Id.
232. See infra Part IV.
233. See Hart, supra note 155, at 577 (describing the great difficulty securities fraud
plaintiffs face in trying to secure discovery); see also supra note 139. But see Per-
ino, supra note 121, at 929-36 (examining and seeking to explain the increase in
securities fraud class-action filings after passage of the PSLRA); see also Wong,
supra note 128, at 834.
234. Hart, supra note 155, at 577.
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to defrauded investors. Not one complaint out of 18 upheld or permitted to go
forward!
2 3 5
Since the PSLRA strictures were enacted in 1995, at least through
2002, the Ninth Circuit has upheld dismissal of many if not most
class-action securities fraud complaints that have come before it.236
Rarely has a plaintiff, in the view of the Ninth Circuit, been able to
present a complaint that pled particularized facts that show a "strong
inference" that each named defendant acted with a specific intent to
defraud.2
3 7
Jarringly, prior to the crash of 2002, securities plaintiffs brought
fraud lawsuits against WorldCom (in early 2000),238 Tyco (in late
1999),239 Arthur Andersen (in early 2000),240 and DeLoitte & Touche
235. Lerach, supra note 13, at 87; see also supra note 196.
236. See Lerach, supra note 13, at 87; see also Seligman, supra note 169, at 111-12
("In large part because of the pleading standards in the [PSLRA], the federal
circuits have dismissed a significant proportion of federal securities class actions
on the basis of the complaint filed. An empirical study.., of motions to dismiss
under the 1995 Act between 1996 and 2001 found that the Ninth Circuit granted
motions to dismiss in 61 percent of the cases.").
237. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2000); see also supra notes 135-39. But see Perino,
supra note 121, at 926-27 (noting that the Ninth Circuit has adopted the "most
rigorous version" of the super heightened pleading standard and that most cir-
cuits have adopted an intermediate position between the Ninth Circuit's stan-
dard (most rigorous) and the Second Circuit's standard (least rigorous)).
Professor Perino argues that some of his data suggests that the rigorous interpre-
tation of the super heightened pleading standard by the Ninth Circuit has in-
creased the quality and decreased the number of cases filed. See id. at 942.
238. See In re MCI WorldCom, Inc., Sec. Litig., 191 F. Supp. 2d 778, 781 (S.D. Miss.
2002). In March 2000, fully two years before the WorldCom implosion, a share-
holder securities fraud class-action suit was filed against MCI WorldCom and its
management. See id. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Missis-
sippi, constrained by the PSLRA pleading standard, dismissed the lawsuit in
March 2002, finding that the alleged facts did not give rise to a strong inference
of intentional misconduct or severe recklessness. See id. at 784. Three months
later, in June 2002, the WorldCom bomb dropped. See supra notes 85-88, 88; see
also infra section IV.C.
239. See In re Tyco Int'l, Ltd., Sec. Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d 102, 104 (D. N.H. 2002). In
December 1999, fully two years before the Tyco calamity, a shareholder securities
fraud class-action suit was filed against Tyco International and its management.
See id. The U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire, constrained by
the PSLRA pleading standard, dismissed the lawsuit in February 2002, finding
that the plaintiffs needed to show more than mere motive and opportunity to
commit fraud under the PSLRA. See id. at 110. Seven months later, in Septem-
ber 2002, members of Tyco management were indicted for securities fraud: "In
September 2002, three top executives at Tyco, former CEO Dennis Kozlowski,
former CFO Mark Swartz and former general counsel Mark Belnick were in-
dicted on charges that they reaped $600 million through a racketeering scheme
involving stock fraud, unauthorized bonuses and falsified expense accounts."
cummings, supra note 8, at 1368 n.314 (quoting Andrew Ross Sorkin, Two Top
Executives Charged with $600 Million Fraud Scheme, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2002,
at Al). The NY. Times further reported that:
1030 [Vol. 83:979
"AIN'T NO GLORY IN PAIN"
(in 1998),241 and each lawsuit was dismissed by the federal courts.24 2
Even though the deceit by WorldCom, Tyco, and Arthur Andersen was
alleged far earlier than the eventual collapse date of each, 24 3 under
the heightened pleading standards of the PSLRA, the federal courts
and the Revolution Congress comfortably sheltered each company, al-
lowing them to continue to defraud U.S. investors for several addi-
tional years.2 44 Further, although both Arthur Andersen and
The authorities accuse Mr. Kozlowski and Mr. Swartz of stealing $170
million from the company itself and reaping $430 million more by co-
vertly selling Tyco stock while "artificially inflating" the value of that
stock. Tyco stock has fallen 70 percent in value this year.... The New
York grand jury indictments . . . also accuse Mr. Kozlowski and Mr.
[Swartz] of bribing a Tyco board member and several Tyco employees
apparently to try to keep the scheme secret. The indictment accuses Mr.
Kozlowski and Mr. [Swartz] of "enterprise corruption," a charge often
used in Mafia prosecutions.
Id. (emphasis added). In announcing the indictment, an SEC representative
claimed: "Kozlowski, Swartz and Belnick treated Tyco as their private bank, tak-
ing out hundreds of millions of dollars of loans and compensation without ever
telling investors .... Defendants put their own interests above those of Tyco's
shareholders. Those shareholders deserved better than to be betrayed by ...
management of the company they owned." Allan Dodds Frank, Kozlowski Hit
with More Charges, CNNMONEY.COM, Sept. 12, 2002, at http://money.cnn.coml
2002/09/12fnews/companieslkozlowski/index.htm.
240. See In re Sunterra Corp., Sec. Litig., 199 F. Supp. 2d 1308 (M.D. Fla. 2002). In
January 2000, fully two years before the Arthur Andersen meltdown, a share-
holder securities fraud class-action suit was filed against Sunterra Corp., its
management, and its accountant, Arthur Andersen. See id. The U.S. District
Court for the Middle District of Florida, constrained by the PSLRA, dismissed the
lawsuit in March 2002, finding that the complaint did not allege sufficient facts
that would give rise to a strong inference that Arthur Anderson acted with the
requisite state of mind, namely severe recklessness. See id. at 1337. Three
months later, in June 2002, Arthur Andersen was convicted of obstruction ofjus-
tice in the Enron fiasco. See E.A. Torriero & Robert Manor, Jury Finds Anderson
Guilty: Firm Says Verdict "Effectively Ends" Its Core Practice, CHI. TRIB., June
16, 2002, at 1-1 ("In an inglorious end to its 89-year history as the country's pre-
eminent accounting firm, Chicago-based Andersen was convicted Saturday of ob-
struction of justice for interfering with a federal investigation of its failed client,
Enron Corp.").
241. See In re Livent, Inc. Noteholders, Sec. Litig., 151 F. Supp. 2d 371 (S.D.N.Y.
2001). In 1998, fully four years before DeLoitte & Touche's client Adelphia was
exposed for criminal fraud, a shareholder securities fraud class-action suit was
filed against Livent, DeLoitte & Touche, and its management. See id. at 391.
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, constrained by the
PSLRA, dismissed the lawsuit in 2001, finding that the complaint did not allege
facts that satisfied the requisite state of mind for some of the defendants. See id.
at 384-85. In July 2002, DeLoitte & Touche client Adelphia was exposed for fed-
eral securities fraud, and Deloitte & Touche was under investigation for its role
in the malfeasance. See supra notes 90-92; see also infra section IV.D.
242. See supra notes 238-41 and accompanying text.
243. See infra Part IV.
244. See SANFORD P. DUMAIN, AM. LAw INST.-AM. BAR ASS'N CONTINUING LEGAL
EDUC., CLASS ACTION SUITS AND THE EFFECT OF THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGA-
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DeLoitte & Touche were recognized as enablers of the deception far
earlier than the eventual collapse of the auditors or their clients,
under the heightened pleading standards of the PSLRA, the federal
courts and the Revolution Congress protected both accounting firms,
allowing each to continue to enable corporations to defraud U.S. inves-
tors for several additional years. 24 5 Had the WorldCom case been al-
lowed to continue in early 2000, had the Tyco case been certified in
1999, or had Arthur Andersen or DeLoitte & Touche been exposed in
the Sunterra or Livent litigation, the devastation that ensued for
shareholders of each corporation may have decreased considerably,
and perhaps the crash of 2002 could have been avoided or sharply
muted. But the crash was not avoided, and the PSLRA is in part
responsible. 24 6
A third PSLRA impact was that the removal of specific regulatory
protections gave corporations and firms carte blanche control over the
information that they revealed to investors with no fear of reprisal or
disincentive for dishonesty. 24 7 The PSLRA (1) "raised the burden of
proof for lawsuits against corporations that mislead shareholders-
weakening an important deterrent against corporate fraud;"248 (2)
may have "made accounting firms and law firms 'sue proof for aiding
and abetting securities fraud;"24 9 (3) provided "protection for baseless
earnings projections, 2 5o particularly enabling Silicon Valley and the
dot-coin industry to explode and then collapse based on artificial
value;251 and (4) sent a strong signal to the U.S. capital markets and
the global economy that "neither the regulators nor Congress has been
looking out for investors."252
TION REFORM ACT OF 1995, SH057 ALi-ABA 361, 373-74 (2003) (materials from
continuing legal education seminar on February 6-7, 2003).
245. See id. at 381-83.
246. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text (reflecting the real life tragedy
suffered by U.S. investors and employees of malfeasant corporations).
247. See supra section II.B.
248. See Lisa Girion, 1995 Tort Reform Act Said To Provide Safe Harbor for Fraud,
L.A. TIMES, July 21, 2002, at C-1. "We in 1995 said this is going to create fraud
like we've never seen before, and I would say our predictions came true." Id.
249. See Molly Ivins, Energy Bills Would Worsen Things, CHARLESTON GAZETrE, July
29, 2002, at 4A. "The 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act is a little
gem you should not miss. So easy to overlook, yet so damaging .... The bill...
made it legal for CEOs to pipe up and lie about their company's prospects." Id.
250. Mike France, This Crash Won't Make Lawyers Rich, Bus. WK., Mar. 26, 2001, at
147, 148. "Now that many of the more grandiose projections of the 1990s have
fizzled, some people are wondering whether Congress gave Silicon Valley a little
too much protection." Id.
251. See Lerach, supra note 13, at 98-102 (detailing the stunning inaccuracies and
reported falsehoods for dot-coin IPOs in the 1990s).
252. Stephen Labaton, Now Who, Exactly, Got Us into This?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2002,
at 3-1. "In 1995, [a] group of lawmakers and lawyers pushed successfully for leg-
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While the Revolution Congress stiff-armed U.S. investors, choosing
instead to cozy up to corporate America through enacting the
PSLRA,253 the SEC stood idly by 254 and allowed the largest deception
in U.S. history to flatten U.S. investors and crush all investor confi-
dence in the U.S. capital markets.255 Again, one enduring legacy of
the PSLRA and Revolution Congress's deregulation will be the market
crash of 2002.256
E. Examination of Legislative History in Opposition to the
PSLRA
The 104th Congress is culpable in significant part for the economic
devastation that accompanied the stock market tumble of 2002; yet,
the leaders of that Revolution Congress have escaped widespread
blame and have certainly refused to accept any responsibility for the
deregulation hysteria that led to many of the corporate collapses of
2001 and 2002.257 Indeed, many 104th Congressional leaders and
other politicians have (or had) close ties to many of the worst corpo-
rate offenders. 25 8 While Revolution Congress leaders duck responsi-
islation that shielded companies and their accountants from investor lawsuits."
Id.
253. See supra notes 127-34.
254. See supra notes 76-98 and accompanying text; see also cummings, supra note 8,
at 1306 n.3.
255. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text; see also cummings, note 8, at
1307 n.4.
256. See supra note 230 and accompanying text; see also Browning, supra note 52, at
Al (reporting that 9/11 had some impact on investor confidence during the mar-
ket collapse in 2001 and 2002); Kahn, supra note 82, at 1582-84 (examining the
role of terrorism and 9/11 in the capital market crash of 2002).
257. See supra notes 12-40 and accompanying text; see also infra sections IV.A-F.
258. See Lavelle & Benjamin, supra note 113, at 34 ("Last week, Enron teetered on the
brink of bankruptcy, a perch few could have imagined just a few months ago. Not
only one of the nation's 10 largest companies, Enron was pioneer and master of
the new competitive markets in energy. Its chief executive officer, Kenneth Lay,
was a close friend of President Bush, a major campaign contributor, and an im-
portant adviser on the nation's energy policy."); see also Follow the Enron Money,
CBSNEws.coM, Jan. 13, 2002 ("More than 250 members of Congress-Democrats
as well as Republicans-received political contributions from now-bankrupt En-
ron and at least 15 high-ranking Bush administration officials owned stock in the
energy company last year, according to two government watchdog groups. Since
1989, Enron has made a whopping $5.8 million in campaign donations, 73 per-
cent to Republicans and 27 percent to Democrats."), at http://www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2002/01/12/politics/main324142.shtml; Kevin McCoy, Enron's Contribu-
tion Trail Reads Like a U.S. Road Map, USA TODAY, Jan. 28, 2002, at 1B ("The
energy-trading giant [Enron], whose sudden fall from Fortune 500 to bankruptcy
court protection has set a benchmark for corporate collapses, doled out campaign
contributions to state officials and candidates from coast to coast as the company
battled for local deregulation laws. The spending, directed to Republicans and in
lesser measure to Democrats, totaled at least $1.88 million since 1998 . . .");
Right to Know: White House Should Share What It Has on Enron Mess, HOUSTON
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bility259 and other politicians have desperately distanced themselves
from the corrupt corporations, 260 not one of the enabling politicians
CHRON., May 23, 2002, at A38 ("Vice President Dick Cheney, who made impru-
dent accounting changes when he headed Haliburton, the giant oil services com-
pany, will not reveal to the public he now serves which energy executive he met
with while formulating the administration's national energy policy. Cheney,
President Bush and other administration figures say they are proud of the energy
policy they crafted. Why are they so ashamed of the process that produced it?");
Jim Yardley, Bush Joined Unit of Enron in '86 Venture to Seek Oil, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 6, 2002, at C1 ("Enron's recent collapse into bankruptcy, however, has fo-
cused attention on the company's political connections, including those with Mr.
Bush. For years, Enron gave campaign contributions to hundreds of officials, in-
cluding nearly two-thirds of Congress. Mr. Bush was the biggest beneficiary, re-
ceiving hundreds of thousands of dollars from Enron and its former chairman,
Kenneth L. Lay, since 1994."). See also Christopher H. Schmitt, Bush and Che-
ney's Not-So-Excellent Adventures, A La Enron, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July
22, 2002, at 28. Schmitt reports in the U.S. News and World Report:
Aggressive accounting to boost profits. Failure to promptly disclose in-
sider stock trading. Bailing out with big gains before a stock swoon.
Disguising losses through bogus deals with fellow executives. Such
charges have been leveled at Enron's Kenneth Lay, WorldCom's Bernard
Ebbers, and ImClone's Samuel Waksal. But also, it turns out, at Presi-
dent Bush and Vice President Cheney.
Id.
259. See Girion, supra note 248, at C-1. In 2002, Girion reported:
"We in 1995 said this [passage of the PSLRA] is going to create fraud
like we've never seen before, and I would say our predictions came true,"
said Sally Greenburg, a lawyer for Consumers Union. Yet Lawmakers,
poised to send to the White House the most sweeping financial reforms
since the 1930s [the Sarbanes-Oxley Act], have rebuffed efforts to re-
store most shareholder rights lost to securities tort reform. Many of the
lawmakers, both Democrat and Republican, who supported the legisla-
tion several years ago remain in Congress and continue to back their
handiwork.
Id.; see also Labaton, supra note 252, at 3-1. In early 2002, Labaton reported:
Mr. Dodd [D-Connecticut] said last week that "as a general proposi-
tion" Congress ought to re-examine the 1995 legislation [PSLRA] as well
as other rules in light of Enron, but that he also thought the 1995 law
had done more good than harm.
"If the point is to blame what happened on this law, it is totally mis-
placed," he said. "The goal of the bill was to deter frivolous lawsuits-
not lawsuits, but frivolous lawsuits. And our goal was to not hold one
guy totally responsible for something that he may be only marginally
responsible for."
Id.
260. See Schmitt, supra note 258, at 28 ("The White House has dismissed these ques-
tions [of corporate improprieties in pre-White House business transactions] and,
by 1990s-bubble standards, the amounts involved aren't huge. Nor is their proof
of wrongdoing. But, says Paul Brown, accounting department chairman at New
York University's business school, 'you can't help but suggest that [there] has to
be some looking in the mirror for events of the past.'").
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can deny that the warning bell rang loud and clear prior to passage of
the PSLRA.261
President Clinton vetoed the PSLRA, returning the legislation
with stark warnings that the Act would have a deleterious effect on
the securities markets and on U.S. investors. 26 2 President Clinton's
veto was motivated in large part by the Revolution Congress's efforts
to place unprecedented pleading standard requirements on victims of
securities fraud, while promulgating numerous provisions that fore-
close securities fraud plaintiffs from gaining access to their constitu-
tionally assured "day in court."2 63
Senator Sarbanes, the coauthor of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act-legis-
lation meant to clean up after the PSLRA and Revolution Congress
deregulation fiasco2 64 -also voiced strong disapproval to enactment of
the PSLRA:
Mr. President, later today the Senate will vote on the final version of the se-
curities litigation bill which has been brought back from conference. Support-
ers of the bill argue that it is a balanced response to a widespread problem;
namely, frivolous securities litigation. What should be clear to all Senators,
however, is that this bill is not a balanced response to that problem.
This legislation will affect far more than frivolous suits .... This bill will
make it more difficult for investors to bring and recover damages in legitimate
fraud actions....
At every stage of the legislative process, this bill has been amended to
make it more difficult for investors to bring legitimate suits. As it has moved
through the process, provisions favorable to investors have been taken out.
Balanced provisions in the legislation have been made harmful to investors.
Individual investors, local governments and pension plans all will be hurt by
this legislation.
2 6 5
In Senator Sarbanes' statement from the Senate floor, the Senator
painstakingly addressed nearly every provision of the PSLRA and
pointed out the flaws in each section, carefully describing the ways in
which the PSLRA would injure small investors and would lead to seri-
ously fraudulent behavior by corporate executives. 266 In retrospect,
Senator Sarbanes appears extrasensory in forecasting the difficulties
261. See infra notes 266-83 and accompanying text (describing the serious warning
delivered from a variety of sources that the PSLRA would lead to corruption and
vice).
262. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
263. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
264. See infra Part V.
265. 141 CONG. REC. 35,241 (1995) (statement of Senator Sarbanes) (emphasis added).
"All will find it more difficult to bring fraud actions and to recover full damages
as a result of the measure now before the Senate. That is why this bill is opposed
by a broad coalition of regulators, State and local government officials, labor un-
ions, consumer groups and investor organizations, and by literally dozens and
dozens of editorials in major newspapers and magazines across the country." Id.
266. See generally 141 CONG. REC. 35,241-47 (1995) (statement of Senator Sarbanes).
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that individual investors, pension funds, and local governments would
suffer if the PSLRA was enacted as proposed. 26 7
To support his position that the PSLRA was an ill-conceived pro-
position and one that slanted the field in the favor of corporate insid-
ers at the expense of U.S. investors, Senator Sarbanes cited a variety
of editorials that predicted the downfall of the U.S. capital markets if
the federal securities laws were deregulated as proposed. 268 The Ban-
gor (Maine) Daily News reported:
Among the most dramatic but least discussed spin-offs of the Contract
With America is securities litigation reform legislation, which earlier this year
quietly passed both houses of Congress in different forms, but this week could
become part of a public spectacle, highlighted by a presidential veto.
House Republicans argued in the contract . . . that accumulated legal
abuses cost American consumers $300 billion a year. Proponents characterize
H.R. 1058 and S. 240, the two bills on which a conference compromise of the
Securities Litigation Reform Act is expected to be voted on this week, as anti-
dotes to costly, frivolous lawsuits pursued by greedy lawyers.
Opponents believe the critical elements of both bills, but especially as re-
flected in the conference version, are destructive of consumer interests. In the
best Washington hyperbole, they refer to it as 'The Crooks and Swindlers Pro-
tection Act" because of the manner in which it tilts the courtroom in favor of
corporate defendants in securities and fraud cases.
267. See 141 CONG. REC. 35,243 (1995) (statement of Senator Sarbanes). Senator
Sarbanes observed:
The [PSLRA] limits joint and several liability under the Federal securi-
ties law to certain defendants, specifically excluding defendants whose
conduct was reckless. The bill, thus, reduces the accountability of ac-
countants and attorneys whose conduct is found to be reckless. This
change will hurt investors in cases where the principal framer of the
fraud is bankrupt, has fled, or otherwise cannot pay investors damages.
In those cases, the innocent victims of fraud will be denied full recovery
of their damages.
Id. Senator Sarbanes further predicted:
[Liet me now turn to the so-called safe harbor provision, and I under-
score "so-called." This bill creates a statutory exemption from liability
for forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements are
broadly defined in the bill to include both oral and written statements.
Examples include projections of financial items such as revenues and
income for the quarter or for the year, estimates of dividends to be paid
to shareholders, and statements of future economic performance, such as
sales trends and development of new products. In short, forward-looking
statements include precisely the type of information that is important to
investors deciding whether to purchase a particular stock.
The SEC currently has a safe harbor regulation for forward-looking
statements that protects specified forward-looking statements that were
made in documents filed with the SEC.
'.. I remain concerned that the safe harbor provision before us today
will, for the first time, provide protection for fraudulent statements
under the Federal securities laws. For the first time, fraudulent state-
ments will receive protection under the Federal securities laws.
141 CONG. REC. 35,243 (1995) (statement of Senator Sarbanes); see also supra
notes 172-78 and accompanying text.
268. See generally 141 CONG. REc. 35,244 (statement of Senator Sarbanes).
1036 [Vol. 83:979
"AIN'T NO GLORY IN PAIN"
The Securities Litigation Reform Act has the potential to save consumers
nothing, protect white-collar criminals and add to the burden of the victims of
fraud.
2 6 9
The Miami Herald, in decided opposition to the PSLRA, editorialized:
While most of the country is paying attention to the feud over the federal
budget, a sinister piece of legislation is making its way through Congress un-
noticed. This bill lets companies report false information to investors. That's
right, it essentially licenses fraud. It has passed both houses in slightly differ-
ent forms. A compromise bill will be written soon. If it passes, President Clin-
ton ought to slay it in its tracks ....
This bill evidently struck many members of Congress as a simple answer
to a nagging problem [frivolous securities fraud lawsuits]. It's nothing of the
kind. The problem is real enough, but its solution isn't simple. And it cer-
tainly doesn't reside in a law authorizing phony statements to investors.
2 7 0
Finally, following PSLRA congressional debate, the San Francisco
Chronicle opined:
In a letter asking Clinton to veto the [PSLRA], San Francisco's chief ad-
ministrative officer, Bill Lee, noted that the legislation would "erode investor
protections in a number of ways: it fails to restore the liability of aiders and
abettors of fraud for their actions; it limits many wrongdoers from providing
full compensation to innocent fraud victims, by eroding joint and several lia-
bility; it could force fraud victims to pay the full legal fees of large corporate
defendants if they lose; it provides a blanket shield from liability for compa-
nies that make knowingly fraudulent predictions about an investment's per-
formance and risks; and it would preserve a short, three-year statute of
limitation for bringing fraud actions, even if fraud is not discovered until after
that time"....
As the draft report stands, investors would be the losers. And their hopes
of receiving convictions in suits similar to those against such well-known con
men as Michael Milken and Ivan Boseky would be severely hampered.
2 7 1
Representative John Dingell (D-Michigan) starkly opposed passage
of the PSLRA, offering that it would only "marginally deter frivolous
lawsuits while causing significant harm to investors with meritorious
claims."2 72 In support of his strong opposition to the PSLRA, Repre-
sentative Dingell submitted to the Congressional Record two articles
that pointed to the serious flaws inherent in the Act. The first stated:
A securities law aimed at reducing frivolous lawsuits also may make it
harder for investors with legitimate claims.
Because efforts to stretch the statute of limitations failed, investors must
continue to check their investment account statements promptly for irregular-
269. Do No Harm, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Nov. 30, 1995.
270. Liars' Bill of Rights, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 14, 1995.
271. Opening the Door to Fraud, SAN. FRAN. CHRON., Nov. 27, 1995, at A18.
272. 141 CONG. REC. 36,944 (1995) (statement of Representative Dingell). Representa-
tive Dingell, in his strong opposition to House of Representatives approval of the
PSLRA, stated: "Mr. Speaker, on December 6, 1995, the House passed the confer-
ence report on H.R. 1058, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. I
am disappointed that the House approved this legislation." Id.
20051 1037
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
ities. They also must carefully document problems and consult a lawyer
quickly ....
But it may be hard to find a lawyer to take investor fraud cases. "The law
tells us we can't just have a good case, we must have a great case," says Mat-
thew Kelly, a lawyer who represents investors at Roemer, Wallens & Min-
neaux in Albany, N.Y.
2 7 3
The Bond Buyer, reporting on municipalities' concern that the PSLRA
would devastate local government's efforts to recover for securities,
stated:
The California State Association of Counties on Friday elected a new presi-
dent-San Mateo County supervisor Mike Nevin-whose first action was
sending a letter to President Clinton opposing the Securities Litigation Re-
form Act.
CSAC, a nonprofit corporation that promotes the interests of California's
58 counties before the state legislature and Congress, contends the [PSLRA]
will severely hinder local governments' ability to recover losses related to se-
curities fraud.
"We need to have the ability to recover losses in the case of securities
fraud," Nevis said yesterday....
The letter to Clinton was signed by 106 county and other local government
officials....
"Local governments are victims of securities fraud; they need access to the
courts to recover their losses," [said Steve Szalay, executive director of CSAC.]
"Orange County, on behalf of 187 independent California governments, is su-
ing to recover about $1.5 billion on the grounds that the investments made on
its behalf were unsuitable and violated the California constitution and
statutes."
"This bill makes it very difficult for local governments and taxpayers to
recover their losses in securities fraud cases, and it will give wrongdoers a
green light to commit more fraud, Szalay said."
2 7 4
Despite a veto from President Clinton,2 75 strong opposition from
state and local governments and municipalities, 276 serious opposition
from dozens of editorializing newspapers and magazines, 27 7 stout op-
position from leading Congresspersons with expertise in the corporate
arena,2 78 a sharply worded letter of opposition signed by the Attor-
neys General of eleven different states,2 79 heavy opposition from the
273. Christine Dugas, Securities Lawsuit Bill May Hurt Investors, USA TODAY, Dec. 8,
1995, at 4B.
274. Joe Bel Bruno, California Counties Ask Clinton To Veto Securities Bill, THE BoND
BUYER, Dec. 5, 1995, at 11.
275. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
276. See supra note 274 and accompanying text; see also infra note 279 and accompa-
nying text.
277. See supra notes 268-71, 273 and accompanying text (quoting several major U.S.
newspapers editorializing against enactment of the PSLRA).
278. See supra notes 264-67 and accompanying text (detailing the stalwart opposition
to the PSLRA of Senator Sarbanes, the architect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.).
279. See 141 CONG. REC. 35,247 (1995) (statement of Senator Sarbanes). In a letter to
President Clinton, authored by Tom Udall, the Attorney General of New Mexico,
and signed by the Attorney General of 10 other states, Mr. Udall proclaimed:
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AFL-CIO,28o grave opposition from the Fraternal Order of Police,
28 1
As Attorneys General of our respective states, we strongly oppose
H.R. 1058/S240, the Securities Litigation Reform Act. The "draft confer-
ence report," which is the basis of agreement between the House and
Senate bills, would severely penalize victims of securities fraud-consum-
ers, workers, senior citizens, state and local governments. The principal
effect of this legislation would be to shield wrongdoers from liability for
securities fraud committed against an unsuspecting public....
If enacted, this legislation would severely curtail our efforts to fight
securities fraud and to recover damages for our citizens if any of our
state or local funds suffer losses due to fraud. There are several provi-
sions in both bills that would make it exceedingly difficult, if not impos-
sible, for consumers and state and local governments to use the federal
courts to recoup losses due to fraud....
As our states' chief law enforcement officers, we cannot countenance
such a weakening of critical enforcement against white-collar fraud. Pri-
vate actions, as a complement to government enforcement, have proven
to be extremely effective in deterring securities fraud and in compensat-
ing injured investors. This longstanding practice has deterred even
greater fraud in the markets and has reduced the burdens that would
otherwise accrue as a result of the government having to fully police the
markets.
Id. (emphasis added).
280. See 141 CONG. REC. 35,246 (1995) (statement of Senator Sarbanes). In a letter to
U.S. Senators, the American Federation of Labor, Congress of Industrial Organi-
zations ("AFL-CIO") expressed strong opposition to the PSLRA and predicted
that fraudulent behavior from corporate executives would increase and that vic-
tims of securities fraud would be left with no remedies:
The AFL-CIO opposes the conference agreement on H.R. 1058, the Se-
curities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. The conference agreement signif-
icantly weakens the ability of stockholders and pension plans to
successfully sue companies which use fraudulent information in for-
ward-looking statements that project economic growth and earning.
There is a new "safe harbor" provision in this conference agreement that
allows evidence of misleading economic information to be discounted in
court if it is accompanied by 'appropriate cautionary language."
The AFL-CIO believes this compromise will vastly increase the diffi-
culties that investors and pension plans would have in recovering eco-
nomic losses. Similarly, the joint and several liability provisions in this
bill provide added, and unwarranted, protection for unscrupulous com-
panies, stockbrokers, accountants and lawyers.
In short, this bill tips the scales of justice in favor of the companies
and at the expense of stockholders and pension plans. Both of these lat-
ter groups are forced to rely exclusively on information provided by these
companies when evaluating a stock, but this information would not be
able to be used in court to recover economic damages for misleading
information.
Id.
281. See 141 CONG. REv. 35,247 (1995) (statement of Senator Sarbanes). In a letter to
President Clinton, the Fraternal Order of Police, National Legislative Program
strongly urged rejection of the PSLRA because it favored corporate criminals:
On behalf [of the] National Fraternal Order of Police, I urge you to
veto the "Securities Litigation Reform Act" (HR 1058/S240). The re-
cently released draft of the House/Senate conference report clearly re-
flects a dramatic reduction in the ability of private, institutional and
government investors to seek redress when victimized by investor fraud.
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and somber warnings of future capital market devastation, 2 82 the
Revolution Congress passed the PSLRA, with a significant assist from
corporate executives and their lobbyists.283 The market crash of 2002
has undoubtedly curbed any joy felt in the corporate world at the time
the PSLRA was enacted. Certainly, no glory can be found in the
PSLRA when the pain of employee and investor losses from the mar-
ket collapse of 2002 is so fresh.
Unfortunately for U.S. investors and employees, the PSLRA was
not the only reform and deregulatory effort undertaken by the Revolu-
tion Congress, and the havoc wreaked by the PSLRA is not the only
destructive influence that enabled the market tumble of 2002. The
104th Congress, soon after swiftly passing the PSLRA, turned its der-
egulation jackhammer toward the telecommunications industry, and,
again, acted improvidently.
III. OTHER 1990s DEREGULATION
A. The 1996 Telecommunications Act
After gunning down decades-old securities fraud protections in
1995, with passage of the PSLRA, the Revolution Congress turned its
attention to the previously staid telecommunications industry. Since
1934, the telecommunication industry had been carefully regulated,
some would argue successfully,284 but the regulation had become in-
As a matter of fact, the single most significant result of this legislation
would be to create a privileged class of criminals, in that it virtually im-
munizes lawyers, brokers, accountants and their accomplices from civil
liability in cases of securities fraud....
Mr. President, our 270,000 members stand with you in your commit-
ment to a war on crime; the men and women of the F.O.P. are the foot
soldiers in that war. On their behalf, I urge you to reject a bill which
would make it less risky for white-collar criminals to steal from police
pension funds while the police are risking their lives against violent
criminals.
Id. In 1995, Gilbert Gallegos, the National President of the Fraternal Order of
Police, worried that the PSLRA would allow freewheeling white-collar crime, at
the expense small U.S. investors, all while his U.S. police personnel were out
risking their lives protecting the white-collar criminals from violent crimes. See
id. The irony of the F.O.P. President's position and the reality of his situation
today is painful.
282. See supra section II.E.
283. See supra notes 119-20 (detailing the actual roll-call votes by which the PSLRA
passed the House and Senate and the roll-call vote that overrode the Presidential
Veto).
284. Interview with Tom Stephens, Qwest Communications, Member, Board of Direc-
tors, in Denver, Colorado (July 2003) (The 1996 Telecommunications Act "created
competition and chaos.") (interview conducted by research assistant Leigh Wald)
(interview notes on file with author).
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creasingly criticized as outdated and inadaptable.
28 5 The 104th Con-
gress, determined to radically unravel the regulatory structure of the
telecommunications industry, overwhelmingly passed the Telecommu-
nications Act of 1996.286 The Telecommunications Act uncompromis-
ingly and inattentively sought to reform "the whole of
telecommunications law, not just one specific aspect of it."287 Passage
of the Telecommunications Act, following hotly on the heals of the pas-
sage of the PSLRA, further deregulated segments of corporate
America, creating an environment ripe for corruption and easy decep-
tion of the investing public.
28 8
B. The Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000
After annihilating decades-old securities fraud protections in 1995
with passage of the PSLRA, and after rewriting decades-old telecom-
munications laws with passage of the Telecommunications Act in
1996, the Revolution Congress directed its attention, or in some cases
inattention, to the energy, electricity, and derivatives trading indus-
tries as its next targets. 28 9 "During the 105th Congress, lawmakers
held 20 hearings on how to deregulate the $208 billion electric power
industry, embarking on what some said would shape up to be the big-
gest lobbying battle of the decade."
2 90 Energy deregulation propo-
nents promised that deregulation would lead to "vigorous competition"
between energy and electricity producers and that such "vigorous com-
petition will benefit all consumers, large and small."
29 1 Revolution
285. See Lawrence Gasman, The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 1996 REGULATION:
THE CATO REV. OF Bus. & GOVT 49, 49.
286. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.
287. See Gasman, supra note 285, at 49.
288. See cummings, supra note 31.
289. See generally Kathryn Kranhold, As Deregulation Moves into the Electricity Mar-
ket, the Changes Promise to Be Dramatic-and Confusing, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14,
1998, at R4 ("In fact, as the U.S. begins its journey into electricity deregulation,
probably only one thing can be predicted with any certainty: It's going to be an
awfully confusing couple of years.").
290. Deirdre Shesgreen, Lobbying Bonanza: Lobbyists Say Unfinished Congressional
Business Is the Best Kind: Unfinished Business Is Good for Business for Many of
Washington's Biggest Lobbying Firms, PALM BEACH DAILY Bus. REV., Jan. 2,
1998, at Al. The Palm Beach Daily Business Review reports that the Revolution
Congress's attempts to deregulate the electric power industry ran aground in
1997 due in large part to massive campaign contributions from "electric utilities,
independent power generators, and rural electric co-operatives." Id. "In the first
six months of 1997, electric utilities, independent power generators, and rural
electric cooperatives poured $2.4 million into politicians' campaign coffers, ac-
cording to the Center for Responsive Politics. Energy groups spent $37 million on
lobbying in the first half of 1996 and continued that spending apace into 1997,
according to Roll Call, the Capital Hill newspaper." Id.
291. See Kranhold, supra note 289, at R4. Nevertheless, critics staunchly refute such
rosy predictions from deregulation proponents:
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Congress attempts to deregulate the electric power industry eventu-
ally broke down in 1997.292
In the wake of the breakdown of Congressional efforts to deregu-
late the electric power industry, Brooksley Born, the then-head of the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission293 ("CFTC") proposed in
1998 that she "explore whether more regulation was needed for over-
the-counter derivatives."294 The value of the over-the-counter deriva-
tives market "had grown fivefold to $29 trillion in the six years since
[federal] regulators had last considered regulating the financial in-
struments" in 1992.295 While Director Born met with early resistance
from the Treasury Secretary and the Federal Reserve Board Chair-
But critics fear that the benefits will be uneven at best. And some aren't
so sure that the competition will be all that vigorous: Deregulation has
already led to rapid consolidation among utilities, critics note, and that
could lead to diminished competition and higher prices down the line.
Indeed, leaving energy prices to the vagaries of the market still un-
nerves some critics of deregulation, and many fear that the potential
benefits don't necessarily justify the uncertainty.
Id.
292. See Shesgreen, supra note 290.
293. In Chicago Mercantile Exchange v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1989), Judge Eas-
terbrook describes the jurisdiction and authority of the CFTC as follows:
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission has authority to regu-
late trading of futures contracts (including futures on securities) and op-
tions on futures contracts. The Securities and Exchange Commission
has authority to regulate trading of securities and options on securities.
If an instrument is both a security and a futures contract, the CFTC is
the sole regulator because "the Commission shall have exclusive jurisdic-
tion with respect to ... transactions involving... contracts of sale (and
options on such contracts) for future delivery of a group or index of secur-
ities (or any interest therein or based upon the value thereof)[." If how-
ever, the instrument is both a futures contract and an option on a
security, then the SEC is the sole regulator because "the [CFTC] shall
have no jurisdiction to designate a board of trade as a contract market
for any transaction whereby any party to such transaction acquires any
put, call, or other option on one or more securities . . . including any
group or index of such securities, or any interest therein or based on the
value thereof."
Id. at 539 (citation omitted) (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 2).
294. Jacob M. Schlesinger, The Deregulators: Did Washington Help Set Stage for Cur-
rent Business Turmoil?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2002, at Al.
295. See id. Derivatives and over-the-counter derivative trading
derive their value from price shifts in underlying assets, such as the in-
terest on a bond, the value of a currency or the price of a barrel of oil.
Multinational corporations, for example, use derivatives as a hedge, to
protect themselves against sudden swings in the value of the dollar.
Id. See generally JOHN C. COFFEE & JOEL SELIGMAN, SEcURrrIEs REGULATION:
CASES AND MATERIALS 15 (9th ed. 2003) (defining derivatives as "contractual in-
struments that derive their value from the values of underlying instruments or
commodities upon which they are based").
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man, 2 9 6 she feared that "leaving the derivatives unregulated... car-
ried huge risks."297 Director Born's fears were justified in that:
Over-the-counter derivatives were traded directly between companies, away
from regulated futures exchanges. Because they weren't subject to rules that
applied to other securities, little was disclosed about the transactions. That
made it easier for traders to take big risks, or fraudulently manipulate deals.
Derivatives had contributed to some spectacular blowups, including the bank-
ruptcy of Orange County, Calif., and the demise of 233-year-old Barings PLC,
which went belly up in 1995 after a rogue trader lost $1 billion in unautho-
rized derivatives trades.
2 9 8
Determined to provide a safe haven for investors and shareholders,
Director Born and the CFTC conducted and released a study, styled a
"concept release," that raised questions as to the integrity of the over-
the-counter derivatives trading market and the lack of federal regula-
tion appurtenant thereto. 299 U.S. financial leadership, together with
the SEC, "rushed out a statement" within hours of the release of the
CFTC's "concept release" that expressed "grave concerns" about the
study.30
0
Ultimately, Director Born was quashed by Congress. Under a diz-
zying lobby barrage, led by energy giant Enron, amongst others,
301
the corporate interests convinced Congress in 2000 to pass the Com-
modity Futures Modernization Act. The CFMA introduced the most
dramatic and sweeping changes in commodity futures market regula-
tion since the phenomenon of commodity futures trading began sev-
enty-eight years earlier, but it failed therein to regulate over-the-
counter derivatives trading.30 2 Such failure to regulate over-the-
296. See Schlesinger, supra note 294, at Al. Schlesinger reported that at the time
Director Born was seeking to introduce regulation into over-the-counter deriva-
tive trading, she was warned that she would disrupt the capital markets:
[Treasury Secretary Robert] Rubin was a former co-chairman of
Goldman, Sachs & Co. whose major political achievements included
making Wall Street and business executives comfortable with Demo-
crats and persuading President Clinton to balance the federal budget.
He took seriously Wall Street's complaints that even the threat of regu-
lation could void pending transactions. Mr. Greenspan believed that in-
novative derivatives were making the economy more efficient by
providing companies with a hedge against financial fluctuations.
Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. See id.
300. Id.
301. See id. ("Wall Street went into lobbying overdrive, as leading derivatives under-
writers such as J.P. Morgan, heavy derivatives users like Enron, and nearly a
dozen financial trade groups pleaded with the Fed and Treasury to stop Ms.
Born.").
302. See HAZEN & RATNER, supra note 67, at 96-97. Hazen and Ratner described the
CFMA as:
eliminat[ing] the longstanding ban on securities futures contracts. In
doing so, the Act established a co-regulatory system under which the
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counter derivatives trading allowed an environment to exist where en-
ergy and telecom companies such as Enron and Global Crossing could
engage in wildly speculative over-the-counter trading of
derivatives.303
IV. IS DEREGULATION RESPONSIBLE FOR THE STOCK
MARKET COLLAPSE OF 2002?
The primary question this Article examines is whether federal der-
egulation and reform in the 1990s, particularly the PSLRA, can be
blamed for the collapse of the U.S. capital markets in 2001 and 2002.
The answer, in a word, is yes. While a variety of other factors must be
included when searching for reasons the market collapsed,30 4 one of
the primary underpinning reasons the collapse occurred can be traced
directly to the deregulation hysteria that gripped Congress through-
out the mid-1990s. 30 5 To wit:
A. Enron
At the time that Enron imploded, the securities industry and in-
vesting public were stunned at the size and scope of the deceptions
that Enron's management had perpetrated. 3 0 6 The massive failure of
the Enron Corporation very well may represent an unparalleled corpo-
rate collapse in United States history. As a number of commentators
have noted:
[i]t seems hard to believe now, but Enron (ENE) used to be the envy of corpo-
rate America. In less than a decade, the Houston company transformed itself
from stodgy gas-pipeline operation to natural gas and electricity trading pow-
SEC and CFTC coordinate their regulatory oversight over securities fu-
tures. A securities future is defined as a security, which makes the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 generally applicable to trading of
securities futures products. Securities futures can be traded only on
common stock registered under Section 12 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. Those securities are subject to the detailed periodic report-
ing requirements generally applicable to publicly traded securities.
The CFMA permits trading of securities futures either on a national
securities exchange registered with the SEC or a commodities contract
market that is registered with the CFTC.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
303. See cummings, supra note 31.
304. See HAZEN & RATNER, supra note 67, at 85-91, 105-18; see also OM MALIK,
BROADBANDITS: INSIDE THE $750 BILLION TELECOM HEIST ix-xvii (2003) (citing
"[flear of falling stock," "[t]he cult of the CEO," and "[h]ypergrowth" as reasons for
the bust of the telecommunications industry); supra notes 52, 256 (discussing the
impact of 9/11 on the U.S. capital markets); infra notes 320-21.
305. See infra section I.A see also Lee & Mande, supra note 107, at 99-105 (docu-
menting the instantaneous decrease in audit quality of the Big Six accounting
firms following adoption of the PSLRA as evidenced by the prevalence of increas-
ing discretionary accruals).
306. See Lisa Gibbs et al., Enron: The Lessons for Investors, MONEY, Jan. 2002, at 30.
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erhouse. Dazzled by sizzling earning growth, giddy investors bid up Enron's
shares 312% in two years to a high of $90.75 in 2000. Then someone turned
out the lights. Beset by marketplace woes and management mishaps, the
stock already had tumbled 53% when chief executive Jeffrey Skilling stunned
investors by resigning last August. After that, the bad news came at hyper-
speed: $1.2 billion in shareholder equity zapped by risky hedging deals, a Se-
curities and Exchange Commission probe, a last-chance merger with rival
Dynegy called off and, finally, a bankruptcy filing. By the end of November
[20011, the stock had plummeted to 26 [cents], obliterating $67 billion in mar-
ket cap-a shocking fall for a company that just last year occupied the No. 7
spot on the Fortune 500.307
Perhaps most stunning were the initial denials of any knowledge of
impending doom asserted by Enron's board of directors and key man-
agement. 30 8 Belying Enron management's professed ignorance to cir-
cumstances leading up to its scandalous collapse is the U.S. Senate
report that found that the Enron board of directors clearly knew of
Enron's "high-risk accounting and off-the-books deceptions." 30 9 The
Senate report further determined that "[t]he board witnessed numer-
ous indications of questionable practices by Enron management over
several years, but chose to ignore them to the detriment of Enron
shareholders, employees and business associates."310
Further belying Enron management's professed ignorance were va-
rious reports that identified several Enron executives who took enor-
mous cash bonuses and sold large portions of Enron stock immediately
prior to the company's collapse.311 When Enron filed for bankruptcy
on June 18, 2002, records and court documents indicated that:
In the year before the Enron Corporation collapsed last December, about 100
executives and energy traders collected more than $300 million in cash pay-
ments from the company, according to documents filed today [June 18, 2002]
in bankruptcy court. More than $100 million... went to Kenneth L. Lay, the
company's former chairman and chief executive. A majority of the cash pay-
307. Id. Despite Enron's implosion and mounting evidence to the contrary, various
executives and management figures continually denied knowledge of an impend-
ing doom awaiting Enron. See id. at 31 ("When pushed to reveal more, manage-
ment was often tight-lipped and unprofessional. During one famous conference
call last April [2001], [CEO] Skilling called an analyst an 'asshole' for com-
plaining about the company's failure to provide a balance sheet with its earnings
announcement."); see also cummings, supra note 8, at 1314 n.17; supra notes
80-83 and accompanying text.
308. See Carrie Johnson, Senate Report Criticizes Enron Board in Collapse, CH. TRIB.,
July 7, 2002, at A-11 ("The members of Enron Corp.'s board of directors contrib-
uted to the company's collapse by failing to curb the Houston energy trader's
risky accounting tactics, approving conflicts of interest, and rubber-stamping
enormous cash payouts to executives, according to a harshly worded Senate re-
port to be released Sunday.").
309. See id.
310. Id.
311. See David Barboza, Officials Got a Windfall Before Enron's Collapse, N.Y. TIMEs,
June 18, 2002, at C1.
20051 1045
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
ments went to employees of units whose profitability has been called into
question since the company's collapse....
The disclosure of scores of large cash payments is certain to increase the
ire of former lower-level employees who have long complained about how
high-level executives sold more than $1 billion in Enron shares in the year
[from July 2001 to June 2002] before the company filed for bankruptcy
protection .... 
3 1 2
Enron management, in a complex hybrid of subsidiary creation,
partnership alliance, and energy derivatives trading, was able to
deceive the investing public, and its employees, to the tune of billions
of dollars of nonexistent value.313 Only those intimately familiar with
the inner workings of the company were aware of the massive decep-
tions that were being played out daily by Enron officers.3 14 Since the
initial astonishment at Enron's brazen activities has passed, several
of the top management figures in the company's disintegration have
been arrested and charged with securities fraud and other crimes. 315
312. Id. "Yet even as the company was hurtling toward bankruptcy, some ... execu-
tives were showered with huge retention bonuses worth nearly $100 million...."
Id.
313. SEC Chairman Pitt Testifies on House Enron Reform Bill, Corporate Secretary's
Guide (CCH) No. 337, at 52 (Apr. 9, 2002) (detailing the fall of Enron as it in-
volved derivatives trading where Enron was compared to an over-the-counter
("OTC") derivatives trading firm operating within a 'regulatory black hole").
While testifying before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, charged
with peeling back the layers of the Enron deception, University of San Diego law
professor Frank Partnoy testified that "some Enron employees systematically
used 'dummy accounts' and 'rigged valuation methodologies' to create false profit
and loss entries for the derivatives Enron traded." Id. Professor Partnoy contin-
ued by testifying "that the OTC derivatives markets are largely unregulated and
Enron's trading operations were not regulated, or even recently audited, by secur-
ities regulators." Id. (emphasis added). Professor Partnoy described Enron's
complex use of deregulated derivatives trading as follows:
Specifically, Enron used derivatives and special purpose vehicles to
manipulate its financial statements in three ways. First, it hid losses it
suffered on technology stocks. Second, it hid huge debts incurred to fi-
nance unprofitable new businesses, including retail energy services for
new customers. Third, it inflated the value of other troubled businesses,
including its new .ventures in fiber-optic bandwidth.
With regard to hiding losses, a critical piece of the puzzle, the ele-
ment that made it all work, was a derivative transaction called a price
swap derivative between Enron and a special purpose entity, or SPE.
Id. Enron's management was able to deftly conceal immense losses from inves-
tors and shareholders by using complex partnership structures, thereby artifi-
cially inflating company value. See id.; see also cummings, supra note 8, at 1314
n.15.
314. See supra note 308 and accompanying text.
315. See Enron Ex-CFO Indicted, CNNMONEY.COM, Nov. 1, 2002 ("Andrew Fastow,
the former chief financial officer of bankrupt energy trader Enron, was hit with a
78-count indictment... accusing him of deceiving investors by making the dying
company appear financially sound."), at httpJ/money.cnn.com/2002/10/31/news/
fastow/index.htm; see also Going After Enron Execs' Assets, CNNMONEY.COM,
Aug. 22, 2002 ("Justice Department officials say the guilty plea.., by Michael
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At least one executive, who originally pled not guilty, has since pled
guilty to two counts of wire and securities fraud.316
In order to orchestrate the intrepid and reckless deceptions perpe-
trated by Enron's management, the criminally obliging officers most
certainly had to feel a particular sense of protection from substantial
personal risk and personal liability.3 17 That craved-for protection
from personal risk and liability arrived nicely packaged in 1995 in the
Kopper, a former assistant to ex-Enron Chief Financial Officer Andrew Fastow,
should allow them to go after $23 million from Fastow and other former Enron
executives."), at http://money.cnn.com/2002/08/22/news/companies/enron/index.
htm. "Former Enron chief executive officers Jeffrey Skilling and Kenneth Lay
also are under continuing investigation." See Enron Ex-CFO Indicted, supra; see
also infra note 308.
316. See Enron's Fastow Pleads Not Guilty, USA TODAY, Nov. 7, 2002, at B1. In No-
vember 2002, one former Enron official pled "not-guilty" to a 78-count indictment
"charging him with masterminding complex financial schemes that enriched him
and helped doom the energy-trading powerhouse." Id.; see also Fastow and His
Wife Plead Guilty, CNNMONEY.COM, Jan. 14, 2004 (reporting that Fastow "agreed
to serve a 10-year prison sentence and to cooperate with authorities"), at http:/
money.cnn.com/2004/1OV14/news/companies/enronfastows/index.htm.
317. See Dennis R. Fox, The Law Says Corporations Are Persons, but Psychology
Knows Better, 14 BEHAV. Sci. & LAw 339, 339-59 (1996) (describing the risks
individual corporate executives are willing to take in unethical scenarios when a
sense of protection is provided by the corporate entity or when a lack of deterrent
is present). Fox writes:
As detailed in Kelman and Hamilton's (1989) analysis of "crimes of
obedience," the psychology of giving and following destructive orders and
making dangerously risky decisions takes on added import within a legal
framework that assigns responsibility not to real individuals but to an
intangible entity. In a bureaucratically rational hierarchical institution,
individuals act as agents of others rather than as independent decision
makers (Coleman, 1982). Workers subordinate in the hierarchy make
decisions and follow orders without absorbing responsibility for those ac-
tions. Managers and executives make decisions and follow orders-and
also give them-in the name of the organization rather than in keeping
with their own sense of morality. "No feelings of guilt are required, no
attributions of moral blame permitted, when the stream is polluted, the
baby food is diluted, or the Pinto explodes" pointed out Mitchell (1995),
because "[t]he institution defines the moral role, and in the case of the
corporation, the moral role is narrow indeed" (pp. 523-524)....
Fortunately, psycholegal scholars building on the large data base of
organizational and social psychology have begun to examine decision
making, risk taking, conformity, and obedience in corporate settings.
Tomkins, Victor, and Adler (1992) summarized the large literature iden-
tifying "psychological realities" leading to reduced individual responsi-
bility and dangerously risky decisions. These include diffusion of
responsibility; role specialization; incomplete information; organiza-
tional culture; individual psychological defense mechanisms such as de-
nial of injury; and, in keeping with Prilleltensky's (1994) reminder about
the importance of focusing on power, management's ability to punish
nonconformity and disobedience (see also Coleman, 1982; Hills, 1987;
Kelman & Hamilton, 1989; Simon & Eitzen, 1990).
Id. at 348-49; see generally A. Mechele Dickerson, A Behavioral Approach to Ana-
lyzing Corporate Failures, 38 WAKE FoREST L. REV. 1 (2003).
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form of the PSLRA.318 The PSLRA carefully placed misbehaving
management in a protective cocoon, mostly safe from lawsuits and lia-
bility for false forecasts and bad behavior.319 Emboldened by these
new protections, officers of dozens of corporations, enabled by their
auditors, 320 began to routinely misstate earnings, misrepresent value,
overstate profits, and minimize or hide losses, thereby creating a fer-
vor of illegitimate company growth and success-all of this malfea-
sance evidenced by the 2001 eruption of reporting company
restatements of earnings forced by the SEC.321
318. See supra sections II.A-B (describing both the removal of personal liability from
management that fraudulently misrepresents as well as the removal of certain
protections and safeguards for investors).
319. See supra sections I.A-B (describing the safe harbor affording management pro-
tection for false statements made in forecasts if accompanied by appropriate cau-
tionary language and describing the role of the raised pleading requirements for
class-action plaintiffs to bring a cause of action that would survive summary
judgment).
320. See Lee & Mande, supra note 107, at 99-105 (detailing the significant drop in
audit quality by Big Six accountants following passage of the PSLRA). While
Professor Lee's study is explicit in its finding that post-PSLRA audit quality
dropped dramatically, as evidenced by the sharp increase in income increasing
discretionary accruals for Big Six auditors, see id., some may be tempted to make
the argument that the Supreme Court holding in Central Bank was the sole im-
petus behind accountants acting badly, not the PSLRA. See supra notes 197-204
and accompanying text. While Central Bank generally removed aiding and abet-
ting liability for secondary players in securities fraud private lawsuits, the hold-
ing did ensure that accountants, lawyers and investment bankers, amongst
others, could still be held to violate 10(b) and 10b-5 as primary actors, if they
were substantially involved in committing the fraud. See, e.g., In re Software
Toolworks, Inc., 50 F.3d 615, 628 (9th Cir. 1995) (applying the substantial partic-
ipation rule that has evolved in some U.S. Circuit Courts post-Central Bank).
Thus, the PSLRA's elimination of joint and several liability, see supra notes
212-13 and accompanying text, together with Central Bank's strict limiting of
aiding and abetting liability, are both behind the fraudulent behavior of Big Six
auditors that enabled the corporate corruption of the late 1990s.
321. See Lerach, supra note 13, at 90 n.66. Quoting both Professor Coffee of Columbia
Law School and Dean Seligman of Washington University School of Law, Lerach
relays:
It is, of course, impossible to disentangle the intertwined causes of
the latest rash of scandals.... But the one-sided judicial and legislative
reforms of the 1990s could not have helped.
"It's very plausible that the incredible increase in corporate earnings
restatements [in the late 1990s] has something to do with the liability
costs for auditors going down," says professor John Coffee, Jr., of Colum-
bia Law School. Such restatements, which averaged 49 a year from 1990
to 1997, jumped to 91 in 1998, 150 in 1999; 156 in 2000; and more than
200 last year [20011. "The message of the 1995 Act [PSLRA] was wrong,"
says Joel Seligman,. the Dean of the Washington University School of
Law in St. Louis. "It was, in effect, that the basic problem with securi-
ties law was avaricious plaintiffs' lawyers. To put it simply, wise legisla-
tion requires better balance. There are also greedy corporate executives
and ineffectual boards of directors, and that was lost in the 1995
analysis."
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B. El Paso
As the U.S. investing public struggled to come to grips with the
Enron fiasco, El Paso, a natural gas supplier, was secretly diverting
and rerouting crucial energy supplies, all in an effort to drive up the
price of energy in order to bilk energy clients out of hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars, and all based on fraudulent representations in connec-
tion with the availability of energy reserves.3 2 2 As just another
example of corporate scandal in the deregulated energy industry, El
Paso allegedly "illegally tightened natural gas supplies needed by Cal-
ifornia during the state's energy crisis, contributing to a rise in power
prices" as the company "withheld extremely large amounts of capacity
that could have flowed to its California delivery points."3 23 As Califor-
nia was mired in a dreadful energy shortage and the state scrambled
to meet energy requirements, with government officials asking citi-
zens to reduce energy usage in their homes,3 24 El Paso Corp. was
Id. (quoting Roger Parloff, We Asked for It, AM. LAw., Sept. 1, 2002, at 114); see
also John R. Emshwiller & Rebecca Smith, As Enron's Ex-Chief Faces Trial, Fo-
cus Turns to Public Statements, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 2005, at Al. Emshwiller and
Smith report that:
On Oct. 23, 2001, with Enron Corp. still in the first week of the crisis
that would eventually sink it, Kenneth Lay went on a public-relations
offensive.
In meetings with analysts and employees, the longtime Enron chair-
man and chief executive touted the strength of the Houston energy gi-
ant's operations and finances. He shrugged off growing public questions
about Enron's extensive dealings with outside partnerships run and
partly owned by the company's chief financial officer, Andrew Fastow.
He predicted that Enron's stock, then about $19.80 a share, would soon
bounce back to more than $50. Yet by that same day, according to the
U.S. government, Mr. Lay secretly had initiated efforts that within
about two weeks would produce an agreement to sell the entire company
to its smaller rival, Dynegy Inc., for only about $10 a share.
Id.
322. See El Paso Hurt Calif.: Judge, CNNMoNEY.COM, Sept. 23, 2002 ("Energy com-
pany's shares continue to fall amid findings that it cut needed gas supplies....
El Paso's shares fell another 21 cents to $7.30 after-hours Monday following a 36
percent tumble in the regular session, as investors scrambled to size up the com-
pany's liability for potential fines or refunds."), at httpJ/money.cnn.com/2002/09/
23/news/companies/elpaso/index.htm.
323. Id.
324. See Nancy Vogel, Heat Wave, Power Plant Crash Sap State's Electricity Supplies,
L.A. TIMES, July 11, 2002, at B-1. The L.A. Times reported in July 2002, that
during the summers of 2000 and 2001, amidst blackouts and desperate attempts
to conserve, that:
"If we had had this kind of weather last summer, the lights would be
off from Eureka to El Centro," said Gov. Gray Davis, whose administra-
tion has worked to stabilize California's electrical system after a disas-
trous brush with deregulation. ...
With California largely dependant on its own energy resources, state
and utility officials beseeched residents to embrace conservation as en-
thusiastically as they did during the electricity crisis of 2000 and 2001,
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charged with intentionally misrepresenting energy availability and
deliberately withholding large capacity, all in order to drive up costs
and turn a larger profit.32 5
The State of California claimed that El Paso Corp. "overcharged by
as much as $3.3 billion for natural gas to fuel their plants because El
Paso improperly capped its pipeline shipments at 79% of capacity from
November 2000 to March 2001."326 El Paso, in its defense, charged
that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission administrative law
judge that ruled against the company in September "wrongly micro-
managed company decisions. " 32 7 El Paso claimed that rather than
seeking to drive up energy costs, it merely was limiting capacity to
"ensure the pipeline operated safely."328 Amidst the environment of
corporate scandal and executive malfeasance, investors did not believe
these protestations of El Paso, as its share price continued to spiral
downward. 3 29 Once El Paso's scheme was exposed, the
[elnergy company's shares continue[d] to fall amid findings that it cut needed
gas supplies .... El Paso's shares fell another 21 cents to $7.30 after-hours
Monday [Sept. 23, 2002] following a 36 percent tumble in the regular session,
as investors scrambled to size up the company's liability for potential fines or
refunds.
330
As California struggled through a frightening energy crisis that
eventually cost Governor Gray Davis his job, El Paso Corp. was
charged with deliberately undercutting its energy supply pipeline to
California simply to drive up energy prices and increase its bottom
line by over $3.3 billion dollars. Inexplicably capitalizing on the strug-
gling state, El Paso allowed self-indulgence and an insatiable desire
for profit and income to shroud its business judgment.33 1 And, once
when wholesale prices soared and blackouts threatened even in low-con-
sumption winter months.
Id. (emphasis added).
325. See El Paso Hurt Calif.: Judge, supra note 322.
326. See FERC to Hear Case Against El Paso, L.A. TImEs, Dec. 2, 2002, at C6. "[A]
preliminary ruling against El Paso in September [2002] prompted investors to
dump shares, wiping out about $4 billion in market value and triggering down-
grades of its debt. El Paso's shares dropped last week after Moody's Investors
Service slashed the company's credit rating to 'junk' status." Id.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. See Vogel, supra note 324.
331. See Big Trouble at 01' El Paso, SRIMEDIA, Feb. 19, 2003 ("After a year of falling
energy prices, civil lawsuits, federal investigations[,] junk debt ratings and 90%
of its value wiped out, the board of El Paso Corporation is about to learn the
meaning of real trouble."), at http://www.srimedia.com/artman/publish/article-
392.shtml. SriMedia further reported that:
El Paso's future also is pending a Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion ruling on whether the company withheld natural gas during Cali-
fornia's energy crisis in 2000 and 2001. In late 2002, a judge determined
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again, investors and the innocent public were struck for illnesses of
the corporate purveyors of such avarice.
C. WorldCom
Just as the furor produced by the 2001 Enron debacle was dwin-
dling, and just as congressional motivation to pass investor protective
legislation was simultaneously deteriorating,3 3 2 the WorldCom bomb
dropped on the U.S. capital markets.3 33 The WorldCom calamity
El Paso, which controlled about 20% of the natural gas supply to Califor-
nia had used its position to raise power prices.
Id.; see also Fraud Allegedly Plagues Energy Trading, AP, Dec. 5, 2004 ("Before
2003, energy trading had little oversight and room for abuse. A slew of indict-
ments handed up a week ago illustrate those days aren't just a memory."), availa-
ble at http://www.pulpny.org/html/fraud-allegedly-plagues-energy.html. The AP
reported in December 2004 that:
Five former traders from three Houston-based companies-El Paso
Corp., Reliant Energy Inc. and Dynegy Inc.-were indicted on charges of
reporting fake trades to industry publication that use such information
to calculate index prices of natural gas. Movement in such prices can
affect traders' profits.... "Because there were no rules, people did what
they wanted," [Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Chief Andrea]
Wolfman said. "It was a little like the wild west."
Id.
332. See Stephen Labaton & Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Enthusiasm Waning in Congress
for Tougher Post-Enron Controls, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2002, at Al ("Six months
after the collapse of Enron, a wave of enthusiasm for overhauling the nation's
corporate and accounting laws has ebbed and the toughest proposals for change
are all but dead."). The N.Y. Times reported that an influential group of lobby-
ists, using partisan differences in Congress as its apparatus, had nearly killed
Congressional efforts to "impose tight new controls on corporate conduct." See id.
("Bills imposing more stringent accounting standards, changing the tax and ac-
counting treatment of employee stock options and setting tougher conflict-of-in-
terest rules for stock analysts and accounting firms have all fallen victim to
political gridlock."); see also cummings, supra note 8, at 1316 n.19.
333. See David Saito-Chung & Jonah Keri, Stocks Undercut Lows on WorldCom Wor-
ries, But Recover at Close Ho-Hum to Latest Frauds? Harldy-Investor's Faith
Seems Shaken: President Pledges To Go After Crooks, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY,
June 27, 2002, at Al ("WorldCom's admission of financial wrongdoing rocked the
stock market Wednesday [June 26, 2002] and left investors wondering how and
when the epidemic of sickly accounting will be cured."); see also Francine
Knowles, Faith in Corporate America Crumbles, CHI. SuN-TIMES, June 27, 2002,
at 6; Kevin Maney, WorldCom CFO Driven to Win: Once Respected, Scott Sulli-
van Is Now at the Center of Controversy, CH. SuN-TIMES, Aug. 27, 2002, at 39
("WorldCom fired [CFO Scott] Sullivan in late June after the accounting mis-
deeds were unearthed.").
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spurred Congress into action 33 4 and seemingly moments later 335 Con-
gress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act with much fanfare.336
If the- securities industry and investing public were stunned at the
size and scope of the deceptions that Enron's management had perpet-
uated, they were absolutely confounded by the range and depth of the
corruption exhibited by WorldCom's management. 337 In an eerily fa-
miliar scene, evocative of Enron's congressional hearings, some of
WorldCom's senior officers, when called upon to testify before the U.S.
House of Representatives Financial Services Committee in early July
2002, refused to testify.3 38 Members of the House Financial Services
Committee were "outrage [d]" at the deliberate silence exhibited by top
WorldCom management called to Washington, D.C. to account for
management inaction in light of WorldCom's colossal collapse. 3 39 The
House Committee members were stonewalled in their efforts to get to
the bottom of the scandal that bankrupted the nation's second largest
long-distance telephone provider. 340
When WorldCom began to buckle under the weight of its own dis-
tortion, most commentators predicted that the company would be
334. See Tom Hamburger et al., WorldCom Scandal Spurs Congress, WALL ST. J.,
June 27, 2002, at A8 (indicating that Congress may have been spurred to action
based on the WorldCom scandal, after the reform furor had died down over En-
ron). "The giant WorldCom accounting scandal is giving a powerful boost of en-
ergy to the drive in Congress to clean up business practices, accelerating
legislation reining in the accounting industry and shooting new life into a range
of other corporate-reform proposals." Id.
335. Enron-motivated congressional reform of the securities industry was as good as
dead in early June 2002, supra note 332, until the news of WorldCom's implosion
dropped on June 26, 2002, supra note 333. A newly inspired (and traumatized)
Congress moved at hyperspeed to pass the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, infra note 376,
which was signed by the once-reluctant President George W. Bush on July 25,
2002. See Cummings et al., supra'note 26, At Al; see also Molly Ivins, Sarbanes
Bill Fixes Only dne Horror, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Aug. 3, 2002, at 4A ("Let's
review what we got with the Sarbanes Bill, so proudly declared by President
Bush (who opposed the entire package until two weeks ago) to be 'the most far-
reaching reform of American business practices since the time of Franklin Delano
Roosevelt."); Statement on Signing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 38 WEEKLY
COMP. PREs. Doc. 1271, 1286 (July 30, 2002).
336. See Part V.
337. See Jared Sandberg et al., Disconnected: Inside WorldCom's Unearthing of a Vast
Accounting Scandal, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2002, at Al (carefully detailing the
unorthodox secreting of expenses as capital expenditures by WorldCom's Chief
Financial Officer, Scott Sullivan, in effect misstating over "$3.8 billion of ex-
penses that were improperly booked and [would have to] be restated").
WorldCom Inc. duped investors for over fifteen months claiming large profit mar-
gins when in fact the company was hemorrhaging money steadily. See id.
338. See Jake Ulick, WorldCom Blames Auditor, CNNMONEY.COM, July 8, 2002, at
http://money.cnn.com/2002/07/08/news/companies/worldcom/index.htm.
339. Id.
340. See id.
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forced to declare bankruptcy. 3 4 1 Those pundits did not have to wait
long3 42 to be proven right, as WorldCom soon thereafter filed a bank-
ruptcy petition larger than any ever filed in U.S. history,3 43 making it
the largest corporate failing of its kind and leading to serious
problems for the "nation's long-distance phone industry."344 Adding
to the depth of WorldCom's deceit and to the further astonishment of
the investing public and securities industry, was that on at least two
occasions since it was initially exposed as fraudulent, the company
has been forced to restate its loss projections, which were originally
reported at $3.8 billion, but now exceed $11 billion.345 To this day,
deeper layers of fraud continue to be exposed.
346
341. See Reinhardt Krause, WorldCom Collapse Is Likely To Force a Rethinking of
U.S. Telecom Policies: Others To Feel Squeeze Too, INVESTOR'S. Bus. DAILY, June
27, 2002, at Al ("The No. 2 long-distance firm, WorldCom is near bankruptcy. It
disclosed a multibillion-dollar accounting fraud.., sending shock waves through
an already sick industry.").
342. WorldCom revealed "on June 25, 2002, that it had committed the largest fraud in
history." Christopher Stern, King of the Bad-News Bulls, WASH. POST., Oct. 10,
2003, at El. Less than one month later, on July 22, 2002, the company declared
bankruptcy. See Simon Romero & Riva D. Atlas, WorldCom's Collapse: The Over-
view, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2002, at Al (detailing WorldCom's Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy filing), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/22/business/22CND-
TELE.html.
343. See Romero & Atlas, supra note 342.
344. See Krause, supra note 341, at Al.
345. See Stern, supra note 342 ("In its initial account to the Securities and Exchange
Commission, WorldCom said that it had uncovered about $3.8 billion in improper
booking. But that turned out to be just the beginning of a series of announce-
ments, with the final tally on the company's fraud closer to $11 billion."); see also
Jeremy Pelofsky & Dane Hamilton, WorldCom to Pay $500 Million to Settle SEC
Charges, YAHOO NEWS, May 21, 2003 ("WorldCom Inc. agreed on Monday [May
19, 20031 to pay a record $500 million fine to settle-charges Stemming from one of
the biggest accounting fraud ases in U.S. history. Under the tentative deal
reached between WorldCom and the Securities and Exchange Commission, the
No. 2 U.S. long-distance telephone and data services company would pay the pen-
alty and the funds would then be doled out to victims of the roughly $11 billion
accounting fraud."), at http:/in.tech.yahoo.con/030521137/ 24hef.html.
346. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. Or March 15, 2005, Bernard Ebbers,
former CEO of WorldCom, was convicted by a jury of "orchestrating the $11 bil-
lion fraud that sank the company in 2002, the biggest corporate fraud and bank-
ruptcy in U.S. history." Erin McClam, Conviction at Trial Marks Stunning Fall
for Ebbers, TUSCALOOSA NEWS, Mar. 16, 2005, at 1A. "As a jury forewoman read
the verdict-guilty on all nine counts, including fraud and conspiracy-Ebbers
face reddened noticeably." Id. McClam reports:
They called him the Telecom Cowboy, a darling of Wall Street who
took a small long-distance company global by steering a snowballing set
of mergers and acquisitions.
Now, Bernard Ebbers is the government's biggest catch since it began
pursuing the largest corporate fraudsters three years ago. He could
spend the rest of his life in federal prison. ...
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WorldCom management, secure in the knowledge that the PSLRA
had provided necessary liability insulation, deliberately misstated
earnings projections and purportedly hid expenses and losses.347 Due
in large part to the Telecommunications Act deregulations, WorldCom
existed and perpetrated these falsehoods in a more secluded environ-
ment, safe from federal government oversight and outside any federal
control.348
D. Adelphia
With the WorldCom telecommunications squalor still thickly in the
air, Adelphia's sins dropped on an unsuspecting, but increasingly cyni-
cal, investing public.3 49
The conviction comes more than two years after an internal auditor
began asking questions about curious accounting at WorldCom, touching
off a scandal that eventually unearthed $11 billion in cooked books.
The company struck a $750 million settlement with federal regula-
tors to repay the aggrieved investors, a small sum compared to the tens
of billions of dollars of market capitalization that evaporated in the
scandal.
Id. at 1A, 7A.; see also Almar Latour et al., Ebbers is Convicted in Massive Fraud:
WorldCom Jurors Say CEO Had to Have Known; Unconvinced by CFO, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 16, 2005, at Al ("After eight days of deliberation, the jury found Mr.
Ebbers guilty of all nine counts against him, including conspiracy and securities
fraud, related to the accounting fraud that topped $11 billion."); Jesse Drucker &
Li Yuan, Documents May Have Been Decisive in Convicting Ebbers, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 17, 2005, at Cl ("In the Bernard Ebbers trial, the decisive evidence may not
have been the star witnesses on either side. It may have been the hundreds of
pieces of paper and other exhibits the jurors pored through during the eight days
of deliberation."). The Wall Street Journal reported that the jury was convinced
by the financial documents that they analyzed prior to reaching the guilty
verdict: I I
For Salina Strong, juror' No. 4, the jury's task was to read as many
documents as necessary to corroborate what they were hearing in the
courtroom.
The result: numerous requests for reams of exhibits, including
monthly financial reports, press releases and even videotapes of Mr. Eb-
bers's speechds and television interviews.
Like many other jurors in the case in federal court in New York City,
she said she didn't find "credible" the testimony of Mr. Sullivan [former
WorldCom CFO], the star prosecution witness. Instead, certain finan-
cial reports that were sent to Mr. Ebbers's office were more important-
so the jury asked to see them themselves. "You saw those adjustments"
in the reports, she recalled. "if we could see them, how could he not see
them?"
Id.
347. See Pelofsky & Hamilton, supra note 345.
348. See cummings, supra note 31; see generally Lee & Mande, supra note 107.
349. See Claudia H. Deutsch & Joseph B. Treaster, Corporate Conduct: The Reaction;
Other Executives Voice Satisfaction at Arrests, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2002, at C5
(describing the arrest of former Adelphia executives for fraud).
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In yet another example of corporate fraud and criminal activity by the
management of a major U.S. [telecommunications] corporation, former execu-
tives of Adelphia ... were arrested July 10, 2002:
Three members of the founding family of troubled cable operator
Adelphia Communications Corp. and two former executives were ar-
rested on Wednesday on federal securities and bank fraud charges.
The complaint, unsealed in Manhattan federal court, names as
defendants former Chief Executive John Rigas; former Chief Finan-
cial Officer Timothy Rigas; Michael Rigas, former executive vice
president, operations; James R. Brown, former vice president, fi-
nance; and Michael Mulcahey....
The lengthy complaint alleges the defendants conspired to com-
mit securities, wire, and bank fraud. "The investigation has re-
vealed probable cause to believe that John J. Rigas ... together with
members of his family has looted Adelphia on a massive scale, using
the company as the Rigas family's personal piggy bank at the expense
of public investors and creditors," the complaint alleges.
The Rigas family members had resigned from Adelphia following the dis-
closure of billions of dollars of off-balance-sheet loans guaranteed by the com-
pany to the Rigas family personally, overstated earnings, and other
accounting issues.
3 5 0
In November 2002, James R. Brown, Adelphia's former executive
vice-president, pled guilty to bank fraud and other charges "as part of
a [plea] deal to testify against Rigas family members accused of plun-
dering the now-bankrupt cable company."
3 51
As Adelphia sought bankruptcy protection due to Rigas manage-
ment malfeasance, the bankrupt cable operator announced the ap-
pointment of a new chairman whom the company hoped would lead it
back to solvency and respectability as a viable corporate concern.
3 52
While Adelphia appears to be emerging as a viable corporate concern,
the staggering breadth of corporate fraud perpetrated by Adelphia
management upon the U.S. investing public continues to bewilder.
Again, the Rigas family, emboldened by the opportunity to be insu-
lated from risk and liability through the PSLRA, and then given free-
350. cummings, supra note 8, at 1380 n.344 (quoting Former Adelphia Executives Ar-
rested for Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2002).
351. See Devlin Barrett, Former Adelphia Exec Cuts Plea Deal, CBSNEws.coM, Nov.
14, 2002 ("The former vice president of finance at Adelphia Communications
Corp. was the first person to plead guilty in the scandal that authorities say cost
investors more than $60 billion."), at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/06/26/
nationallmain5l3444.shtml.
352. See Adelphia Names New Chiefs: Bankrupt Cable Company Seeks Help from 2
Top AT&T Broadband Executives, CNNMONEY.COM, Jan. 17, 2003 ("Bankrupt
cable operator Adelphia Communications Corp.... named former AT&T execu-
tive William Schleyer as its chairman and chief executive .... In addition, the
company said Ron Cooper, AT&T Broadband's chief operating officer, would be
appointed with the same title at Adelphia."), at http://money.cnn.com/2003/01/17/
news/companies/adelphia/index.htm; see also Peter Grant, Cable Giants' Adel-
phia Purchase Could Change Industry Picture, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 2005, at B2
(detailing likely acquisition of Adelphia by Time Warner, Inc.).
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dom to roam with less federal oversight by the Telecommunications
Act, went off on a spending, cheating, deceiving, unethical, and dis-
honorable extravaganza of recklessness. 3 53
E. Global Crossing
Stunned by Enron and not yet blindsided by WorldCom, U.S. in-
vestors and the securities industry were cuffed by Global Crossing
when news of its transgressions hit the airwaves, described as the
"latest killer earthquake rumbling on Wall Street."35 4 Global Cross-
ing, launched in 1997 by founder and former junk-bond trader Gary
Winnick,355 rapidly built a preeminent "worldwide fiber-optic commu-
nications network."356 Global Crossing's dramatic collapse and subse-
quent bankruptcy filing in January 2002 made it the fourth-largest
public bankruptcy in U.S. history.357 Global Crossing's downfall was
precipitated "by the entrance of a flurry of competitors and a sharp
drop in demand for broadband capacity" that made it impossible for it
to pay off its massive debt.358 Despite the flurry of competition and
the drop in demand for broadband capacity, the primary reason for
Global Crossing's crushing failure was the misrepresentation and out-
right fraud perpetrated by Winnick and Global Crossing's executive
management. 359
Global Crossing's primary accounting trick to inflate value, in-
crease revenue, and deceive shareholders and employees was its "now-
infamous asset swaps it conducted with other telecom companies." 3 60
Essentially Global Crossing inflated its financial status by selling
broadband capacity on its network to other telecommunications carri-
ers and recording such sales as revenue while concurrently buying
353. See supra notes 349-52 and accompanying text.
354. Adam Lashinsky, Being Global Crossed: Investors in Other Telecoms Are Likely
To Suffer Fall-Out from the Demise of Global Crossing, CNNMONEY.COM, Feb. 13,
2003, at http://money.cnn.com/2002/02/13/investing/lashinsky/index.htm.
355. See Mark Harrington, Global Crossing Files Chapter 11, NEWSDAY, Jan. 29, 2002,
at A43.
356. Edward S. Adams, Corporate Governance After Enron and Global Crossing: Com-
parative Lessons for Cross-National Improvement, 78 IND. L.J. 723, 777 (2003).
Adams writes:
In contrast to Enron, Global Crossing's problems appear to have their
beginnings in its board of directors. Winnick was firmly rooted in
Global's board as its chairman. In stark contrast, the rest of the board
had been composed of thirty different directors since 1998, with the
board's size ranging between eight and seventeen members during that
time.
Id.
357. See Global Crossing Director Resigns, Third in Month, REUTERS ENGLISH NEWS
SERV., Mar. 4, 2002.
358. Adams, supra note 356, at 777.
359. See id. at 777-78.
360. Lashinsky, supra note 354.
1056 [Vol. 83:979
"AIN'T NO GLORY IN PAIN"
back a like amount of capacity on other telecommunications carriers
and recording such buybacks as non-liabilities.
3 6 1 While Global
Crossing and other telecommunications carriers maintained their in-
nocence by conveniently blaming their accountants for reporting irreg-
ularities,36 2 such cries of innocence are belied by Global Crossing
executives' behavior leading up to and directly following its bank-
ruptcy filing.36 3 In January 2002, when Global Crossing filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection:
Global Crossing failed to provide severance pay to thousands of laid-off em-
ployees after filing for bankruptcy protection, but a published report Thurs-
day [Feb. 21, 2002] said the outcome for many company executives was quite
different, with some receiving millions of dollars in pensions and loan
forgiveness....
The Bermuda-based company also moved up its last pay date by a week so
its executives and other still-employed staff could be paid before the company
declared bankruptcy Jan. 28....
Global Crossing also forgave large loans to executives, including one for
$10 million to Legere. In addition, Global Crossing has made 11th-hour lump-
sum pension payouts totaling $15 million to high-ranking executives in recent
months, most of them no longer employed by the company.
3 6 4
Global Crossing engaged in an elaborate shell game with U.S. in-
vestors and its employees. Emboldened by the PSLRA and freed from
federal oversight by the Telecommunications Act, Global Crossing
fleeced investors of billions of dollars of value and crushed once-loyal
employees.
36 5
361. See Global Crossing Restates Financials, CNNMONEY.COM, Oct. 21, 2002 ("Bank-
rupt telecommunications service provider Global Crossing Monday [Oct. 21,
2002] said it will restate some of its recent financial statements to reflect 'swap
deals' it made with other providers, erasing some $19 million in revenue."), at
http:l/money.cnn.com/2002/O21/technology/global/index.htm.
362. See id. In connection with Global Crossing's capacity swap agreements and fi-
nancial restatements recorded in response to such, CNN Money reports:
The company [Global Crossing] said it made the restatement to reflect
swaps deals it made during the period. The Securities and Exchange
Commission recently had deemed such transactions improper. Global
Crossing blamed beleaguered auditing firm Arthur Andersen for the dis-
crepancy, saying the firm advised it to account for the transactions is
[sic] such a way. It said the SEC has told the company that such ac-
counting did not comply with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles,
or GAAP.
Id.; see also Lee & Mande, supra note 107, at 93-105.
363. See Global Crossing Shielded Execs: Firm Reportedly Moved Up Pay Date, Gave
Executives Big Pensions, CNNMoNEY.coM, Feb. 21, 2002, at http://money.cnn.
com/2002/02/21/technology/globalcrossingindex.htm.
364. Id. "The Wall Street Journal report indicated that that [sic] even though the
telecommunications company has never turned a profit, in October [2001] it
awarded its new CEO, John Legere, a $3.5 million signing bonus despite the fact
that he already was employed in a separate Global Crossing affiliate in Asia." Id.
365. See cummings, supra note 31.
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F. Qwest
Qwest, like its telecommunications rivals WorldCom and Global
Crossing, engaged in deceptive accounting practices while pursuing
the all-important corporate value and revenue.366 Of its most serious
deceptions in its quest for value and revenue, illegal swap agreements
top the list of Qwest indiscretions.367 Qwest engaged in swaps of tele-
phone connections with other telecommunications carriers and re-
corded the swaps as new revenue.368 Such swaps, coupled with other
dubious accounting practices, caused Qwest to have to restate all of its
misrepresented value.369 Qwest ended up restating more than $2.2
billion in value and four of its executives were indicted for artificially
inflating Qwest's revenue. 370
While maintaining that its dubious swap agreements were argua-
bly permissible, Qwest executives engaged in further unsavory and fa-
miliar practices when the news dropped that it would be restating
financial disclosures.371 On March 13, 2002:
Qwest Communications International Inc. joined the ranks of troubled compa-
nies Enron and Global Crossing when it prohibited thousands of employees
from selling company stock or other assets in 401(k) plans over a four-week
period in December and January.... Although Qwest shares only fell 7 per-
cent during the four weeks, it's reminiscent of the move made by Enron when
it prohibited employees from selling stock and 401(k) assets as it headed to-
ward bankruptcy.3 72
Taking advantage of the deregulated telecommunications environ-
ment, Qwest, and a battery of other corporate malefactors, engaged in
deceptive and dishonest practices to inflate value artificially and to
ultimately reap ill-gained rewards from a duped investing public.373
366. See Jerry W. Markham, Accountants Make Miserable Policemen: Rethinking the
Federal Securities Laws, 28 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 725, 781--82 (2003).
367. See id. at 782.
368. See Dennis K. Berman et al., Tricks of the Trade, As Market Bubble Neared End,
Bogus Swaps Provided a Lift, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 2002, at Al.
369. See id.
370. See Dennis Berman & Deborah Solomon, Ex-Executives Are Indicted in Qwest
Probe, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2003, at Bi.
371. See Qwest Locked Down'4O1(k)'s: Troubles Telecom Barred Employee Stock and
Asset Sales for 4-Week Period, CNNMONEY.COM, Mar. 13, 2002, at http://money.
cnn.com/2002/03/13/technology/qwestlindex.htm.
372. Id. "In addition to the job cuts and debt reviews, Qwest said Monday the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission is investigating methods the company used to
book sales in 2000 and 2001." Id.
373. See Deborah Solomon & Dennis K. Berman, Qwest's Nacchio to Face SEC
Charges, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 2005, at A3 ("Securities regulators plan to file civil
charges as early as next week against Joseph P. Nacchio, the former chief execu-
tive of Qwest Communications International Inc., over his role in accounting
fraud at the Denver telecommunications company, according to people familiar
with the matter."). Solomon and Berman report that:
In a long-awaited action, the Securities and Exchange Commission
also is expected to file charges against about a dozen other former Qwest
1058 [Vol. 83:979
"AIN'T NO GLORY IN PAIN"
Simply stated, it is difficult to claim coincidence when examining
the bulk of the major corporate criminals responsible for the crash of
2002. Most major malfeasors are corporations in industries deregu-
lated by the Revolution Congress.37 4 Most, if not all, major
malfeasors are corporations that employed (and criminally collabo-
rated with) Big Six auditing firms, whose accountants were found to
have significantly decreased audit quality and ballooned income in-
creasing discretionary accruals following the deregulatory and reform
hysteria of the PSLRA and Central Bank.37 5 Deregulation on a na-
tional scale has badly failed, was ill-conceived, and has been responsi-
ble in large part for the failing market and sick economy of 2001, 2002,
and 2003.
In a typical rush to legislate, the 107th Congress, still teeming
with hundreds of holdovers from the Republican Revolution and devo-
tees of the arguably failed "Contract with America," passed the tooth-
less and too-weak Sarbanes-Oxley Act in startlingly rapid fashion.
V. DID THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT RECAPTURE ANY
LOST PROTECTIONS?
The question-whether the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002376 recap-
tured any lost protections or federal regulations given away in the
PSLRA, the Telecommunications Act, or the CFMA-must be an-
swered with an emphatic no.3 77 The primary disconnect, overlooked
by most commentators and apparently by the members of the 107th
Congress, is that deregulation and the PSLRA, the Telecommunica-
tions Act, and the CFMA must shoulder a large portion of the blame
for the historic stock market collapse of 2001-02. 3 78 Yet the protec-
tions, which were discarded by the Revolution Congress when it en-
acted the deregulatory legislation, have not been returned to the U.S.
executives, including two chief financial officers and a chief operating
officer. While exact charges aren't known, the SEC's case is expected to
accuse the former executives of a program to falsely represent the com-
pany's financial condition, particularly Qwest's ability to meet aggres-
sive revenue goals during the telecommunications investing boom of the
late 1990s.
Id.
374. See Cummings et al., supra note 26, at Al ("[T]he most notorious [fraud-plagued
corporations] have exploded in sectors deregulated in the 1990s .... ").
375. See Lee & Mande, supra note 107, at 99-105; see also supra notes 108-10, 305,
320 and accompanying text.
376. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7201-7266 (West Supp. 2004); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
Pub. L. 107-204, 115 Stat. 745.
377. See infra notes 378-401 and accompanying text.
378. See cummings, supra note 8, at 1307 n.4 (detailing the collapse of the U.S. capital
markets in 2001 and 2002 and styling it the "Crash of 2002").
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investing public; nor have they been addressed or restored by the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (or "SOX").379
While the 107th Congress had a tremendous opportunity to reject
the "super heightened" pleading standard instituted by the PSLRA,380
to remove the dangerous corporate-executive protections for forward-
looking statements originated in the PSLRA,38s and to discard the
nearly impossible aider-and-abettor standard articulated in Central
Bank,382 it badly failed to correct these errors. 38 3 While the 107th
Congress had an excellent opportunity to reexamine its deregulatory
mistakes perpetrated in the Telecommunications Act, particularly
noting in hindsight that the 105th Congress had miscalculated badly
many of its assumptions in connection with growth and expectation in
the telecom industry, the 107th Congress did nothing to re-regulate
the telecom industry and correct its mistakes through remedial legis-
lation.3S4 Finally, with a chance to redeem itself for abruptly and
wrongly enacting the CFMA, the 107th and 108th Congresses have
failed to regulate fully an industry in desperate need of federal over-
sight-commodity derivatives trading, particularly in energy and
electricity.3 8 5
In truth, SOX, which has been criticized as doing little more than
attempting to assuage the conscience of U.S. investors, has accom-
plished little or nothing where investor protections are concerned.38 6
379. See Lerach, supra note 13, at 123 ("Unfortunately, [the] Sarbanes-Oxley [Act] did
not undo a single provision of the 1995 [PSLRA]").
380. See supra note 135.
381. See supra notes 172-73.
382. See supra notes 197-204.
383. See supra note 379.
384. See generally, Michael A. Hiltzik and James E. Peltz, Did Telecom Reformers Dial
the Wrong Number?; Deregulation: A 1996 Landmark Law May Be at the Root of
the Industry's Meltdown Analysts Say, L.A: TIS, July 24, 2002, at 1-1 ("As the
wreckage of once-highflying telecommunications companies such as WorldCom
Inc. and Global Crossing Ltd. piles up, attention is turning to whether the root of
the disaster lies in the sweeping deregulation set in motion in the mid-1990s that
was expected to usher in a golden age of competition."); see also cummings, supra
note 31.
385. See supra notes 289-303 and accompanying text.
386. See ROBERTA ROMANO, N.Y UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW AND
ECONOMICS WORKING PAPERS, No. 3, THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT AND THE MAKING
OF QUACK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1 (2004) ("The learning of the literature,
which was available when Congress was legislating, is that SOX's corporate gov-
ernance provisions were ill-conceived.... SOX was enacted as emergency legisla-
tion amidst a free-falling stock market and media frenzy over corporate scandals
shortly before the midterm congressional elections."), available at http:/
lsr.nellco.org/nyu/lewp/papers/3; see also Lerach, supra note 13, at 122-23. Ler-
ach describes the potential effectiveness of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as follows:
This new law [Sarbanes-Oxley] does precious little to empower inves-
tors. It increases prison terms-but violation of the securities laws has
long been a felony carrying long prison terms due to the provisions of the
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Certainly, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has done nothing to address the
deficiencies created by the PSLRA. Nor has SOX done anything to
remedy the deregulatory chaos that emerged through enactment of
the Telecommunications Act. Neither has the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
sought to offer new regulation in the energy or derivatives trading in-
dustries. Simply, SOX does not address, in any sense, the failed der-
egulations perpetrated by the Revolution Congress. Congress's bid
once again to offer protection to investors and ensure the integrity of
the U.S. capital markets will not come about via Sarbanes-Oxley.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, formally the "Public Company Account-
ing Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002,"387 was enacted by
the 107th Congress in nearly unanimous fashion.388 SOX, while hast-
ily drawn together and passed with little legislative history, proposes
to "override[] and significantly modify both the pre-existing structure
for the regulation of the accounting profession and much traditional
corporate governance that was formerly the exclusive subject of state
law."38 9 While it appears unlikely that SOX will have any significant
effect on improving investor protection, on ensuring capital market in-
tegrity, or even on encouraging appropriate behavior from corporate
executives, the Act certainly busies itself with window dressing:3 90
sentencing guidelines .... It increases the authority of the SEC-but
the SEC helped get us in the mess in the first place. The real problem at
the SEC is the pro-corporate bias of its recent Chairmen-not a lack of
statutory authority or power. It establishes yet another new accounting
oversight board-but these kinds of oversight entities have existed for
years, have always been coopted by the accounting industry and were in
place when the accounting excesses that got us where we are now were
put in place and pursued. Yes it gives investors a short extension of the
statute of limitations, but the litigation playing field is not tilted by the
time period within which a victim must sue, but rather by a punitive
pleading standard, the lack of aiding-and-abetting liability, the lack of
joint-and-several liability, a harsh sanctions provision, a safe harbor per-
mitting executives to knowingly lie about financial projection and forcing
all securities call action suits into federal court, depriving investors of
their traditional remedies under state law.
Id.
387. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 115 Stat. 745.
388. See John C. Coffee, Jr., An Introduction to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, in RICHARD
JENNINGS ET AL., SARBANES-OXLEY ACT SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT: FEDERAL SECURI-
TIES LAw: SELECTED STATUTES, RULES AND FORMS 1 n.1 (2003) ("The Act (107 Pub.
L. No. 204, 116 Stat. 745) passed the Senate 99-0 and the House 423-3.").
389. Id.
390. Of note, while SOX added little by way of investor protection, the New York Stock
Exchange did adopt new listing standards and implemented requirements man-
dating that NYSE member corporations incorporate "an internal audit function
and adopt and publish a code of business conduct and ethics." Kimberly D.
Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81
WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 488 (2003) (citing Press Release, New York Stock Exchange,
NYSE Approves Measures to Strengthen Corporate Accountability (Aug. 1,
2002), available at http://www.nyse.com/press/NT00545421.html.). While a short
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(1) Title I of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act creates a self-regulatory
body, the "Public Company Accounting Oversight Board," to
regulate the accounting profession by establishing auditing
standards and imposing discipline.391
(2) Section 301 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act mandates that a
public company's audit committee must be composed exclu-
sively of independent directors and seeks to strengthen the
powers and responsibilities of the audit committee.3 92
(3) Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act directs the SEC to
"promulgate rules of practice that require attorneys appear-
ing before it to report 'evidence' of material securities law
violations, fiduciary breaches, or similar misconduct" in-
volving an attorney's public reporting of the client "first, to
its chief legal counsel or CEO and then, if those officers fail
to act 'appropriately,' up the ladder to the company's audit
committee, its independent directors, or its board of direc-
tors as a whole."3 9
3
examination of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is undertaken here, a full and exhaustive
examination of that legislation is beyond the scope of this Article.
391. See Coffee, supra note 388, at 2. Professor Coffee writes that:
The centerpiece of the [Sarbanes-Oxley] Act is the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (the "Board"), which is empowered and in-
structed to "oversee the audit of public companies that are subject to the
securities laws, and related matters, in order to protect the interests of
investors and further the public interest in the preparation of informa-
tive, accurate, and independent audit reports ... ." Although the Board
is a private body, established as a non-profit corporation, the Act ex-
pressly makes it subject to SEC oversight in a manner paralleling the
relationship between the SEC and the NASD. The five members of the
Board are appointed by the SEC (after consultation with the Chairman
of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Secre-
tary of the Treasury) for five-year terms. Two (but only two) of the
Board's five members must be certified public accountants. These re-
strictions are obviously intended to prevent the "capture" of the Board by
the accounting profession.
Id. at 3. (footnotes omitted).
392. Id. at 2.
393. Id. Professor Coffee reports in connection with the attorney reporting responsi-
bility provision:
In one of its more controversial provisions (which was added by a
floor amendment submitted by Senator Edwards of North Carolina),
Section 307 of the Act requires the SEC to prescribe "minimum stan-
dards of professional conduct for attorneys" who practice before the SEC.
These rules must require attorneys who represent public companies "to
report evidence of a material violation of securities law or breach of fidu-
ciary duty or similar violation by the company or any agent thereof" to
the company's chief legal counsel or CEO. If those officers do not take
appropriate action, Section 307 further mandates that the SEC's rules
require the attorney to report the evidence to the public company's audit
committee, to its independent directors, or to the board of directors as a
whole.
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(4) Sections 302 and 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act require the
CEOs and the CFOs of public reporting companies to pro-
vide on an ongoing and continuous basis a prescribed certifi-
cation of their company's financial statements and imposes
an enhanced criminal sanction for certifications that are
knowingly false.3
9 4
(5) Title IV of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires reporting com-
panies to make more current, real-time disclosures of mate-
rial changes in the company's financial condition.
3 95
(6) Section 403 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act obligates directors,
principal stockholders, and officers of a company to disclose
transactions in their company's securities within two busi-
ness days. 3 9 6
(7) Section 501 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act instructs the SEC to
promulgate rules governing the objectivity and indepen-
dence of securities analysts and rules protecting analysts
from retaliation from their firms because of negative re-
search or ratings. 3
9 7
(8) Section 201 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act prohibits an ac-
counting firm, that audits a reporting company, from con-
ducting contemporaneous nonaudit services for that same
reporting company, in nine categories.
3 98
The Act also empowers the SEC to censure, suspend, or deny any
person the privilege of appearing or practicing before the SEC (tempora-
rily or permanently) if that person is found to not possess the "requisite
qualifications to represent others," to be "lacking in character or integ-
rity, or to have engaged in unethical or improper professional conduct,"
or to have willfully violated or aided and abetted a violation of the secur-
ities laws or the rules and regulations thereunder.
Id. at 11-12 (footnotes omitted).
394. Id. at 2.
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. Id. "[Tihis provision was obviously prompted by recent disclosures involving
Merrill Lynch, Salomon Smith Barney, and Credit Suisse First Boston, which
appeared to show their analysts contradicting published recommendations or rat-
ings in contemporaneous internal emails." Id.
398. Id. In relation to the prohibitions imposed upon accounting firms, Professor Cof-
fee maintains:
Section 201 contains the Act's most controversial provision regarding
accounting, which prohibits accounting firms from providing a variety of
non-audit services contemporaneously with auditing of any public com-
pany. The services specifically prohibited by the Act are the following:
(1) bookkeeping or other services related to accounting records or finan-
cial statements of the audit client;
(2) financial information systems design and implementation;
(3) appraisal or valuation services, fairness opinions, or contribution-in-
kind reports;
(4) actuarial services;
(5) internal auditing outsourcing services;
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While not exhaustive, the preceding list of SOX provisions shows
clearly that Congress sought to get at the problem of corporate malfea-
sance through singular and fairly limited, timid efforts. 39 9 Sadly, no-
where in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act can an effort to re-regulate the
1990s deregulated industries be found-which most assuredly must
be one important answer to the spate of recent corporate criminality.
One Sarbanes-Oxley area that can be viewed as a small victory for
investor protection and its advocates is the section that increases the
statute of limitations for initiating investor securities actions against
an allegedly bad-acting corporation from one year to two years. 40 0
While the statute of limitations increase is a small part of SOX, it is
important in that Congressional support was sought and eventually
won for protection of U.S investors. Unfortunately, this small victory
is almost completely negated by the fact that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
did not correct, nor endeavor to correct, the impossibly high pleading
standard for plaintiffs promulgated by the PSLRA.401
VI. PROPOSALS FOR RE-REGULATION
Certainly, the picture of malfeasance painted above is bleak and
gloomy. Undoubtedly, the "deregulators" of the Revolution Congress
believed that the corporate executives and industry insiders would be-
have in a fundamentally fair and honest fashion when given the reins
to the most deregulated modern economy and industry in U.S. history.
Unfortunately, for the Contract with America deregulators, massive
fraud, mindboggling dishonesty, and economic disaster were the re-
wards for hastily passing and joyously deregulating crucial U.S. in-
dustries. Federal regulation must be returned in several sectors and
industries in order to once again protect the U.S. consumer and inves-
tor. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act simply does not provide many meaning-
ful regulatory protections.40 2
(6) management functions or human resources;
(7) broker or dealer, investment adviser, or investment banking
services;
(8) legal services and expert services that are unrelated to the audit ....
A compromise is apparent here, because the provision of tax services by
audit firms was not prohibited, and tax services have long been a major
source of income for audit firms, responsible for up to an estimated one
third of audit firm revenues.
Id. at 5-6 (foontotes omitted).
399. See supra note 386 and accompanying text.
400. 28 U.S.C.A 1658(b) (West Supp. 2004).
401. See supra notes 129-30, 135.
402. See supra Part V.
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A. Re-regulation Must Occur To Protect Investors and
Ensure the Integrity of the Capital Markets
To begin, nearly every provision of the PSLRA should be repealed
or softened and replaced with the common-sense regulations that
were in place before the Revolution Congress descended upon Capitol
Hill.403 Excruciating monthly reports detail the efforts of sharehold-
ers and employees seeking to sue Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing,
Tyco, and Adelphia for retribution, only to have most efforts stone-
walled by the PSLRA.404 Not only has the PSLRA prohibited many
shareholders from conducting preemptive suits against malfeasant
companies, 4 0 5 but the PSLRA has blocked aggrieved shareholders and
employees from finding a deserved remedy from the criminally-
charged and admittedly-guilty corporate executives. 4 06 Inexplicably,
Congress offers up SOX as the best that it can do. Congress must un-
dertake to repeal much of the PSLRA, return the standards and regu-
lations that the PSLRA stripped away, and further strengthen the
ability for offended shareholders and employees to hold a corporation
and its management responsible for egregious breaches of public trust
perpetrated by such management.
Further buttressing the argument that the PSLRA was a short-
sighted grab for favor and approval from corporate America by the
104th Congress, at the expense of the U.S. investor and U.S. worker,
is a recently released exhaustive report entitled What Works in Secur-
ities Laws? and written "by a troika of Ivy League economists-
Dartmouth's Rafael La Porta, Yale's Florencio Lopez De Silanes, and
Harvard's Andrei Shleifer."4 07 The study seeks to identify the mark-
403. See supra sections IL.A-C.
404. See Lerach, supra note 13, at 87-88.
405. See supra notes 135-59 and acompanying text (evaluating the PSLRA's super
heightened pleading standard).
406. See supra note 404.
407. Daniel Gross, So Sue Me: What's the Best Way To Punish Corporate Criminals?
With Lawsuits, Not Prison Sentences, SLATE MAG., Sept. 23, 2003, at http://slate.
msn.com/id/2088790. "[A]ccording to [a] study by a troika of Ivy League econo-
mists... stockholders shouldn't hunger for perp walk and criminal persecutions.
In fact, markets develop better when civil-not criminal-law is strong." Id.
Gross, in introducing the study and its important results, reminds the U.S. inves-
tor that:
Sellers rip off buyers: This is a fundamental downside of capitalism.
Governments have three ways to deal with it. They can do nothing and
trust (or hope) that financial and reputation concerns will keep securi-
ties-selling executives on the straight and narrow. (How quaint.) Sec-
ond, they can establish a regime of private enforcement. Governments
establish securities laws that impose disclosure obligations on those who
sell stocks to the public and then provide avenues-i.e., lawsuits and
arbitration-through which wronged investors can try to recoup losses.
The third approach is more explicitly statist: public enforcement. In-
stead of just promulgating rules and letting the private sector fight it
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ers that establish the most efficient and productive worldwide capital
markets:
In what must have been a heavy exercise in data-mining, the economists
examined the 49 largest stock markets in the world, devised "quantitative
measures of security laws and regulations" and indicators of stock market de-
velopment, and then gauged the relationship between the two sets of vari-
ables: data such as the different kinds of liability regimes, the nature of
securities enforcement agencies, and the number of domestic publicly traded
firms in each country relative to its population. They used regression analysis
to determine which variables correlate with more developed stock markets.
Their conclusion is surprising-and surprisingly practical. What works
best, it turns out, is a combination of mandated disclosure (thus allowing the
markets to work their efficient magic) and the ability of plaintiffs' lawyers to
sue the hell out of corrupt CEOs and underwriters.
4 0 8
The study's conclusion is that private lawsuits, combined with com-
mon-sense regulation and governmental control, is by far the most ef-
fective method to manage a national capital market.40 9 In 1995, the
PSLRA effectively weakened one of those vital tools for investors-the
private lawsuit brought by aggrieved U.S. investors. In light of the
study What Works in Securities Laws?, it is little wonder that the mar-
kets collapsed once the private class action was severely constricted.
In 1994 with Central Bank and 1995 with the PSLRA, the Su-
preme Court and Congress respectively weakened substantially that
vital tool for investors-the private lawsuit brought by aggrieved in-
vestors against secondary enablers.410 In light of the study The Effect
of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 on Accounting
Discretion of Client Managers of Big 6 and Non-Big 6 Auditors,411 it is
little wonder that the markets collapsed once the private class action
against secondary actors was severely constricted.412
out, governments create agencies, like the Securities and Exchange
Commission-independent regulators with the power to investigate,
prosecute, and fine. Many countries-including the United States-
combine the second and third options.
Id.
408. Id.
409. See RAFAEL LA PORTA ET AL., WHAT WORKS IN SECURITIES LAws?, NATIONAL Bu-
REAU OF ECONoMIcs RESEARCH WORKING PAPERS SERIES, WORKING PAPER No.
9882 (July 2003) ("We examine the effect of securities laws on stock market de-
velopment in 49 countries. We find almost no evidence that public enforcement
benefits stock markets, and strong evidence that laws facilitating private enforce-
ment through disclosure and liability rules benefit stock markets."), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9882.
410. See supra note 320.
411. Lee & Mande, supra note 107.
412. See Steven A. Ramirez, Fear and Social Capitalism: The Law and Macro-
economics of Investor Confidence, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 31, 61 (2003) ("[I]t is criti-
cally important that not only companies, but associated professionals be held to
account for securities fraud. The PSLRA specifically undercut the liability of
such affiliated professionals.").
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To remedy this lapse in judgment, Congress should act quickly to
repair the PSLRA damage and return the private class action against
corrupt CEOs and underwriters to aggrieved investors. 4 13 Specifi-
cally, Congress must begin by rejecting the "super heightened" plead-
ing standard instituted by the PSLRA414 and replace the pleading
standard with the already effective Rule 9(b) standard, as was re-
quired prior to passage of the PSLRA.415 Congress must act affirma-
tively straightaway and acknowledge its deregulatory failure.
Legislation has been introduced in the House of Representatives to
that end-the Shareholder and Employee Rights Restoration Act of
2003.416 The bill should be given immediate attention and should be
enacted with the haste and pomp that its predecessor, the PSLRA,
was afforded. The appropriate pleading standard must be the Rule
413. On February 5, 2003, Representative Bart Stupak (D-Michigan) introduced a bill
in the House of Representatives that seeks as its primary purpose "[t]o repeal the
provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act and the Securities Liti-
gation Uniform Standards Act that limit private securities actions, and for other
purposes." Shareholder and Employee Rights Restoration Act of 2003, H.R. 636,
108th Cong. (2003). Upon introduction, the bill that seeks to repeal each of the
prohibitive provisions of the PSLRA was referred to the Committee on Financial
Services and to the Committee on the Judiciary, "for a period to be subsequently
determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as
fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned." Id. The bill, as intro-
duced, provides the following:
Shareholder and Employee Rights Restoration Act of 2003-Amends
the Securities Act of 1933 governing private securities litigation to re-
peal: (1) certain limits on private class actions; (2) the safe harbor ap-
plied to forward-looking statements (corporate predictions); (3)
proportionate liability of an outside director; and (4) specified limitations
on class action remedies.
Amends the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to repeal guidelines gov-
erning: (1) the safe harbor applied to corporate predictions; (2) limita-
tions on class actions remedies; (3) court-ordered security for payments
of costs in class actions; (4) motions to dismiss and stay of discovery; (5)
sanctions for abusive litigation; (6) written interrogatories as to defen-
dant's state of mind; (7) limitation on damages; and (8) proportionate
liability.
Modifies guidelines governing a securities fraud action to prohibit a
complaint that is based upon information and belief from specifying the
source of the facts upon which such belief is formed (thus granting whis-
tle blower protection).
Amends the Securities Act of 1933 and the Investment Advisers Act
of 1940 to establish liability for aiding and abetting securities violations.
Amends the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to modify guidelines
governing aiding and abetting.
Extends the statute of limitations for an implied private right of ac-
tion to three years after the date on which the alleged violation was
discovered.
Id.
414. See supra notes 129, 135.
415. See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
416. See H.R. 636, 108th Cong. (2003).
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9(b) heightened standard, which existed prior to passage of the
PSLRA, where aggrieved investors would make colorable claims, be-
come certified as a-class, and-be provided the opportunity, through
discovery, to uncover further deceptions and corruption. Otherwise,
neither Sarbanes-Oxley, nor the market crash of 2002, will dissuade
corrupt corporate executives from attempting to further bamboozle
U.S. investors.4
17
Further, Congress should now remove the dangerous corporate-ex-
ecutive protections for forward-looking statements by repealing the
rules that allow false statements to abide if accompanied by appropri-
ate cautionary language, as originated in the PSLRA.418 As discussed
supra, the safe-harbor provision for forward-looking statements serves
to shield issuers and management from private liability in connection
with these false or misleading statements.4 19 If an issuer accompa-
nies its false or misrepresentative information with "meaningful cau-
tionary statements," then it will escape private liability under the
revised securities laws.420 As eradicating liability for intentional false
projections cannot square with the intent of the drafters of the federal
securities laws in the 1930s, whose primary objective was to protect
investors and to ensure that honest and straightforward information
was being widely disseminated, Congress must act quickly to enact
the Shareholder and Employee Rights Restoration Act of 2003.
Additionally, Congress must discard the nearly impossible aider-
and-abettor standard articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court 4 2 1 and
replace it with the prevailing U.S. Circuit Court interpretation that
was in place prior to Central Bank.422 In order for a plaintiff to now
prevail in a private right of action under an aiding and abetting alle-
gation, Central Bank requires a plaintiff to prove that the harm- done
by the aider and abettor was the "proximate cause" of a defendant's
fraudulent activity.4 2 3 This must be replaced with a "but for" require-
ment.4 24 Rejecting this "proximate cause" standard will make it much
more likely that a victim of securities fraud will be able to hold respon-
sible and liable other parties, apart from the issuer, that assist in the
perpetuation of the corporate fraud-including underwriters, account-
ants, and law firms-which is precisely what is needed in this post-
417. See generally supra notes 407-12 and accompanying text (describing the Securi-
ties Laws study concluding that a combination of sensible federal regulation and
the deterrence of private lawsuits is the hallmark for the most efficient world-
wide capital markets).
418. See supra notes 172-73.
419. See supra notes 172-78 and accompanying text.
420. See id.
421. See supra note 197.
422. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
423. See supra notes 197-204 and accompanying text.
424. See id.
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2002 crash corporate world.4 25 Further, Congress must return the
Rule 11 mandatory sanction provision back to the more appropriate
standard enunciated in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and Con-
gress should repeal the drastic limitations it imposed on class-action
remedies.
4 26
The Revolution Congress sought to severely restrict private securi-
ties class-action lawsuits.4 27 That wrong must be rectified. 428 To re-
pair the damage caused by the PSLRA and to begin to heal the
wounds inflicted upon U.S. investors by the Revolution Congress, Con-
gress merely needs to act upon the proposed House of Representatives
bill that seeks to repeal the PSLRA.429 Further, Congress simply
needs to repeal the "super heightened" pleading standard, allowing se-
curities fraud pleadings to default to Rule 9(b) requirements, which
adequately protected corporate interests prior to 1995 and the
PSLRA.430
B. To Those that Reject Federal Regulation as a Solution
While re-regulation may appear abundantly, even crystal, clear as
a solution to those forces that caused the market crash of 2002, many
in Washington, D.C. still maintain that re-regulation will hurt the
country and the U.S. economy. 4 3 1 Despite those that cling to the idea
425. See generally supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
426. See supra notes 192-96 and accompanying text.
427. See supra note 139.
428. See generally supra notes 407-12 and accompanying text (describing the Securi-
ties Laws study concluding that a combination of sensible federal regulation and
the deterrence of private lawsuits is the hallmark for the most efficient world-
wide capital markets).
429. See supra note 413.
430. See supra subsection II.A.2.
431. See David Ho, FCC Chief Says Move to Regulation Could Hurt Economy: Powell
Decries D.C. "Mood Swing" in Aspen Speech, DENV. POST, Aug. 18, 2003. Ho re-
ports that:
Federal Communications Commission Chairman Michael Powell said to-
day the threat of terrorism and the "despicable activity" of some compa-
nies has led to a shift toward more regulation that could harm
innovation and the economy. "I do see a mood swing in Washington. I
see a mood swing in the country," Powell said at the Aspen Summit, a
technology and telecommunications summit held by the Progress and
Freedom Foundation, a Washington think tank. Powell said he worries
about the rising belief that regulations do a better job than free markets
because "the telecommunications sector and the high-tech sector are at a
point in history where they can ill afford to be lined up with that kind of
thinking." He also said industry bears much of the blame. The litany of
corporate fraud cases has undermined the public trust and generated
support for more regulations.
Id. But see Morrissey, supra note 203, at 826-27 (disputing the notion that more
regulation would harm the U.S. economy). Professor Morrissey points to a differ-
ent cost analysis in connection with adoption of the PSLRA:
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of deregulation in today's corporate climate, even leading administra-
tion officials acknowledge, however begrudgingly, that the public con-
tinues to cry out for protection from corporate malfeasors and from
congressional enablers:
"The despicable activity engaged in by Enron and MCI and Adelphia-and the
list is long-violates the trust of their employees, violates the trust of the mar-
ket, violates the trust of consumers and people cry out to be protected," [FCC
Chairperson Michael Powell] said. Powell said the government must respond,
but should avoid going too far.
4 3 2
Further, in recent election campaigns, in the face of the deregulatory
disaster of the 1990s, holdovers from the Revolution Congress are still
championing the importance of electing them so as to continue to der-
egulate crucial U.S. industries. 43 3
C. Specific Regulations Must Be Adopted
As discussed in some detail previously, Congress must now be will-
ing to adopt specific regulations in order to protect consumers, safe-
guard investors, and ensure that future market collapses, such as the
Commentators have widely described the passage.., as a direct result of
corporate lobbyists and the professionals who serve them persuading
Congress that corporations were routinely being victimized by. strike
suits-frivolous law suits brought merely to force the corporations into
extortionist settlements....
While Congress was focusing its energies on putting an end to those
strike suits, statistics pointed clearly to the opposite conclusion-that
the value of the fraudulent schemes being committed and not subjected
to litigation vastly outweighed the value of the supposed notorious strike
suits threatening corporations.
Id. at 826; see also Stout, supra note 132, at 713-15.
432. Ho, supra note 431 (emphasis added).
433. See Jay Bookman, Enron Just Tip of Corruption that Runs Deep, ATLANTA J.-
CONST., June 20, 2002, at 18A. Bookman reports that in Senator Bill Frist's (R-
Tennessee) 2002 reelection campaign, Frist sought out corporate officers and lob-
byists to remind them that in the wake of Enron, that GOP control of the Senate
was critical to continuing to deregulate corporate America. See id.
Clearly, the accounting industry's system of self-regulation has been
a dismal failure. However, efforts to reform that system have been
blocked to date by Republican opposition in Congress. To understand
why, consider a letter written by U.S. Sen., Bill Frist (R-Tenn.) inviting
corporate officers and lobbyists to attend a GOP fund-raising dinner
Wednesday night. In his letter, Frist reminded contributors that if the
GOP regained Senate control, it was committed to "relax the strangle-
hold of rules, regulations and restrictions on American business."
Apparently that message went over well, since the dinner-high-
lighted by a speech by President Bush-raised well over $28 million in
soft money for the GOP.
Id. Inexplicable. In the face of Enron, Global Crossing, and with WorldCom just
about to drop, Republican leadership, having deregulated industries to the point
of market failure, were continuing to campaign to "relax the stranglehold of rules,
regulations and restrictions on American business." Senator Frist, just 35 or so
days later, voted to support enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley.
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market crash of 2002, are not enabled by ill-conceived federal legisla-
tion. Specifically, Congress must set about to repeal large portions of
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. Congress must also re-
regulate certain sectors of the telecom industry, namely the cable tele-
vision sector and the Internet region. Congress must also set about
reexamining its Telecommunications Act enactments to determine
where it failed in promoting and encouraging competition in the local
telephone industry and the international carrier segment of the tele-
phone zone. Additionally, Congress must examine its failings in en-
acting deregulating telephone legislation that enabled WorldCom,
Global Crossing, and Qwest to deceive U.S. investors and perpetrate
massive frauds upon the capital markets.
In addition, Congress must begin immediately to enact laws that
will serve to regulate the trading of commodity derivatives, particu-
larly the regulation of private corporations engaged in commodity fu-
tures trading. 43 4 Congress should shoulder the responsibility of
failing to heed the calls of those espousing regulation of the commod-
ity futures trading market,4 35 realize the errors that allowed Enron,
El Paso, and Dynegy to devastate the capital markets and the U.S.
economy, and humbly enact regulation that will provide CFTC over-
sight of all commodity futures trading, particularly amongst private
corporations that may use such speculative trading to hide massive
losses and generate mythical revenues. 4 36
VII. CONCLUSION
The Revolution Congress's clarion call of "deregulation" and reform
that accompanied the revolution class into power in 1995 is nothing
now if not a faint reminder of the abject failure of most of the 104th
Congress's deregulatory efforts. A stark token of the 104th Congress's
efforts are: a telecommunications industry in chaos; collapsed U.S.
capital markets that continue to struggle to right themselves, despite
five years of Administration calls that all is well; a derivatives trading
industry that enabled the greatest corporate collapse in U.S. history;
disbelieving investors with no confidence in corporate executives; dis-
enfranchised U.S. employees; a jobless rate that refuses to decline;
and, absent the tragic distraction of 9/11, a complete joylessness in
corporate, blue collar, and inner-city America.
Despite quick passage of the weak Sarbanes-Oxley Act, despite a
war effort-that has traditionally been a harbinger of better economic
times-despite continued assurance by politicians that the economy is
434. See supra section III.B. The need for regulating commodity derivatives will be
detailed in a future article.
435. See supra notes 289-303 and accompanying text.
436. See generally supra sections VI.A-B.
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improving, and despite the arrest and jailing of several of the corpo-
rate criminals implicated in the crash of 2002, things simply are still
amiss. 1990s deregulation must be deserted. The PSLRA has failed
to protect anyone, other than corporate malfeasors.43 7 The Telecom-
munications Act has failed to provide competition, jobs, and the prom-
ised economic upsurge. The CFMA, in a costly refusal to regulate has
given the U.S. investor "Enron" as a common curse word for corporate
excess and all that is wrong with current protections for
corporations. 4 38
The regulations that were abandoned a decade ago need to be re-
turned to the citizens of the United States. The PSLRA must be re-
jected, so that private investors once again can wield a realistic sword
of an impending class action against offending and offensive corporate
executives. Certain of the repealed regulations under the Telecommu-
nications Act must be returned-so that true competition can be gen-
erated between those monopolists in the industry-before any dream
of true deregulation can be entertained. The commodity derivatives
trading industry, particularly derivatives trading amongst private
parties, must come under new regulation imposed through the Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission. Perhaps then will the pain of
the market collapse of 2002 be averted in the future.
437. For an argument that the PSLRA has worked in a limited way, see Perino, supra
note 121.
438. See Greenwood, supra note 82, at 774 (describing "Enronitis" as a new definition
for corporate corruption.) Professor Greenwood writes:
Enronitis. (n., neologism derived from Enron, a large company that
went bankrupt amid allegations of market manipulation, phony account-
ing, looting, and other corporate misbehavior)
1. A malfunction of corporate governance in which top managers be-
come extraordinarily wealthy while misleading shareholders, creditors,
employees and the general public about the company's prospects and
practices, eventually resulting in share price collapse, loss of jobs, and,
in extreme cases, the corporation's bankruptcy. ... Often accompanied
by sudden collapse of the reputations of seemingly upstanding corporate
citizens who turn out to have been routinely lying, not only to sharehold-
ers, but to their own boards, employees, tax authorities, etc.
Id. at 774-75.
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